If these institutions had not been broken down by the abuses which hastened the fall of the Persian monarchy, they would have formed a considerable set-off against all the inevitable evils which accompany despotic governments. However considerable might be the expense occasioned by the maintenance of the king, his satraps, and forces, it cannot have been oppressive in countries blessed with such singular fertility, where the imposts were chiefly paid in kind, so long as wise enactments for the cultivation of the soil tended to lighten these burdens; but the extravagance and luxury of the great, and their frequent revolts and intestine wars, caused these sage laws to fall into disuse, and frustrated the benevolent intentions of the Median legislator.
The disposal of the government of provinces rested with the king, who usually appointed kinsmen of his own, his brothers, or his sons-in-law. The court of the satrap was formed on that of the monarch, and all its ceremonial the same, only less magnificent. The satraps also had their harems, entrusted, like that of the monarch, to eunuchs, and a numerous attendance of household troops, distinct from the king’s soldiers, and consisting in part or altogether of Persians: their residences, like those of the monarch, were surrounded by parks; and occasionally, in the finer months of the year, they (like the monarch) migrated from one place to another, attended by their courts, and spent the summer under tents.
History has afforded us a remarkable instance of the manner in which the imposts were collected by these officers. When the Persians had subdued Ionia the second time, the whole territory was measured out by parasangs, and the tribute apportioned accordingly. In this case it was evidently a land tax, which, however, was paid, it is probable, for the most part in produce. The satrap received these imposts, whether in kind or in money, and after providing for his own expenditure, the support of the king’s troops, and the maintenance of the civil magistrates, the remainder was handed over to the king. The personal interest of the satrap, if he wished to retain the king’s favour, prompted him to make this return as considerable as possible, even if no precise amount was fixed.
To take care of the king’s interests there were also attached to the court of each satrap royal scribes, to whom were issued the king’s commands, and by whom they were communicated to the satrap. The commands thus conveyed required the most prompt obedience, and the smallest resistance was accounted rebellion. Even the suspicion of anything of the kind was sufficient to cause their ruin, and, as in the Turkish empire, their punishment was unaccompanied by any formality whatever. The sovereign despatched an emissary, who delivered the order for the execution of a satrap to his guards, who put it in execution by hewing him down upon the spot with their sabres.
To further the speedy communication with the provinces, a system was adopted which has been compared, but very improperly, with the European institution of posts. Messengers were appointed at different stations, distant from each other a day’s journey, for the purpose of conveying the king’s mandates to the satraps, and the despatches of the latter to the court.
Institutions of this kind are peculiarly essential to despotic governments, in which it is excessively difficult to maintain the dependence of the prefects or governors, and occur in almost every one which possesses anything like an internal organization. The same existed under the Roman monarchy, and was established, at still greater expense, in the empire of the Mongols, by the successors of Jenghiz-Khan.
Another plan was also adopted by the Persian monarchs for securing the allegiance of their satraps. A commissioner at the head of an army was sent every year, with authority, according to circumstances, to uphold or chastise those officers; and Xenophon assures us that this custom, which dated from the commencement of the empire, subsisted in his time. The design at first undoubtedly was, as in other kingdoms similarly governed, to collect the outstanding tribute; but when we consider the power and arrogance of the satraps during the latter half of the Persian monarchy, we may well believe that the custom may have died away.
We have already described in general the causes of the presumption of the satraps and the revolts to which it led. Besides the union in their persons of the civil and military powers, one main cause was the greatness of the command entrusted to some by joining together two or more satrapies. An example of this, and of the arrogance to which it gave rise, occurs as early as the reign of Darius Hystaspes in the person of Orœtes, who was at the same time satrap of Phrygia and Lydia; and in succeeding reigns this practice became still more frequent, especially in the case of the satrapies of Asia Minor. Cyrus the younger was governor of the greater part of that peninsula, and, after his death, Tissaphernes was allowed to hold the governments possessed by him in addition to those which had been all along his own.
From this period Persian history continues to present a constant picture of the perpetually increasing arrogance of these viceroys, who sometimes openly revolted, and sometimes, with the title of satrap, set themselves up as independent sovereigns. Several of them were, in fact, the founders of monarchies, which, like those of Cappadocia, Pontus, and others, gradually became more or less independent. The combinations and dissensions of these governors among themselves contributed to keep alive a spirit of insubordination, which was promoted by the effeminacy and corruption of the court. They began to treat their provinces, not as districts committed to their care, but as territories, the revenues of which they were to enjoy; and as early as the time of Xenophon, we find a satrap of Mysia arbitrarily nominating a vice-satrap, to whom, on payment of a tribute, he committed the management of his province, and after his death continued the same to his widow on security being given of the payment of his revenues. Such arbitrary measures must have gradually destroyed the internal structure of the empire, and the slightness of the adherence of its several parts is effectually proved by the history of its fall.
MILITARY METHODS
The military expeditions undertaken by a nomad nation, such as the Persians once were, are, in their origin, migrations, for the purpose of occupying better and more fruitful spots. Hence the custom of removing at the same time their wives and children and all their movable possessions, which invariably encumbered the march of such armaments. Xenophon expressly tells us that this was the practice of most Asiatic nations, and that it was an old Persian custom would appear from the sequel of their history.
In like manner the habits of nomad nations necessarily causes such armaments to consist altogether or principally of cavalry. The first was the case with the Mongols; the last with the Persians. As the first-mentioned practice retards, so does this greatly accelerate the march of their armies. The limited nature of their wants enables them, when occasion requires, to dispense with any baggage, and the history of the Mongols affords examples of the inconceivable speed with which such armies have accomplished lengthened marches which would have driven a European army to despair.
Costume of a Persian King
(After Du Sommerard)
These are the fundamental points to be observed with regard to the military system of nomad nations in general and the Persians in particular; but as their civil constitution became gradually developed, so did their military institutions undergo at all events considerable modifications, although they never attained the perfection which marks those of Europe. The example of the Turkish empire continues to show with what difficulty an Asiatic, who is always half a nomad, can be inured to discipline. As this is the offspring of a sense of honour and love of country, so, on the other hand, despotism is the parent of license and brutality, which may indeed display their energies in furious onsets, but not in deeds of cool daring like those of Europeans.