LATER ISLAMITE MOVEMENTS
The Arabs of Arabia (as has been said before) have long since lost the place in the history of the world which they once occupied under circumstances wholly exceptional. Only twice since then has a strong movement made itself felt in at least the nearest of Islamite lands. In the tenth century the Karmates, a secret sect of Persian origin, hostile to the Abbasid caliphs and, at bottom, to Islam altogether, established themselves firmly in a part of northeastern Arabia, very difficult of access. Their leaders succeeded in winning over many Bedouins by the prospect of booty, and thus caravans of pilgrims were frequently massacred or robbed of all they possessed; some of the large cities of Babylonia were several times captured and pillaged; Mecca itself was taken during the pilgrim festival; the sacrosanct Black Stone carried off (930), and an end put to pilgrimages for a time. These proceedings were accomplished by much bloodshed. The Black Stone was ultimately restored after an interval of twenty-one years, on payment of a heavy ransom. The Karmates were secretly in league with the Fatimites, the anti-caliph dynasty in Africa, which claimed descent from Ali and Fatima, the daughter of Mohammed. They sank back into insignificance by slow degrees.[28] A connection of some sort exists between the above-mentioned occurrences and the migration of certain Bedouin tribes, under the auspices of the Fatimites, from Arabia to Upper Egypt and remoter parts of northern Africa, where they committed great ravages (eleventh century).
And in the eighteenth century the puritanic movement of Abd al-Wahhab arose in the heart of Arabia, with the object of restoring Islam to its pristine purity and repudiating all innovations that had crept in by lapse of time, from the veneration of the tombs of saints to the smoking of tobacco. The Wahhabees brought the greater part of Arabia, inclusive of the holy cities, under their influence for a while, exacted a minute observation of the precepts of religion, bore strict rule in all things, and established a condition of peace such as that country, predestinate to lawlessness, had not known since the days of the caliphate. The Wahhabees were heretics inasmuch as they did not regard the “catholic” principle, which had won acceptance in Islam, that all things adopted by the consensus of the whole church were binding upon all men; though of course the fiction was kept up that this consensus was invariably in harmony with the original character of the faith. They, on the contrary, held in all seriousness the principle, which was universally recognised in theory, that every innovation in the sphere of religion was wholly reprehensible.
The great simplicity of the religion of Mohammed made it possible to effect the restoration of its pristine purity in a far higher degree than the mighty efforts of the sixteenth and subsequent centuries could effect a return to primitive Christianity; and besides, the conditions of contemporary life in Arabia were not widely different from those that had prevailed in the time of the prophet. A few of the theologians of the Ottoman empire actually recognised the Wahhabees as orthodox. These fanatical zealots were, however, obnoxious to the Turkish government for more reasons than one, and hence their power was broken by Muhammed Ali of Egypt, after a desperate struggle. Wahhabism actually exists to this day in the interior of Arabia, but under two mutually hostile dynasties and (in spite of having occasionally sent its emissaries as far as India) without any great prospect of spreading. It is firmly rooted only among the non-nomadic Arabs. The Bedouins never obey a Wahhabee ruler except under compulsion. They are at all times loath to serve a master, and though animated by the Moslem spirit, they are very negligent in the performance of their religious duties. They do not even hesitate to extort all they possibly can from pilgrim caravans, either by openly waylaying them or by levying toll for the privilege of passing through their territory. Taken as a whole, the life of the Bedouin of to-day still bears a strong resemblance to that of his ancestors long ago, but his intellectual level seems to have sunk from the height it maintained at the time of Mohammed. Even the number of places in Arabia suitable for agriculture appears to have diminished through the neglect and decay of irrigation.
The fact that a few points on the coast are of some importance to European commerce and politics is of no consequence to the country as a whole, at least for the present.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies, pp. 295; 304 ff.; Schrader, Keilschrift und Geschichtsforschung, pp. 202, 261.
[2] In Jeremiah iii, 2 and xxv, 24; Ezekiel xxvii, 21; xxx, 5; Jeremiah xiii, 20 (from the end of the Captivity); Jeremiah xxi, 13, ערב is “desert.”
[3] Die alte Geographie Arabiens, p. 293. Berne, 1875.
[4] Cf. S. A. Barton. A Sketch of Semitic Origins (New York, 1902), Ch. 1, where the various opinions of the subject are compared.
[5] Var. Σαρακηνοί as a tribe.
[6] Cureton, Spicilegium Syriacum, 16 ult.
[7] The powerful Shammar of the present day, some who live in Nejd, the ancient home of the tribe, and some in the Mesopotamian desert, belong to the Tai.
[8] That whole peoples should be called after certain frontier tribes by neighbouring nations is not altogether an unusual phenomenon, as everybody knows.
[9] These forms have to a certain extent survived to our own day, as the name of an Iranian people in Transirania and elsewhere, who accepted the Arab religion earlier than their neighbours and were consequently called “Arabs.” In the same way later Syrians often call all Moslems “Taits.”
[10] Acta Martyr. ed. St. Ev. Assemani, 2, 345, 1.
[11] Migne, Patrol. græca, 79, LXXIX, 611 seqq.
[12] The proper translation of εὐδαὶμων in this connection. The usual felix or the Horatian beatus (Carm. 1, 29, 1) is like our “happy,” too strong.