5See Norman Anderson, The Teachings of Jesus (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity, 1983).
6For details on this message and its centrality, see Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic, chapters 4-5, Appendix 3, and Habermas and Moreland, chapter 9, for more on the confirmation of this theme.
7Of the remaining sources on the death of Jesus, twelve are from creedal texts, including the important traditions in the book of Acts.
8These sources include the early creeds in 1 Cor. 15:3ff. and Acts 13:29, as well as hostile sources such as Toledoth Jesu and the information implied in the Nazareth decree. The Shroud of Turin is perhaps helpful, even if it did not belong to Jesus, since it evidences post-crucifixion burial.
9See chapter 7, pp. 159-165 for more details.
10See p. 160 for a list of these evidences that are based on the accepted historical facts.
11See pp. 152-157 for details.
12See chapter 7, pp. 161-167 for details.
13For instance, the evidence of the Nazareth Decree (see pp. 176-177) and the assertions of Tacitus and Suetonius that Jesus’ teachings broke out again in Palestine after his death are other avenues that might be explored. The direct testimonies of Josephus and Phlegon are the most helpful in arguing for this event from non-New Testament sources.
14See Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic.
Part Three
Appendixes
Appendix 1:
Historiography
History is much more than simply memorizing names and dates. Some of its inclusive aspects involve various sorts of theories about the nature of past events, analyzing trends, and the actual process of gathering evidence in order to ascertain what happened. A cognate discipline, philosophy of history, investigates the theoretical underpinnings of the discipline of history itself. In this chapter we will begin with a preliminary notion of history. Then we will provide a critique of those who question the amount of objective knowledge that can be gained from this discipline. Lastly, we will give an overview of the method of historical investigation.1
A Concept of History
The term “history” is used variously by different scholars. No uniform definition is agreed upon by everyone, while numerous approaches and interpretations are commonly utilized.2 It is not our purpose to treat these contemporary notions. Still, there is at least some general agreement concerning the concept of history.
Historians generally recognize that their subject includes at least two major factors — the actual events in particular and the recording of these events. So this discipline is chiefly concerned with what has happened and how these events have been annotated and interpreted. This conception comprises the core understanding of history as it will be used in this book. Other elements are certainly involved, but these two major ideas are essential and recur most often, composing the foundation of historiography.
A couple of other factors are relevant to this discussion and should also be mentioned briefly. First, there is always a subjective factor involved whenever history is recorded. To give just one example, the historian must select the material that she will (and will not) present. The historical event itself is objective — generally we speak in terms of it occurring or not occurring. But the recording and interpreting of the event introduces various subjective factors.
For W.H. Walsh, the subjectivity of the writer is certainly present, but it does not keep us from obtaining historical truth. This subjectivity must be allowed for, but its effects can be offset.3 Our approach towards history ought to be one of caution, since we need to recognize this subjective bias and then make the proper allowances for it.4
Perhaps an example of this subjective factor would be helpful. In ancient history, the writings of Tacitus provide a case in point. It is known that this Roman historian was prejudiced in his writing, presenting an “aristocratic bias” and being convicted that moralizing was the “highest function” of history. Other times inaccuracies tarnish his text, as when he credits speeches to people who never gave them or incorrectly reports details in battle accounts. Moses Hadas maintains that the interpretations of Tacitus “must often be challenged” since he “could see only through his own lenses which were strongly colored.”5
Does this mean that Tacitus must be rejected as a trustworthy source for ancient Roman history? Do these subjective elements found in his writings invalidate the information that he seeks to impart to his readers? As strange as it may seem, Hadas paradoxically states that Tacitus was Rome’s greatest historian.6
Then he explains:
One may well ask how trustworthy the resultant history is. A modern historian guilty of such faults would surely lose all credit. . . . With allowance made for rhetorical embellishment customary in his day, and within the limits of distortion which his own views of morality and politics make inevitable, Tacitus never consciously sacrifices historical truth.7
Michael Grant illustrates how Tacitus is not an isolated case in ancient times. The Greek Herodotus blended legends and anecdotal material into his histories, while another Roman, Livy, allowed for the operation of omens. Even worse, both Livy and Tacitus are examples of ancient historians who wrote about events that took place long before their time, sometimes as much as five centuries earlier. The results indicate frequent inconsistencies and contradictions in these ancient writings.8
But modern historians do not despair about reconstructing ancient times. As Hadas explained, scholars can make allowance not only for the subjective facets involved in the recording and interpretation of events, but even for incorrect data. The reconstructing of ancient history relies on the ability of the scholar to determine the facts of the past in spite of these deterrents.9
We employed some of these same principles when we investigated the resurrection of Jesus in the above chapters. Although the events occurred many centuries ago, historical investigation is still capable of ascertaining objective data.
Second, history cannot reach a point where it is positive of its findings in all instances. As with physics, medicine, and other inductive disciplines, there is also a certain amount of dependence on probability in history, as well.10 Ernest Nagel, for example, concedes that his deterministic view of history opposes the almost unanimous convictions of contemporary physicists. Such scientific conclusions have had an effect on historians, for the accepted scientific view against a deterministic universe has helped to turn historians in the same direction.11
Nagel tabulates five primary reasons for the general rejection of historical determinism by so many historians today. First, there are no developmental laws or patterns in history. No principles or precepts exist that would determine certain outcomes in advance of their occurrence. Second, history cannot be predicted, in spite of frequently-repeated ideas to the contrary. Past events or other such data do not determine the future. The third argument concerns the appearance of novel events and configurations of new ideas that recur throughout history.
Fourth, unexpected or chance events outside the ordinary are also a part of history. The fifth argument is the conflicting results that occur when one attempts to apply the concept of a deterministic world to the freedom and moral duty of human beings. Such freedom requires a creative aspect in history arising from human choice.