Some examples of Nagel’s five points might be helpful. Who could have predicted the wide dissemination of views brought about by a novel culture from a war-like community in third century BC Macedonia? Or who could have anticipated the creative civilization that would grow from a barbaric people situated on the banks of the Tiber River that would finally emerge in the first century BC? These and other similar findings have convinced many historians to reject the deterministic view of history. Again, Nagel asserts that the opposition to determinism in modern physics has also been a key factor, exercising a direct influence on most historians.12
So historians generally recognize the necessity of couching conclusions in probabilistic terms. Wand points out that we cannot be as sure of historical investigation as some have thought in the past. Our judgments must be made according to which facts are most likely in terms of the historical evidence.13
However, we must carefully note a critical detail of special importance. The concept of probability does not preclude our achieving certainty in matters of well-established historical findings. Events that are validated by careful historical research (and especially those established for long periods of time) in the absence of viable contrary findings are proven facts. The best-established historical events are those that are confirmed by careful research into the relevant data, especially when it has repeatedly withstood the eye of critical scrutiny. The possibility of future reevaluation does not preclude present certainty. After all, we cannot hold in abeyance all of history, science, or other inductive areas of study, in the constant fear that something may be challenged!
If additional data do cast doubt on an event, it might be necessary to reopen the investigation. But precluding such contrary material, the fact may be viewed as certain, or as provisional proof. For instance, we need not doubt the death of Julius Caesar by assassination, Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, or the election of Abraham Lincoln as the sixteenth president of the United States of America. These facts are well-established at this time and thus proven to be certain.14
In this sense, the historian may achieve objective data when he has accurately performed his investigation, applied the appropriate standards of criticism, and determined the outcome according to the canons of reliability. The scholar also needs to be open to additional challenges, entailing further defense and/or adjustment.
It has not been our purpose to deal exhaustively with the concept of history.15 Yet, a contemporary treatment of the subject ought to include at least these components. We will refer to history as both the occurrence of past events, as well as the recording and interpreting of them. Recognizing the inevitable influence of a subjective element when history is written, allowance must be made for it in order for objective data to be obtained. Realizing also that history deals with probabilities, we need to ascertain as nearly as possible those facts that best fit the data.
As is the case with probabilities and uncertainties, any event is possible. Such is the nature of inductive studies. Therefore, events ought not be ruled out (either scientifically or historically) before they are researched. A thorough investigation of the evidence is required. Events that are firmly established by historical investigation may be regarded as certain, proven by the available data.
Historical Analysis and Objectivity16
But some scholars have downplayed the objective element, preferring to emphasize the more subjective role of the historian. This was especially the case with certain trends from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. W.H. Walsh enumerates some of these subjective factors, dividing them into four categories: the personal preferences of the researcher, group prejudices, differing concepts of historical interpretation, and worldview conflicts.17 More in agreement with this emphasis, Charles Beard produces similar reasons.18
But since the middle of this century, most historians have preferred a synthesis of the objective and subjective outlooks. These scholars both pursue past facts by utilizing the more objective tools of historical research, while still attempting to take seriously the limitations imposed by various sorts of subjective factors. In brief, though various outside influences are admitted, we still have at our disposal significant historical means of researching the past and deciding what occurred.19
There are numerous reasons why so many contemporary scholars opt for this synthesis between discovering objective facts in spite of subjective limitations. Personal biases can distort the interpretation of data and thereby affect one’s conclusions. However, to hold that these factors cannot be overcome and are so serious that they must necessarily nullify all historical conclusions is to stumble into a host of errors. Recent historians and philosophers who study this subject have noted numerous problems with relativistic hypotheses, which have accounted for the fact that this outlook has “suffered a decline in status.”20
1. Self-contradiction
First, and quite devastating to relativistic claims, the statement that all historical knowledge is relative is self-contradictory. Nagel argues that when such a claim is made, at least one objective conclusion is known, so there could well be others.21 Christopher Blake explains the criticism in slightly different terms: “either Relativism is wrong or, if it is correct, then it is itself only a relative verdict . . . .”22
Amazingly, even Charles Beard (frequently recognized as the “foremost spokesman” for historical relativism23) fully admits this problem. In fact, it could scarcely be stated in any stronger or more forceful terms than his:
Contemporary criticism shows that the apostle of relativity is destined to be destroyed by the child of his own brain. If all historical conceptions are merely relative to passing events . . . then the conception of relativity is itself relative. When absolutes in history are rejected the absolutism of relativity is also rejected. . . . the conception of relativity will also pass, as previous conceptions and interpretations of events have passed. . . . the skeptic of relativity will disappear in due course. . . . the apostle of relativity will surely be executed by his own logic.24
2. Logical fallacy
Second, to assert that subjective biases must nullify or overcome objective procedures is to argue in a non-sequitur manner. Morton White insists that, “The mere fact that historians are biased is no argument against the existence of impersonal standards . . . .” To hold that bias nullifies all historical knowledge is fallacious, just as it would be to declare that a physician’s feelings about her patient’s sickness prevents her from making a proper diagnosis.25 Ernest Nagel concurs: “the bare fact that inquiry is selective [is] no valid ground for doubting the objectively warranted character of its conclusions . . . .”26
3. Inconsistency
Third, another indication of the inadequacy of relativistic approaches to historiography is that these historians fail to carry out the skepticism of their own position, perhaps because there would be no history to write. So, in spite of their relativism, they pursue the writing of the actual occurrences of history. White criticizes Beard’s skeptical approach, in that it did not affect Beard’s “own scientific work” on “the essence of history.”27 For instance, Beard considered his own work on an economic understanding of the Constitution28 to be “objective and factual.”29 Meyerhoff also recognizes this problem, stating that “Beard never reached a satisfactory middle ground” between the objective and subjective elements in his own historiography.30