I hand this to him. He reads the tag and opens the bag.
“A number of items of jewelry,” he says.
Kline gives me a look, a pained expression, as if I were leaving him suspended in air. He doesn’t sit but drifts to the witness for a look over my shoulder.
“And where did this particular jewelry come from?”
“The police department,” says DeShield.
“And where did they get it?”
“From the defendant’s home,” he says. “It’s contained in an inner bag signed by Detective Stobel, and there is an inventory sheet,” he says.
“And you retrieved this from the police department with the special master?”
“I did.”
“Why did you do this?”
“Because the prosecution was not going to place it in evidence,” he says.
“Objection,” says Kline. “How could he know that?”
“It’s a given,” I say. “You have closed your case and the jury has not seen it.”
Radovich nods. “Overruled. The answer will stand.”
“Do you know whether this is all the jewelry belonging to the defendant?”
“I’m told that it’s all the jewelry belonging to the defendant that the police found when they conducted a search of his home.”
“And do you know whether they examined it for chemical composition, or comparison to the traces of metal found on the victim’s coffee table?”
“I’m informed that they did. I have a copy of their report.”
All the reasons you don’t want to bury unproductive evidence. The other side will beat you over the head with it.
“And what did they find?” I ask.
“They were able to exclude every piece as not consistent with the chemical composition of the traces of metal found on the table.”
“And have you examined the jewelry belonging to the defendant?”
“I have.”
“And do you confirm the findings of the police crime laboratory that this jewelry belonging to the defendant does not correspond to the chemical composition of the trace metals found on that table?”
“I do.”
“And have you examined these pieces of jewelry to determine if any of them contain tool marks corresponding to the ridges on that table?”
“I have.”
“And what did you find?”
“None of the pieces contain such tool marks.”
“And to your knowledge, all of this information was available to the police, was it not?”
“Yes.”
Kline looks at me at this moment, seething with anger.
“Thank you. Your witness.”
He cannot resist the obvious question, even before he reaches the podium.
“Mr. DeShield,” he says, “did you not just tell us that the item of jewelry in question is likely to have been ripped off of the perpetrator?”
“It’s a distinct possibility,” says the witness.
“Then isn’t it probable that the item in question would not have been in the defendant’s home when the police searched it?”
“That’s true,” says DeShield, “but then I would have assumed that the police would have found it at the scene.”
Acosta actually grabs my arm and chuckles when he hears DeShield’s reply. This sticks like a burning hot poker from Kline’s ass, the thought that police not only buried their findings on the jewelry from Acosta’s house, but may have destroyed evidence when they discovered that it did not belong to their principal suspect.
Kline looks at Stobel, who actually shrugs his shoulders, a whaddya-gonna-do kind of expression.
“Isn’t it possible that the defendant removed it before he left,” says Kline, “and discarded it?”
“Objection, calls for speculation.” I’m up out of my chair.
“Sustained,” says Radovich.
“No more speculative than that we should have found it at the scene,” says Kline.
“You asked the question,” says the judge.
Kline fumbles at the podium with a yellow pad. His pen lands on the floor and he has to stoop for it. When he comes up, he is clearly puzzled, and pissed.
This is clearly not his finest hour. There is some shuffling in the jury box, and after several seconds Kline finally regroups and finds his place in his notes.
“Now. Now. You say,” he says, “that positive identification is possible. Exactly how specific could one of these tests be to determine what you called positive identification, the metal scrapings with the jewelry?”
“Which test are you talking about?” says DeShield.
“Well, any of them?” says Kline, like take your pick. He is obviously angry with the witness.
“As I said, given the gold content of the trace metals taken from the table, chemical analysis would not be useful to determine a positive identification with a specific piece of jewelry. But tool marks are another matter.”
“Yes,” says Kline. “The tool marks. How specific could you be in that regard?”
“I couldn’t say for certain until I examined it, but. .”
“Then you haven’t seen this jewelry?”
“Objection. Counsel should allow the witness to answer the question before interrupting,” I say.
“Sorry,” says Kline.
“As I was saying,” says DeShield, “an examination of the jewelry I believe would be dispositive. I believe that the marks would permit a definitive identification.”
“Then you haven’t seen the jewelry?” Kline is obsessed with this. By now he is thinking we must have it, holding it for a dramatic moment, but how?
“I haven’t seen it. Not yet,” says DeShield.
This sets Kline off.
“Then you know where it is?” he says.
“No.”
“You just said you haven’t seen it yet.”
“That’s what I said.”
“Does Mr. Madriani have it?”
“I don’t know.”
Kline looks at me and for a moment I actually wonder if he’s going to demand that I take the stand.
“Your Honor, we have a right to know if the defense is withholding evidence,” says Kline.
“Your Honor.” I jump in before Radovich can say anything. “We’re aware of the rules of reciprocal discovery. I will assure the court here and now that we have not violated them. We’ve produced everything to date that the law requires us to produce. Beyond that we cannot be compelled.”
This is a legalism that does not satisfy Kline.
“Your Honor, a straight answer,” he says.
“In chambers,” says Radovich. He gavels down. “Five-minute recess.”
Inside it are Harry and I, Kline and Stobel. Kline is animated, clearly angered by my antics of hide-the-ball. He is telling the judge that he has figured it out.
“The item of jewelry is being held by Lenore Goya,” he says. “Her fingerprint on the victim’s door. Now it all makes sense,” says Kline.
“Is this true?” says Radovich.
“I don’t know what he’s talking about,” I say.
“You have the missing jewelry,” he says. “It no doubt belongs to his client,” Kline tells Radovich. “All the pieces fit. It’s how she muscled her way into the case.”
“Who?” says Radovich.
“Goya,” says Kline.
He calls it extortion, and Radovich cuts him off.
“I don’t want to hear any more of that,” he says.
Kline comes off like a man on the edge.
“A straight answer.” Radovich looks at me. “Do you have the missing item or not?”
“I don’t have it,” I say. All the inflection is on the personal pronoun, which sets Kline off again.
“If anybody else has it, I don’t know about it,” I say.
“No games,” says Radovich. “I won’t have games here.”
“Well, he’s playing games,” says Kline.
“No games,” I say. “We may, I admit, have theories. But theories are not discoverable,” I tell the judge.
“You know where it is?” he says.
“I don’t know anything,” I tell him.
Radovich lays both hands palms down on the desk and shrugs.
“He says he doesn’t know,” he tells Kline.
“He’s lying,” says Kline.
“You’ve asked me and I’ve told you, Your Honor. I don’t have it, and I don’t know where it is.”