When the Panthers began to roll forward at 15.35hrs, with 3rd Company in the center and the 1st and 4th Companies on the left and right, they faced defenders who were far from destroyed or disrupted. Their task was to capture hill 209.4 and wait there until German infantry arrived, whereupon the Panthers were to continue forward. Lieutenant Muth, who had commanded the 3rd Company since Wartmann became wounded, was particularly worried about flanking fire from Pisarivka, where the Soviet defenders most likely concealed antitank guns. His fears were fully justified. When the Panthers rolled forward, two tanks belonging to the 4th Company burst into flames after being hit in the side. Soon tanks from the 3rd Company received hits too, and Muth ordered his tanks to open fire on the Soviet guns. Hardly had Muth’s Panthers taken up positions to fire on the Soviet guns before Colonel Büsing ordered the company commanders to come to his command post.217
At twilight, Muth and Kirchhoff arrived at Büsing’s command post, on the southern slope of hill 205.4. Büsing greeted them by blaming them for the battalion’s slow progress since the artillery barrage. He even threatened to court martial them if their units did not show more daring. Büsing’s threat was not confined to the two commanders who had already arrived, but also included the other two. The battalion adjutant was sent to find Captain Mayer, as he was one of the two who had not yet arrived.218
Muth and Kirchhoff returned to their units, and it is unclear what they thought about Büsing’s court martial threat. In the after action reports, written by the company commanders a few days later, neither gave a flattering impression of Büsing’s command. Rather the reports were quite critical. Amongst other complaints, they pointed to the fact that they were not informed about the timing of the artillery barrage and the Stuka attack. This criticism seems justified, since it was indeed impossible for them to take advantage of an attack of which they had not been informed. An even more direct criticism of Büsing is the comment that time was lost by calling the company commanders back to the battalion command post. Daylight would soon be gone and every minute could be valuable. In darkness the Panthers would be robbed of the advantage they possessed with the much superior range of their guns.219
The attack got rolling, but the 1st Company had hardly advanced more than 800 meters when the battalion adjutant found Mayer and ordered him to go to Büsing. Thus, in the midst of the attack, the senior company commander had to go back to the command post. When Mayer reached Büsing he was accused of delaying the attack. Büsing harshly told him: “I command the battalion, you have nothing at all to give orders to.” Again Büsing tried to instil urgency, but as Mayer wrote three days later, by the time he got back to his company it was already dark. He could discern vehicles lit up by star shells, and the muzzle flashes from guns and machine guns, but it seemed that most of his own tanks had lost their orientation when they tried to carry out the order to capture hill 209.4.220
Mayer’s company had been accompanied by the 3rd and 4th Companies when they advanced, while ten Brink’s company covered the left flank. As could be expected from the observations made in the afternoon, flanking fire from Soviet antitank guns was very strong. Almost immediately, the tank commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Neumeyer, who led one of the platoons in Kirchhoff’s company, was hit and caught fire. Kirchhoff’s tankers found that in the darkness they were unable to locate the enemy antitank guns with sufficient precision to destroy them. Even though their muzzle flashes were visible, it was impossible to assess the distance to the guns.221
Nevertheless, Kirchhoff drove to Muth to continue forward. They shot a light flare and discovered Soviet vehicles on the road between Tishkovka and hill 209.4. On the radio Kirchhoff gave orders to fire on these vehicles, but almost immediately Büsing commanded on the radio: “Immediately cease firing on the vehicles and continue forward towards the objective.” In fact, Büsing’s order seems to have been justified, because the Panthers reached hill 209.4, where one or two T-34s were shot up and the rest withdrew.222
The German tankers took a short break when they had reached the northern edge of the hill. At this moment Kirchhoff heard Büsing on the radio ordering that the road north of hill 209.4 should not be crossed until Büsing himself arrived. After that, nothing was heard from Büsing for a long while. Instead, Soviet antitank guns opened flanking fire on the Panthers, causing the Germans to pull back 50 to 100 meters to find less exposed positions. However, by this maneuver Soviet infantry came close to the German tanks. Kirchhoff, with his head, shoulders, and arms up through the cupola, tried to shoot Soviet riflemen with his pistol. In the darkness it was very difficult to hit them. Behind his tank he saw two other German tanks, with the crews preparing to tow one of them. Furthermore, he made out infantry and horse-drawn vehicles very close to the tanks. The engine noise of the Panthers had drowned out the sound from the Russians. Kirchhoff immediately ordered his crew to turn the turret, but it was too late. A Soviet antitank gun opened fire at point blank range and hit one of the two German tanks that had been prepared for towing. Kirchhoff frantically urged the German tanks not to become stationary, but to keep moving.223
Kirchhoff tried to reach Büsing on the radio several times to inform him about the situation. All the attempts were unsuccessful and Captain Mayer took command of the battalion. As there was no clear mission and the tanks lacked infantry protection, even as enemy infantry and antitank units infiltrated their position, Captain Mayer gave orders that the battalion should move east, in particular to avoid standing in an area lit up by burning vehicles. The German tanks formed a hedgehog position and soon heard from Büsing on the radio. He ordered that Mayer should fire green and white flares to indicate his position. However, Mayer did not fire flares, because he feared that they would illuminate his own tanks and make them easy targets for the Soviet gunners. Instead Kirchhoff took a flare gun and ran away from the Panthers before he fired. After some time, two German half tracks showed up, giving the Panthers some sort of infantry cover in the darkness. However shortly thereafter Büsing issued orders over the radio that the battalion should pull back to hill 205.4, which, after some hesitation, was done.224
As there were Soviet troops between the main body of the Panther battalion and Büsing’s command post, this maneuver was not as easy to accomplish as it might appear. However, Captain Mayer instructed his tankers to form columns and steadily move south. In the dark night it was very difficult for the Soviet infantry to identify the Panthers. As they moved in columns, it seems they were mistaken for Soviet tanks. The Germans escaped south and reached Büsing’s command post without a shot being fired.225
Several of the Panthers were very low on fuel and ammunition, and their crews had expected to find replenishment when they reached south of hill 205.4, but none was to be found. They were told that the supply column had been subjected to Soviet artillery fire and suffered losses. Also, Soviet antitank guns could fire on the area reached by the Panthers. It seemed better for most of the tanks to continue towards the supply column, and to leave a screen at hill 205.4.226