Thus ended a very long first day in combat for the tankers of I./Pz.Rgt. 26. They had set out with 61 Panthers in the morning of 28 January, and 24 hours later 17 runners remained, for a loss of 44 tanks. Of these, 10 had to be written off, and the remainder could be salvaged and repaired. A considerable number had simply broken down due to mechanical defects. Sixteen had been rendered inoperable due to engine damage; in many cases connecting rod bearings were found to be damaged. The mechanics would have to work hard to raise the number of operational Panthers in the battalion.227
This first day in action had hardly been impressive, and the performance of the battalion was discussed in higher command echelons. The 11th Panzer Division, to which the I./26 was subordinated, was very dissatisfied with the battalion’s combat performance, and Wietersheim commented on the unit when he spoke with XXXXVII Panzer Corps and 8th Army. Büsing was, unsurprisingly, critical too, and on the morning of 29 January he relieved Captain Mayer from the command of 1st Company, although the threat of court martial never materialized. Thus, within 24 hours the battalion lost its commander, who was killed, one of the company commanders, also killed, one company commander wounded, and one sacked. The only one who remained was Lieutenant Kirchhoff.228
It is questionable whether the harsh verdict regarding the battalion’s performance is justified. Perhaps it was, but it is also possible that the situation was exaggerated. For example, at 11.00hrs on 29 January it was noted in the 8th Army war diary that the battalion had only 17 Panthers left out of its initial 61, and that it had suffered 20 complete losses. However, a more detailed investigation showed that only 10 tanks were complete write-offs. Nevertheless, that was still a significant loss. In the ensuing action at Korsun, the battalion lost only a further three Panthers, which suggests that the battalion quickly learned combat lessons.229
It must be remembered that the unit faced several disadvantages. On 28 January the battalion went into battle without any support or cooperation from infantry, artillery, air power, or any other arm. Also, when the battalion was promised support from infantry, artillery, and air power, time was lost by waiting for these assets to be available. Another problem was intelligence, which was available but was not detailed. The strength of the enemy defenses was assessed by officers to whom Glässgen's battalion was subordinated. Indeed it appears that the battalion was rather haphazardly given a mission that was more difficult than assumed.
Büsing’s conduct was not beyond question either. If he found fault with Captain Mayer’s leadership after the death of Glässgen, then he ought to have gone forward rather than trying to command the battalion from behind, as he did on 28 January.
There were many examples of insufficient radio communication during the actions of 28 January, so it seems especially important that the acting commander should not stay behind. In fact, it was a well established tradition in the German army that the commander should lead from the front, not from the rear. Why Büsing refrained from this is somewhat mysterious, as he was a very experienced commander.230 Colonel Büsing’s threats did not instil his untried soldiers with the confidence needed to face the horror and chaos of combat. On the other hand, the commanders threatened by Büsing do not seem to have taken him seriously, and they certainly did not shy away from criticizing him in their after action reports.
Captain Mayer may be accused of hesitancy in his actions. For example, he went back to Büsing’s command post at 09.00hrs rather than remaining forward to ensure that the attack regained momentum. Also, he appeared uncertain when the battalion should attack after the artillery barrage just before 15.00hrs. While it may very well be correct to emphasize the fact that he lacked information on when the barrage would end, German doctrine emphasized that in unclear situations it was better to act than remain passive. Mayer seems not to have acted according to this tradition in that particular situation.
Unfortunately, Büsing was killed three weeks after the end of the Korsun battle and did not leave any comments on the event. The surviving war diaries of 8th Army and XXXXVII Panzer Corps mention, in sharp words, the poor conduct of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 on 28 January, something that does not occur for any other unit, as far as we have been able to see from the records that have survived the battle.
Whatever the causes of the failed attack, the Germans had lost the chance to prevent Konev from reaching his first goal. With the failure of the only fresh German unit, the XXXXVII Panzer Corps had to struggle hard to hold its positions. At the end of the action the situation was not much different from what it had been 24 hours earlier. Both sides held scattered positions in the Kapitanovka area, with neither in full control of the situation. The cost had been high to the Soviet 18th Tank Corps, too, which seems to have been the main opponent of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26, as it reported the loss of 29 T-34s and eight lend-lease tanks, which had been burned or destroyed by enemy fire. However, it could at least find some consolation from the fact that it received 22 tanks as replacements, unlike the German units, which seem not to have received a single replacement tank.231
Until 28 January the Germans had made relatively minor command rearrangements, but the Soviet thrust to Zvenigorodka prompted more substantial changes. When the Soviet pincers closed, the Germans combined the XI and XXXXII Corps into Gruppe Stemmermann, which was placed under the command of 8th Army. The forming of Gruppe Stemmermann was in fact little more than recognition of what had happened. As General Stemmermann was the senior officer in the surrounded German force he was given overall command of it. Also, it was regarded as a simpler command situation if the entire pocket was placed under one army HQ, rather than being split between two.232
It was also clear that the XXXXVII Corps was too weak to cope with the situation on its left flank. It was decided that the 320th Infantry Division should be shifted west, but also the corps needed substantial reinforcements. The 13th Panzer Division was to be immediately relieved and sent to the XXXXVII Panzer Corp’s left flank. The 376th Infantry Division was to be relieved and sent to the same area, even though its shift could not be done as quickly as with the 13th Panzer Division. These units already belonged to 8th Army, but the army was also promised 24th Panzer Division as reinforcement, a unit that was with 6th Army further south.233
Given the distances involved, and the weather that threatened to turn the roads into mud, these units needed at least a few days before they could reach the battle area. The XXXXVII Panzer Corps would have to struggle to hold its positions until these units arrived.
After hard fighting, the 2nd Ukrainian Front had secured a corridor to Zvenigorodka. However, a double encirclement required two prongs to succeed. Konev’s front had attacked from the southeast. In the meantime, Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front was attacking from the northwest.
CHAPTER 7
Vatutin’s Attack
Unlike the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Nikolai Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front did not attack on 25 January. Rather it was forced to begin the operation one day later, since the assembly of the attacking formations could not be completed earlier. This was perhaps not a significant disadvantage. If the 2nd Ukrainian Front made good progress on 25 January, the Germans might not realize immediately that they were facing a two-pronged offensive.