Vatutin and his staff planned attacks on a rather wide front, but there were two areas where a major effort was focused: near Tinovka and near Koshevatoe. The southern attack force—in the vicinity of Tinovka—was the strongest, but the German defense was stronger in this sector. The Soviet 6th Tank Army concentrated on the Tinovka–Krasilovk–Besedka–Bashtechka area. Of the two corps belonging to the army, the 5th Mechanized Corps was the strongest, with 106 tanks and 46 SP guns, while the 5th Guards Tank Corps had only 54 tanks and four SP guns. The 5th Mechanized Corps was almost up to strength, while the 5th Guards Tank Corps suffered from considerable man power shortages before the offensive. Replenishment took place during preparations and assembly, but many of the new soldiers were inexperienced and poorly trained.234
The 5th Mechanized Corps was supposed to penetrate just south of Tinovka, in cooperation with the 104th Rifle Corps, rush towards Shubennyi Stav, and then continue to Zvenigorodka. It was expected to capture Shubennyi Stav at the end of the first day and reach the Shpola region during the second day. A tank brigade and an SP gun regiment from the 5th Mechanized Corps was held as army reserve.235
After a 40-minute artillery preparation, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched its attack.236 The infantry divisions of the 104th Rifle Corps, supported by the main body of the 5th Mechanized Corps, encountered stiff German resistance and made scant progress. After the 58th Rifle Division had failed to penetrate the German defense during the first half of the day, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Corps ordered his brigades to “complete the penetration” of the first German defense line and to exploit success themselves. This was to little avail, however, since the attack bogged down with heavy losses. The German VII Corps claimed to have knocked out 82 tanks during 26 January. At the end of the day, the Soviet attackers had only managed to capture the first German defense line.237
In fact, the main 1st Ukrainian Front attack was almost completely unsuccessful. It had hit the German 34th Infantry Division, belonging to the VII Corps, but the corps was more worried about the Soviet secondary attacks. The small Soviet gains south of Tinovka were contained, but Soviet pressure on the 34th’s northern neighbor, the 198th Infantry Division, caused more problems. Its left flank was pushed back to Votylevka and Repki where it barely managed to hold. Its northern flank was in even greater trouble.238
Captain Georg Grossjohan commanded the II Battalion of 308th Grenadier regiment (198th Division). Later he recalled the fierce battles his battalion fought:239
On the morning of 26 January heavy Soviet artillery fire rained down not only on Votylevka, but along the entire front line. The Russians must have used hundreds of batteries in support of their attack against us. Shells of every caliber fell on our positions. Waves of 132mm rockets added to the cacophony with their howling noise, before they hit the ground around us. Especially, the enemy focused on the junction to our northern neighbor, the 88th Infantry Division. Clearly, it was a major attack.
We only had a few seconds to get our weapons and our clothes before we jumped down in the narrow ditch we had dug and covered with logs, earth, and hay. A few minutes later only pathetic fragments remained of the hut we had just left. Just before my lieutenant Armbruster jumped into the ditch he got hold a bottle of brandy, which was passed around after the first seconds of shock had abated. It helped to relieve the trauma caused by the impact of the heavy artillery fire that just went on and on.
At exactly 6 am, precisely after going on for 80 minutes, the enormous artillery fire ceased. There was dead silence.
The soldiers of the Red Army began their assault, tactically correct, immediately when the artillery fire ceased. We left our shelters and saw that everything in Votylevka, with few exceptions, was completely demolished. Even the few trees had been stripped to skeletons. Only a few chimneys still remained erect in the smoking lunar landscape that was filled with large craters.
The Germans regarded the situation in the sector of the 88th Infantry Division, which belonged to the XXXXII Corps, as most ominous. The division was stretched so thinly that it could not withstand the Soviet attacks in the Baranye Pole area, which was captured by a Soviet force of regimental size supported by tanks. After this success, Vatutin’s forces could advance along the Koshevatoye–Medvin–Lisyanka–Zvenigorodka road, which was one of the better roads in the area. The link between the 88th and 198th Divisions, and thus also between the XXXXII and VII Corps, was broken. The Germans had to do something, but there were few units available. Despite the Soviet pressure on the VII Corps, the latter was ordered to dispatch the 239th Assault Gun Battalion to the 88th Infantry Division, but no other reinforcements were available to send to the XXXXII Corps.240
To General Vatutin, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the main attack must have been a disappointment, but on the other hand the secondary attack in the Baranye Pole area made much better progress. He thus had the option to keep pressure on the German 34th Division, while shifting mobile forces to the northern attack sector. A mobile force was built around the 233rd Tank Brigade, which had been held in reserve. Major General M. I. Savalev was instructed to take command of a task force consisting of the tank brigade, reinforced by an SP gun regiment, a motorized rifle battalion, and an antitank battery. In all, it had 55 tanks and assault guns and four antitank guns.241 The force was committed along the Medvin–Lisyanka road, but it did not make its presence felt before the end of the day.
The Soviet attack of 26 January was obviously the offensive that the German 1st Panzer Army had expected. The only uncertainty was whether the Soviet intention was to liberate the encircled Soviet force around Tichonovka, or if the intention was to cut off the XXXXII Corps. It was serious enough in either case.242 The only thing the army could do was to conclude Operation Watutin—the attacks conducted by XXXXVI Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps further west—as rapidly as possible. But even if these attacks were terminated immediately, it would still take a few days to move the units to the threatened sector. That would probably mean they would come too late to prevent an encirclement of XXXXII Corps.
On 27 January, the staff of 1st Panzer Army and its commander, General Hans Hube, considered pulling out the 17th Panzer Division as soon as possible and sending it to the VII Corps. This was only to be done when it did not endanger Operation Watutin. Hube also repeated his demands that the northern part of XXXXII Corps should be withdrawn, to give it at least some chance of mastering the situation by freeing forces to send south.243
The Soviet gains on the southern wing of the XXXXII Corps had caused VII Corps’ northern wing to became almost surrounded at Chesnovka, and it seemed inevitable that the Red Army would cross the Gniloi Tikich River at Lisyanka, thereby liberating the encircled Soviet forces in the Tikhonovka area. The Germans expected this to happen no later than 28 January. The danger to the VII Corps’ right wing affected its ability to withstand the attacks on the sector held by the 34th Infantry Division in the center. Since the German Corps was forced to focus more on the threat to its northern flank, the Soviet pressure in the center became more dangerous. In order to cope with the situation, the corps was ordered to take its right flank behind the Gniloi Tikich River. The 40th Army pushed back the Germans from Tinovka to Vinograd, which was taken in the evening.244