While the Red Army had only attacked the southernmost part of XXXXII Corps on 26 January, it extended its attacks to the northern part the following day. This of course made it more difficult for the Germans to disengage units and send them south to the sector where the Red Army had broken through. Another factor to consider was the weather, which became warmer. While the previous days had seen frost, on 27 January the temperature reached 0°C. If this trend continued, a thaw could set in at any time and the roads would quickly be reduced to mud, making redeployment of forces even more difficult.245
On 28 January the weather was still balancing between frost and thaw and the Soviet spearheads proceeded relatively unhindered by the elements, although occasional drifts of snow caused difficulties.246 Kravchenko’s tanks continued their advance towards Zvenigorodka, where they linked up with advance elements of 5th Guards Tank Army in the afternoon. Thus the encirclement of the two German corps was accomplished.247
While the 1st Ukrainian Front spearheads approached Zvenigorodka, other units put pressure on the German 198th and 34th Divisions. This, together with the threat posed by the open flank of the German VII Corps, pushed the Germans far south of the Gniloi Tikich River. The Soviet forces near Tichonovka, which had been surrounded for a long time, were freed.248
The 1st Ukrainian Front was not content with pushing the VII Corps south and establishing contact with the 5th Guards Tank Army. It also advanced towards the Rossava River and threatened the rear of the XXXXII Corps, whose entire left flank was wide open. However, pressure on the German VII Corps slackened after the Soviet force at Tikhonovka had been relieved. Part of the 198th Division was also surrounded in the Bossovka–Dadushkovka area, but these elements broke out to the south, thereby saving the Germans from an even greater debacle than the one that loomed.249
Perhaps Vatutin had hoped to catch the German 198th Division, but although this did not happen, he could still be satisfied with the results of the operation so far. At this moment he seems to have worried more about the developments further west, where the operation launched by the Germans, carrying his own name, caused him to order Kravchenko to send most of the 5th Mechanized Corps west.
The Germans’ Operation Watutin was also designed to create an encirclement, but a much smaller one than the pocket created by the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. It met with success, as the Soviet 1st Tank Army was badly hit. The Germans claimed to have captured or destroyed 701 tanks and assault guns. When Operation Watutin was concluded on 30 January, it had scored a notable success, although not sufficient to disrupt the Soviet operation. When Vatutin ordered the 5th Mechanized Corps to disengage and move west, the encirclement of the German XI and XXXXII Corps had already been accomplished.
CHAPTER 8
The Korsun Pocket
When the 1st Ukrainian Front began its offensive on 26 January, the threat of encirclement was clear to the senior German commanders, including Lieb and Stemmermann. The situation deteriorated quickly, especially for Lieb’s XXXXII Corps. Both his divisions—88th Infantry and Korps-Abteilung B—were spread out on a very wide front. The corps had to defend a sector more than 100 kilometers wide, which made it difficult to pull out units to create reserves, and time-consuming to move them where they were needed. When the Soviet 180th and 337th Divisions attacked the southern wing of the German 88th Division, there was little Lieb could do, at least in the short term, especially as Korps-Abteilung B also had to fend off enemy attacks.250
The rapidly deteriorating situation on the southern flank gave Lieb few options. He had to shift units south, despite the ensuing risks to the defenses in the north. Two artillery batteries were sent from Korps-Abteilung B to reinforce the 88th Division and, in addition, one artillery battalion from Korps-Abteilung B and an infantry battalion from the 88th Division had to be sent to the Boguslav area, where important bridges over the Rossava River were threatened by approaching Soviet forces. Finally Lieb ordered Korps-Abteilung B to send two battalions to Olkhovets, where they could constitute a reserve.251
During the night of 26 January Lieb decided to form “Sperrverband Foquet,” which was to be a varied collection of units under the command of Colonel Foquet. His main task was to protect the southern flank of the XXXXII Corps, which was dangerously exposed. Fortunately for him the Ross River formed a suitable defense line, and by the end of the day on 27 January weak positions had been established along the river, from Steblev to Dybnitsy. For the moment this was a very weak line and would not withstand a determined Soviet attack, but the main direction for the 1st Ukrainian Front was toward Medvin and Zvenigorodka, far to the south of Foquet’s positions.252
On 28 January the Soviet 27th Army continued to press the northern part of the front, and also threatened the south flank of the German XXXXII Corps by attacking Nikolayevka and Sidorevka. These two villages were on the route to Steblev, an important town on the Ross River that the Germans could ill afford to lose. Divisionsgruppe 255 from Korps-Abteilung B, a regimental-sized unit, and the recently arrived 239th Assault Gun Battalion were ordered to hold the Steblev area. The 88th Division was ordered to pull back its front line during the night of 28 January and to take up new positions along the Ross River east and north of Boguslav.253
Lieb’s eastern neighbor, Stemmermann’s XI Corps, faced a slightly different situation. With its four divisions it was stronger than Lieb’s Corps. Also, since it was given command over the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions it could attack the Soviet breakthrough, unlike Lieb’s corps, which could only adjust its front, trying to prevent its rear from being overrun. However, with the loss of Shpola, the XI Corps’ southern flank had to be protected or else its rear would be dangerously exposed. When the Soviet pincers met at Zvenigorodka, the Soviet units turned northeast, confirming German fears. The Soviet 20th Tank Corps sent a detachment towards Olshana, an important road hub on the Olshana River. It was possible that Olshana could be occupied before the Germans reacted.254
The SS-Wiking Division had seen relatively little action in the days before 27 January. It had sent its few tanks and assault guns to support other units, but otherwise its units had remained in calm sectors, spread out over a large area. On 27 January news reached the division that Shpola had been occupied by Soviet units. Reconnaissance was initiated in the Shpola–Olshana area, but soon further alarming news was received. The Steblev region was also threatened. The latter danger could directly affect the SS-Wiking, as it had two units located at Steblev: the field replacement battalion and a school for combat engineers. In Olshana, the SS-Wiking formed alarm combat units from soldiers combed out from rear services. These did not have the same combat value as regular combat units, but at least they provided some kind of defense. Their worth was soon to be tested.255
Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Gille, the commander of SS-Wiking, did not consider the forces available in Olshana sufficient to defend the town. On 28 January he personally instructed Lieutenant Hein to take four assault guns to secure Olshana. In the evening, Hein’s small force reached its destination and realized that the Red Army had already entered the outskirts of the town. In the darkness it was difficult to make an accurate assessment, but it was clear to Hein that the improvised defenders needed the support of his small force. On the way to Olshana the radio in his assault gun had broken down, but he assembled his tankers and ordered a counterattack, which succeeded in pushing the Russians out of the town. Later in the night, Hein sent two assault guns to the nearby village of Kirilovka, where they salvaged petrol stores that were brought to Olshana.256