Hein’s small force was not the only reinforcement sent to Olshana. The SS-Wallonien had an assault gun company which had been included in the brigade in a somewhat unusual way. In the fall of 1943, at the training center at Debica, an assault gun company had been formed for Wallonien. Simultaneously an assault gun company had been forming for the 4th SS-Panzer Grenadier Division “Polizei.” The training of the latter company had proceeded faster and in mid-November it was decided to exchange the companies, and send the one intended for SS-Polizei to SS-Wallonien instead, where it arrived at the end of November. The company did not have to take part in heavy combat immediately but was allowed some time to get acquainted with its new parent unit. As the soldiers in the Wallonien were from Belgium, there was a language barrier between them and the German soldiers of the assault gun company.257
The period of relative calm came to an end on 28 January, when Captain Planitzer, an officer with considerable experience who commanded the assault gun company, received orders to take two of his platoons to Olshana to help shore up the defenses of the vital communications center. His force was soon to be joined by another unusual unit, the SS-Narwa battalion, an infantry formation composed of Estonians, which would arrive at Olshana in the evening.258
For the 389th Division the troublesome period continued, and Anton Meiser was among the soldiers in that division who were fully aware of their perilous situation. Early in the morning of 28 January, the surrounded group of artillery he belonged to was subjected to a Soviet attack from the east, which was repelled. The German gunners began withdrawing to the west. Meiser was given command of two howitzers and some extra infantry. His group was to set out first, and occupy a position from which it would be possible to provide covering fire for the remainder of the battalion-sized force.259
Due to the injury he had suffered earlier, Meiser was unable to walk and had to lead from horseback. Initially, everything went according to plan. He was able to rely on the instructions received from one of the scouting parties that had been sent out on the previous day, but after a while the small group reached a ravine. The road twisted down the ravine and the glassy ice made the descent very slippery. Meiser realized that it would be a demanding descent. He gave orders to round up the local inhabitants. With ropes attached to the wagons and howitzer carriages it was possible to make a slow descent, and the group took up their assigned covering position. Meiser sent a radio message that the remainder of the force could begin to move. He emphasized the difficulties encountered at the ravine.260
Without being harassed by Soviet units, the motley German force began to move westward. The journey went well, except for one of the last carriages. The driver did not take the same precautions as Meiser had done and the gun carriage began to slide, pushing the harnessed horses forward and crushing them when it reached the bottom of the ravine. After hard work the carriage was salvaged but the horses were dead. Eventually all the howitzers were saved, but the Germans were puzzled why there was so little interference from the Red Army. Perhaps the Soviet commanders knew that the small German group was heading into another encirclement, but that was yet unknown to Meiser and his fellows.261
In the evening, Meiser got an inkling of what might lie ahead. He spent the evening and night in a small house owned by an elderly Russian man who spoke good German. The old man told Meiser that the Red Army had created a large cauldron, and even outlined the situation on a map. He even compared the situation to that at Stalingrad and said it would be better to surrender. Meiser was flabbergasted and thought the man had had too much to drink. Even though it had been suspected for a while, Meiser did not want to believe that the threat of encirclement was true.262
Meiser and his fellows were not alone in their ignorance about the overall situation. It seems that the rank and file seldom knew the larger picture, especially in critical situations like the present one. Arne Hansen was a Norwegian who had volunteered for the Waffen-SS and had served in the SS-Wiking for a long time. In August 1943 he had been on leave to his home in Norway, but returned to the division on 3 September and from then on saw continuous action until the division went into the Korsun area. When the Soviet pincers closed, the antiaircraft battery he served with was stationed near Gorodishche. Little news trickled down to Hansen and his comrades, but when they observed large numbers of transport aircraft landing and taking off from the Korsun airfield they realized something serious must have happened.263
To Hube and his staff it was evident the encirclement they had long feared had taken place. On the evening of 28 January, Hube received the order that XXXXII Corps should leave the 1st Panzer Army and be placed under command of 8th Army, which he duly forwarded to his units. He ended his message to the departing corps with the words: “I will fight you out.”
If General Hube failed to fulfil his promise, the result would be a disaster for the Germans, similar to that at Stalingrad although on a smaller scale. Hube was well aware of what had happened at Stalingrad. He had himself been among the encircled, but had been flown out before the destruction of 6th Army. At Stalingrad five corps had been surrounded, compared to two at Korsun. The number of corps does not give a clear indication of how many men were trapped, however. As with Stalingrad, the size of the encircled German force at Korsun has been subject to some debate. The Soviet sources maintain that 10 German divisions plus the Wallonien Brigade were encircled at Korsun, but this is patently wrong. Only six divisions could be claimed to be encircled.264 Had such a force been at full strength, it would probably have amounted to close to 100,000 men, including corps and army troops.
Perhaps fortunately, the trapped divisions were not at full strength, for a variety of reasons. Each of the divisions had taken casualties in previous actions and a significant number of soldiers were on leave. Exactly how many is not clear, but information exists on the number of returning soldiers who assembled outside the pocket (see table).
These figures should be regarded as the lower limit on the number of soldiers on leave, since there may well have been more soldiers who had not yet returned from leave when the battle ended.
In addition, there were always soldiers who were hospitalized due to disease or injuries from accidents. These hospitals could be located outside a potential encirclement. Furthermore, a division, even a fresh one, could have some of its soldiers away at various courses or schools, which could be located well to the rear. Thus, even if a division was at full strength, in the sense that all positions called for in its organization tables had a person assigned, it could often have 10–20% of its soldiers absent due to leave, disease, accidents, or training.
Corporal Josef Eisner provides an example of one of the ways in which a soldier might be absent from his unit. He was an Austrian who served with the music platoon of the Westland Regiment, one of the motorized infantry regiments of 5th SS-Panzer Division Wiking. Together with six other musicians and a few other soldiers he left the division towards the end of September 1943 to take equipment to Münich for extensive repairs. Having accomplished their mission they enjoyed a fairly long leave, before going to Warsaw to pick up four Wespe SP Artillery pieces in December. On New Year’s Eve, Eisner and his fellows unloaded the four Wespes from a train at Berdishev, but were soon informed about the Soviet offensive not far away. It was deemed necessary to use the Wespes immediately and they had to be handed over to the 1st SS-Panzer Division. There was nothing left for Eisner and his group but to try to reach their division, which at the moment was more than 200 kilometers away. The trains made long detours to avoid advancing Red Army forces, but finally the soldiers reached their destination. A day or two later the Soviet pincers met at Zvenigorodka and Eisner and his fellow soldiers were trapped.266