While the Red Army attempted many encirclement operations before the Korsun battle, only Stalingrad could be regarded as an undisputed success.
From 1944 onwards, the German Army gradually became less mobile, due to shortages of vehicles and lack of fuel. Furthermore, the “no-retreat policy” exacerbated the situation. Consequently, during the last 11 months of World War II, German units found themselves encircled more often and at that stage of the war there was little hope for any successful air supply operations, as by then the Luftwaffe was a spent force.
An encirclement is a dramatic experience for a modern army, since military doctrine usually assumed that the army’s rear is fairly safe. The frontline troops are dependent on a constant supply of ammunition, fuel, food, spare parts, and a miscellany of other items. Occasionally these may be stored in advance in such a way that units retain a healthy supply if encircled, but such occasions are rare. More often, armies in war find themselves operating with many shortages, forcing them to live from hand to mouth. In the case of the German army during World War II, fuel is a good example of a commodity that could be in short supply. It is doubtful if German fuel production—imports from Romania and synthetic fuel production plants notwithstanding—was sufficient to provide enough fuel to supply the aircraft and motorized vehicles used to wage a modern war. The army suffered periodic shortages that made it impossible for the frontline units to build up significant reserves of fuel nearby. Instead, fuel had to be delivered regularly to cover consumption. Ammunition was in slightly better supply, but not much. A few days of intensive combat could deplete the stores held by a corps. If an encirclement lasted longer, food would also become scarce.
It was not only transportation of supplies to the combat units that became difficult or impossible when formations were cut off. A combat unit also had to send important traffic in the opposite direction, including any wounded men who required evacuation. Although the divisions had their own means for taking immediate care of the wounded, the seriously wounded were supposed to be transported to medical facilities in the rear where they could receive proper treatment.
At Korsun, the two surrounded German corps faced an additional difficulty, since some of the medical resources belonging to the divisions were outside the pocket, due to the relative shallowness of the encirclement. Consequently, it was more difficult to treat even those who were only lightly wounded.274
The Germans only had two realistic options to alleviate the situation in the pocket. The first was the relief attempt. However, it would take days to move up the Panzer divisions, and the encircled soldiers needed help soon. The second option would provide assistance more rapidly, but its overall capacity was limited. This option was an air lift operation, the need for which was immediately clear to the German commanders. When the Soviet tank armies met at Zvenigorodka, the Germans were already preparing the air supply operation, and before noon on 29 January, 14 aircraft took off from the air base at Uman with 30 tons of ammunition on board. They landed on the airstrip at Korsun, a facility that was to play a prominent role in the following weeks.275
CHAPTER 9
The Red Army Squeezes the Pocket
When the spearheads of the two Soviet fronts met on 28 January, the first phase of the operation was successfully concluded. The Soviet generals may have celebrated their success, but much hard fighting lay ahead before they could claim a final victory. The Red Army could choose either to squeeze the pocket until it collapsed or attempt to starve the German troops into submission. In either case it was necessary to prevent German relief attempts from breaking in. In order to keep the pocket isolated, an outer ring of Soviet forces was created, from Panchevo in the east to Konstantinovka in the west. About two thirds of the distance was covered by troops from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 5th Guards Tank Army took responsibility for the sector between Zvenigorodka to Vodianoe, and the area east of Vodianoe was allotted to 53rd Army.276
Initially, Pavel Rotmistrov’s Tank Army only had its three tank corps, but it was reinforced with the 49th Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions and also a combat engineer brigade. The tank corps were not intended to occupy defensive front lines, and Rotmistrov was pleased to receive the rifle divisions. The length of the front line forced him to keep his armor at the front too, but the arrival of the infantry allowed him to allot shorter defensive sectors to his tank corps and even to create some reserves.277
Andrei Kravchenko, the commander of 6th Tank Army, was in a much more precarious position. On 28 January he received orders to detach his most powerful unit, the 5th Mechanized Corps, and send it 100 kilometers to the west. The reason was the dire situation created by the Germans’ Operation Watutin in the Balabanova area. Kravchenko did retain the battle group built around the 233rd Tank Brigade from the 5th Mechanized Corps.278
The 5th Mechanized Corps, with attached units, became temporarily subordinated to the 40th Army. In deplorable weather, the corps marched the 100 kilometers. Rain and snow fell, and lack of vehicles in the rifle brigades forced many men to march by foot. The men had to walk fully equipped, wearing felt boots and fur coats. Despite the difficult conditions, the corps reached its destination near Staryj Zhivotin and took up defensive positions. The Germans detected the presence of the corps and refrained from attacks against it. The 5th Mechanized Corps conducted some minor attacks. However, on the third day after its arrival, the corps was ordered to return to 6th Tank Army.279
Since the mechanized brigades had a far stronger infantry component compared to the tank corps, the loss of the 5th Mechanized Corps was sorely felt by Kravchenko. He found some consolation in the fact that the 47th Rifle Corps, with two rifle divisions, was subordinated to his army, and further reinforcements were on the way. Within a few days the 2nd Guards Airborne Division would arrive and take up defensive positions in the Ryshanovka area. But whether Kravchenko’s defenses would prove sufficient depended above all on whatever reinforcements the Germans might send to oppose his tank army. He already knew that the lead elements of the 17th Panzer Division had arrived. Further Panzer divisions might follow.280
General Filipp Zhmachenko’s 40th Army had been given responsibility for the sector to the right of the 6th Tank Army, from Kobyliaki westwards. His divisions were extended; the four that covered the sector east of Okhmatovo had, on average, 11 kilometers to cover, although Zhmachenko was heartened by the fact that the opposing German divisions had to cover sectors that were roughly twice as large.281
Vatutin and Konev chose to keep a defensive line to the south, despite the fact that there were tempting targets not far away. In particular, Uman was only 55 kilometers from the positions held by 6th Tank Army, with almost no German units positioned to arrest a Soviet thrust to the city. Uman was a very important logistical center for the Germans, and also a very important air base. The air base played a prominent part in the ensuing German airlift operation. It was a tempting target for the Soviets and one wonders why the Red Army did not exploit this opportunity to take control of it. Still, it must be remembered that, with the exception of Stalingrad, encirclement operations had not been a Soviet strength. Either the Germans had broken out of encirclement or else the Soviet spearheads had been halted. In some cases the Soviet armored spearheads had been destroyed. With this experience, the Soviet generals had good reason to exercise caution.