To Bittl and the commanders of the XI and XXXXII Corps it was abundantly clear that the XXXXII Corps was vastly over-extended. The Soviet breakthrough at the corps’ southern sector extended the already long front line even further, as the Red Army advanced along the southern bank of the Ross River. It had only been possible to create anything resembling a defense along the Ross line in the south by stripping the northern front. Towards the end of the day on 29 January, only three battalions from Korps-Abteilung B were defending the corps’ northern front, a sector almost 75 kilometers wide. Although the Soviet forces conducting the attacks on Korps-Abteilung B were weak, the situation was clearly untenable, especially as the defenses in the southern part of the pocket were anything but secure. The shifting of battalions within the XXXXII Corps was robbing Peter to pay Paul, rather than a tenable strategy.289
The top priority for the German commanders in the pocket was to reestablish contact with 1st Panzer Army and 8th Army. The southern part of the cauldron was clearly the most important, and forces had to be shifted south. The most powerful unit available was the SS-Wiking Division, which had seen relatively little action lately, except for its Panzers. It was located far to the north, at a sector where there was only slight Soviet activity, so it was a suitable choice to be sent south where it might even be transferred to the XXXXII Corps, since the XI Corps was in a more stable situation.290
Major Bittl returned from the pocket at 16.00hrs and gave a briefing, but before he returned, Wöhler and Speidel had discussed the plans with Army Group South. It was agreed that the most important area was the southern part of the pocket, a conclusion that was corroborated by Bittl’s visit. Army Group South emphasized that the Boguslav area was vital because of the planned counterattack, and Steblev also had to be held under all circumstances.291
General Lieb was convinced that it was necessary to withdraw the thinly held northern front, but he did not receive clear consent from his superior commanders. Despite this, he initiated a withdrawal to the Rossava River line in the afternoon. He reported this to 8th Army, but the transmission was delayed and the staff did not receive the message until 23.10hrs.292
The withdrawal was an important maneuver, one of several vital alterations made by the German forces during the afternoon and evening. As we have seen, the 11th Panzer Division had been reinforced with the armored group from the 14th Panzer Division and several non-divisional armor and assault gun units.293 This force shifted further west, but 8th Army was doing even more reshuffling of its deck. To cover the sector held by 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions, the 320th Division arrived in the evening. Its previous positions had been taken over by the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division. Furthermore, the 13th Panzer and 376th Infantry Divisions were on the way and could be expected to arrive within a day or two. The 24th Panzer Division was also moving towards the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, but it would have to negotiate long and muddy roads before it could influence the battle at Korsun.294
Changes were also implemented inside the pocket. The SS-Wiking Division was mostly transferred from XI to XXXXII Corps. Eleven tanks from the SS-Wiking Division were detached to the 72nd Division, which still remained with the XI Corps, and sent to the village of Matusov. Nevertheless, the decision contributed to a shift of forces to the southern part of the pocket.295
The intermingling of units became worse as the battle progressed. Sometimes it was the result of deliberate orders, sometimes due to enemy pressure, and sometimes it was caused by units being cut off, like the group of artillery that Anton Meiser accompanied.
On the morning of 29 January, Meiser’s artillery group continued westward, at least initially unhindered by enemy action. After a while they reached a hilly area. The road followed the southern slope of a hill, then turned right only to turn left again before reaching a bridge over a river. From there it continued on the southern slope of yet another hill. When moving onto the slope of the first hill, the Germans heard artillery shells exploding, and realized that the bridge seemed to be the target, but the shells, optimized for shrapnel and with impact fuses, had not caused any damage to the bridge and only marginally affected the road.296
The men could cross the river further south, but for the carriages there was no alternative to crossing the river by the bridge, and a risky solution had to be adopted. The howitzers halted in cover by the first hill, while Lieutenant Sorajewski took up a position southwest of the bridge, where he could direct the horse drawn carriages. He had observed that the Soviet gunners fired at very regular intervals. One by one the horse drawn carriages moved forward to his position, and with a clock in his hand he gave the order for one vehicle at a time to dash over the bridge. It was not an easy task for the drivers, as it was necessary to travel quickly to cross the bridge before the next Soviet round exploded, but not so quickly that the horses and carriages slid on the icy road.297
At first everything worked according to plan and several vehicles crossed the road and reached a point where Meiser waited for them and directed them towards a place where they were covered from enemy observers. However, when a light wagon, drawn by two horses, was about to cross the bridge, the Soviet artillery fired after a shorter interval. Shrapnel from an exploding shell tore off two feet from one of the horses. For a while it stumbled forward on the stumps that remained, but fell next to the bridge and pulled the other horse into the ditch. The wagon remained on the road, but across it, thereby blocking the entire road. The driver had the presence of mind to unharness the unscathed horse before he himself took cover.298
Fortunately, Lieutenant Sorajewski had been foresighted enough to place a group consisting of an NCO and six men next to Meiser. They promptly dashed toward the stricken carriage. When they had reached the bridge, they immediately took cover. After an artillery salvo had crashed down, the men sprang forward from their cover, unharnessed the dead horse, and pushed the wagon aside before taking cover again, just in time before another salvo landed. Again the men moved out from their cover when the shells had exploded and dashed to the wagon, at the same time as a rider with an extra horse galloped up. Working feverishly they managed to harness the horses to the wagon and the driver began to urge the horses to pull as hard as they could. Soon another salvo exploded, shrapnel whizzed around, but nobody was hurt. After this drama, all other carriages and wagons passed the bridge without incident. The isolated force continued west, until another river was crossed and it halted for the night. Meiser was given command of a small number of infantrymen and received the task of defending the bridge that had just been crossed. Except for a minor skirmish the night passed uneventfully.299