Further to the west, where the Soviet 40th Army and 6th Tank Army had clashed with the German VII Corps, both sides seemed to settle down, relatively content with the positions they held and beginning to prepare for the next round. Indeed, it seemed as if the fighting diminished on the XXXXVII Panzer Corps’ sector too, with both sides busy reorganizing their units, but inside the pocket the situation remained uncertain.
Once the 2nd Ukrainian Front had secured the connection to its spearheads at Zvenigorodka, it concentrated on the surrounded German units. As it reached Shpola, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps was directed towards Burty and Olshana, while rifle divisions tried to keep up on its right flank. Selivanov chose to commit his 63rd Cavalry Division on the left, while the 12th Guards Cavalry Division advanced on the right and the 11th Guards Cavalry Division in the center. It was important to gain ground. The corridor held by the 2nd Ukrainian Front was little more than 20 kilometers wide, far less than on the sector held by the 1st Ukrainian Front.
The German attacks on the southern side of the corridor had abated, but if they were renewed, with the aid of substantial reinforcements, such a small depth could prove dangerous. It would be prudent to try to push back the Germans towards Gorodishche.300
On 30 January Selivanov’s cavalry advanced towards Burty and by the end of the day they could see the outskirts of the village. The distance to Olshana was greater however, and by the end of the day the forward units of 63rd Cavalry Division had only reached Zelenaya Dubrova, still about 8 kilometers from Olshana. The fighting for Olshana would have to wait until next day.301
Further east, Anton Meiser woke up in the morning, only to find that Soviet troops had crossed the river about two kilometers south of the bridge he was responsible for defending. His wounded leg was recovering by now, which was fortunate as he saw no alternative except to withdraw, and decided to avoid the roads. Instead, his little group plodded through the snow that covered the terrain, until they reached a village held by infantry from the same battalion as Meiser’s grenadiers. In the afternoon the village was abandoned and the withdrawal continued. During the retreat, two of Meiser’s comrades were killed, one by a shot to the head and one by a shot in the chest. In the darkness a snow-clad hill was chosen as position for the night, and foxholes were dug for an all around defense. The hungry soldiers, whose wet clothes provided little protection from the elements, prepared for the cold night.302
In the morning of 30 January Wöhler decided to visit some of his division commanders. He flew to the 320th Infantry Division as well as the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions. He learned that 320th Division had relieved the 11th Panzer Division according to plan and that von Wietersheim’s tanks were ready to advance towards Zhuravka and Meshigorka. He had some complaints, though. The I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther Battalion was very inexperienced, and the battalion commander had been killed. He was to be replaced by a more experienced officer from the Grossdeutschland Division, who hopefully would manage to lead the battalion more efficiently. Von Wietersheim also complained about the poor air support, claiming that the Luftwaffe reconnaissance was insufficient and had led to friendly fire incidents, as when his own troops had been bombed by German aircraft. But von Wietersheim did not only complain, he also had some praise for the Soviet cavalry, which he had found consisted of very good troops.303
At the 14th Panzer Division command post, Wöhler was informed that Kampfgruppe von Brese, which had been out of communication for a few days, had managed to break out in a north-westerly direction and had reached Vyasovok. Thus the battle group had actually only succeeded in breaking out from its own encirclement into the larger pocket consisting of XI and XXXXII Corps. With Kampfgruppe von Brese more or less permanently removed from the 14th Panzer Division, Unrein’s division was weak in infantry as well as tanks.304
Wöhler departed before von Wietersheim’s tanks began to advance at noon. Meeting only weak opposition, they drove through Meshigorka and on towards Zhuravka, where they surprised Soviet units marching westward. In the confusion caused by the sudden appearance of German tanks, the Soviet columns suffered losses, before the German tanks turned back towards Meshigorka. The lack of infantry to protect them made it risky for the German tanks to maintain forward positions during darkness.305
While Wöhler consulted with some of the commanders in the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, Lieb was busy assembling a varied attack force near Steblev. It struck at 11.00hrs, advancing towards Shenderovka. Aside from the obvious advantage of getting closer to the main German forces outside the pocket, the purpose of the attack was to take some pressure off the weak German forces defending in the Olshana–Burty region. Initially the Germans made good progress, reaching the outskirts of Shenderovka within three hours. At that point Soviet reinforcements arrived, while the attacking German forces had become extended, causing the attack to ground to a halt.306
Information on the outcome of the fighting at Steblev reached 8th Army staff at 16.30hrs, and Wöhler concluded that the northern front of the pocket should be shortened in order to release units that could be sent to Steblev. At 18.00hrs Wöhler called Busse at Army Group South to discuss the idea, but the answer was blunt. Field Marshal von Manstein considered a withdrawal to be out of the question, as the army group was bound by orders from OKH. Two hours later, 8th Army received an order from Army Group South that the positions in the north of the pocket should be held.307
Almost simultaneously, Lieb sent a radio message to 8th Army that he would have to pull out a reinforced battalion from the assault group at Steblev, in order to hold the front line in the north. Perhaps this gave von Manstein and Busse second thoughts. At 22.15hrs Lieb was instructed to report as soon as possible what forces he could release by a withdrawal of the northern front.308
While the generals wasted time by debating, there were pressing matters to take care of. More than 1,000 wounded men remained within the pocket. It had been hoped that they might be flown out from Matusov, but the advance by the Red Army ruled out the use of Matusov as an air field. Instead, the wounded were to be transported over muddy roads to the Korsun air strip and from there evacuated from the pocket.309
The weather continued to be difficult to predict, but the thaw seemed to continue. The roads had frozen during the night of 29 January, but when temperatures rose during the following day they became muddy. Some of the smaller roads were no longer negotiable, except for tracked vehicles. On 31 January the troublesome weather continued. The sky was covered by clouds in the morning, but they began to clear before noon. Again the temperature was just above freezing. The roads deteriorated further.310
Early in the afternoon, ominous clouds gathered again and soon rain showers and snow squalls took turns making life even more miserable for the troops. The German infantry in the positions closest to the enemy suffered the most. In worn-out clothing and Zeltbahnen (waterproof fabric with which soldiers were issued) the riflemen of 14th Panzer Division got little cover from the elements. They became wet during the day and froze during the night. Covered by dirt they soon resembled moving clods of clay. It was no surprise that the number of soldiers who got ill increased sharply. The only means of lessening the hardship for the soldiers would have been to provide them with sufficiently frequent periods of rest in better quarters. However, the very low trench strength, caused by the prolonged fighting, meant that all available soldiers were needed at the front. In this way a vicious circle was created. Casualty rates forced the units to rely on fewer men, who then had to spend more time at the trenches. This in turn meant that the burden increased on the remaining soldiers, who became more prone to suffer from disease or from the accidents that were more likely to happen because of their exhausted condition. More men subsequently had to be evacuated, and the pressure on the remaining soldiers increased. The 14th Panzer Division was by no means unique among the German units fighting at Korsun, and most likely many soldiers of the two Soviet Fronts would probably find the description accurate too.311