Even if there was a daytime thaw, the temperature at night could still be bitterly cold. When Anton Meiser woke up in the morning on 31 January he saw that two of his comrades did not move. One of them had frozen to death during the night; the other was still alive, but so deeply chilled that he could not move his legs. Both were placed on a sledge and sent north, where it was believed that a dressing station was located. Meiser never found out if they had reached their destination.312
During the night Lieb and his staff had pondered how many units would be released by shortening the front in the north. The answer, received by 03.40hrs at 8th Army staff, was two battalions and three artillery batteries. Hardly an impressive force, but given the overall strength of the XXXXII Corps it was not insignificant. The information did not provoke any immediate reaction from the decision makers higher up in the command structure.313
Nevertheless, Lieb was not alone in realizing the need for a withdrawal from the Dnepr. At 09.00hrs Speidel and Busse held a telephone conversation in which Busse emphasized that the order to hold on to the Dnepr originated from OKH. Busse said that there should not be any talk of withdrawing the front, but of the enemy pushing the front back. It was evident that none of the German commanders in the Ukraine would do the utmost to hold on to the Dnepr. They could only hope that Soviet pressure would be strong enough to offer an excuse for a retreat, but not so strong that it was a serious menace. With the policy practised by Hitler, retreats were only possible when units were under attack.314
Despite the shortage of troops, the German attack force south of Steblev did make some progress on 31 January, even though results were more modest than on the day before. Tarashcha, Turkentsy, and Petrushki were taken, but the advance was only two to three kilometers.315
The situation at Olshana had been critical for a few days, and on 31 January Soviet forces, most likely from Major-General Beloshnichenko’s 63rd Cavalry Division, attacked near Verbovka, which was situated just east of Olshana. This move threatened to cut off Olshana from the rest of the pocket held by XI and XXXXII Corps. Very weak elements of the SS-Wiking Division were defending the corridor between Olshana and XI Corps’ main forces, a corridor in which Verbovka was an important part. Fortunately for the defenders, Kampfgruppe von Brese arrived to bolster the lines.316
One can not help wondering what von Brese thought about this situation. First his Kampfgruppe had been surrounded and isolated for several days near Kapitanovka. After having extricated most of his force from there, he was now ordered to stick his nose into another dangerous location where the threat of isolation was imminent. If von Brese did have such fears, events further to the east probably strengthened his worries. Early on 31 January the Red Army attacked west of Matusov and made good progress, reaching Nosachev, about 10 kilometers north of Matusov, where the Germans still defended. By committing its last reserves, the XI Corps managed to create something resembling a defense line, but they could only hold on and hope that the Soviets did not send reinforcements. The Germans were fortunate that the 2nd Ukrainian Front was at the moment still moving the main forces of 4th Guards Army forward, but this was not known to Stemmermann.317
The western part of the pocket, where the German 88th Division defended, had seen relatively little action since the Germans withdrew to the Rossava River line. One reason was that the 1st Ukrainian Front had few units with offensive capabilities in the area. This sector was mostly covered by units from the 54th and 159th fortified regions, units that were mainly suited to defense. The 27th Army had, quite correctly, sent most of its more mobile units into the breakthrough, but on 31 January it was again able to attack the German-held, nose-shaped front west of Boguslav. The Germans were pushed back to the Khutora–Boguslav line before halting the Soviet attack.318
At the XXXXVII Panzer Corps staff, some optimism was nurtured. The 13th Panzer Division began to arrive, and at 15.00hrs Major-General Hans Mikosch, the division commander, entered Reinhard’s staff room to discuss the forthcoming operations. His division was not particularly strong, since it had only 18 combat-ready tanks and less than half of them had arrived. The division was also short 4,152 officers and men. Furthermore, the muddy roads caused delays, and von Vormann suspected that only 100 riflemen from the division would be available to attack at dawn on 1 February. Nevertheless, this was the first major reinforcement von Vormann could throw into the Korsun battle in a way he chose, rather than being forced to dance to the tune played by Konev.319
He derived additional consolation from the successful raid carried out by 11th Panzer Division, which again had sent its tanks roving around Meshigorka. In this attack, which was just a prelude to the main assault planned for 1 February, von Wietersheim’s tankers claimed to have destroyed 15 enemy tanks. The 11th Panzer Division was intended to strike from its staging area northwest of Novo Mirgorod and the 13th Panzer Division was to jump off from its bridgehead over the Bolshaya Vyss River at Petro Ostrov. They were to converge and cross the Shpolka River west of Shpola. It was hoped that Soviet pressure on Gruppe Stemmermann would thereby be reduced.320
Still, von Vormann remained skeptical of the chance of success, and at 16.00hrs he talked with Speidel over the telephone. Von Vormann thought that only the armored group plus a weak infantry regiment with only 100 riflemen would be available from 13th Panzer Division, and he doubted if the planned attack could take place.
“Under all circumstances must the armored group and the infantry regiment from 13th Panzer Division thrust forward tomorrow,” Speidel replied.
“The mission is unclear,” von Vormann responded, “whether the thrust should go over Shpola, or west of Shpola.”
“The first mission is to thrust into the flank and rear of the enemy group at Shpola, but the group must be prepared to thrust west of Shpola.”
“But then we must we must have more information on the enemy and friendly forces west of Shpola.”
“The attacking units themselves will have to establish the enemy situation. The XI Corps is at Matusov. 8th Army can not wait another 24 hours. Tomorrow the 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions must attack.”
“But the 11th Panzer Division is engaged at Turiya and Tishkovka,” von Vormann protested, “and its armored group is fighting at Lebedin, where it has knocked out 15 enemy tanks.”