“The thrust tomorrow will have to be carried out. We can not leave XI Corps in the lurch.”
“But with a mere 100 riflemen I cannot thrust north with an unlimited objective.”
“The objective is not unlimited; the objective is the south wing of XI Corps.”321
Thus ended the discussion, but an hour and a half later Wöhler called von Vormann and again emphasized the need for attacking as early as possible the following day, with all available elements of the 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions, without concern for the flanks, in order to establish contact with the XI Corps. Von Vormann again had objections.
“I fully understand the need for the attack, but what should I do if the enemy thrust southwest from Shpola?”
“Cover the flank with a battalion,” Wöhler replied.
“But I don’t have a battalion to spare.”
“The attack is ordered and I demand that it will begin as soon as possible tomorrow. I also ask you to relieve 3rd Panzer Division with 376th Infantry division more rapidly. It seems that the enemy is getting weaker in that sector.”322
Wöhler’s decision was a difficult one, of course. Possibly he was reassured that it was the right one when Wenck called a few minutes later. The 1st Panzer Army had reconnoitered the roads south of Zvenigorodka and found all of them to be empty of Soviet units. Also, the Red Army had dug in opposite the VII Corps. This suggested that the threat to von Vormann’s western flank was weak or non-existent. Von Vormann’s attack at least stood a fairly good chance of releasing some of the enemy pressure on Gruppe Stemmermann, and might perhaps even manage to establish contact with it.323
Stemmermann needed every respite he could get. The southeastern part of the pocket seemed to be on the verge of becoming cut off from the rest of his forces, something he could ill afford. On muddy roads it had been possible to move 750 wounded to Korsun, out of the roughly 1,000 men who had previously been assembled near Matusov. They still had to be flown out however, and one could never trust the weather to be cooperative. Everything that might prevent the Red Army from closing in on the airfield was desirable.324
CHAPTER 10
Von Vormann’s Counterattack
At 06.00hrs on 1 February, the armor of the 11th Panzer Division which, including subordinated units, possessed 35 tanks and assault guns,325 began attacking towards Meshigorka. Meeting weak opposition, the division made rapid progress. Wöhler flew to the staff of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps at 09.30hrs and received good news about the progress of the attack. However, he also learned that there was an urgent need for more manpower. The divisions were chronically short of riflemen, but there was little Wöhler could do about it.326
By 11.30hrs von Wietersheim’s division had reached Skotorevo, more than 20 kilometers from the jump-off area. Continuing towards Kapustino it met with fierce resistance, but the Panzers captured the village and moved on to Iskrennoye, where they established a bridgehead over the Shpolka River in the early afternoon. So far, von Wietersheim could be very satisfied, but difficulties soon became apparent.
There was only one bridge over the Shpolka River at Iskrennoye, but it seemed quite strong. A Panther tank moved on to the bridge and successfully crossed to the northern side of the river, but when the second Panther tried, the weight of the tank proved too great and the bridge collapsed.327
The 13th Panzer Division had jumped off two hours later than the 11th, but it also made good progress and was able to cover the left flank of von Wietersheim’s division, as the latter closed in on Kapustino. However, since neither division possessed the necessary equipment to construct a new bridge to replace the one that had collapsed, the requisite materials would have to be brought up and that would take time.328
On 1 February, von Vormann, as well as Mikosch and von Wietersheim, set up their command posts at Mokraya Kaligorka, little more than 15 kilometers south of the bridgehead at Iskrennoye. Before noon the commander of the 55th Nebelwerfer Regiment arrived at the XXXXVII Panzer Corps command post. His regiment, except one battalion which had been detached, was not far away and it was decided to subordinate it to 11th Panzer Division.329
Later in the afternoon the first Soviet counterattacks took place. Rotmistrov had dispatched tanks from 29th Tank Corps, which operated from Vasilkovka and probed the east flank of 11th Panzer Division, especially at Skotorevo. The German commanders were well aware of the exposed east flank. They planned to use the 3rd Panzer Division to cover the flank, as soon as it had been relieved by the 376th Infantry Division, a process that began at dusk. The intent was to resume the advance north from the bridgehead at Iskrennoye on 2 February.330
There was every need for the XXXXVII Panzer Corps to continue its attack, as the XXXXII Corps’ attack south of Steblev made relatively little progress. Having set out at 08.00hrs, the hodgepodge German force had slowly advanced during the day, finally penetrating into Selishche and Kvitki, where street fighting was still raging at dusk.331
Lieb had every reason to worry about the slow progress south of Steblev, as the Red Army would certainly not stand idle. In the morning, the 27th Army resumed its attacks on the northern sector of the pocket, where it probed the German defenses at Maslovka and Kosin. However, Lieb was reassured by the progress of the Steblev group, which had managed to double the distance between the Soviet ground forces and the vital airfield at Korsun. For the moment, the Red Army could only interfere with the activity on the airfield by using long range artillery.332
There remained another threat to the air supply operation: the Red Air Force. On 1 February, some of the wounded were flown out of the pocket, but before noon, two Ju-52s loaded with wounded were shot down by Soviet fighters just after take-off. One officer who was brought on board a Junkers was Heinz Moritz, commander of the 1st Company of the tank battalion of SS-Wiking, who had become ill and it was decided that he should be flown out. Perhaps some of his fellow soldiers considered him fortunate to be evacuated from the pocket. However, he was aboard one of the Junkers that was shot down and he was killed when the aircraft crashed, together with the crew and the other wounded men.333
Of the other 11 aircraft that took off, two had to make emergency landings right after take-off and one was delayed, presumably due to Soviet fighter activity. The remaining eight seem to have made it to the air bases outside the pocket. Lieb demanded that the Luftwaffe should provide continuous fighter cover over the airfield. This was easy to demand but more difficult to achieve, since the weather remained fickle. Fog could suddenly close in on the air base and the thaw made the runways soft. Both sides had reason to complain that it was difficult to provide air support in a timely and well planned fashion.334
Gruppe Stemmermann had little air defense units available. The two corps had no independent Flak units, all available Flak belonging organically to the divisions. The infantry divisions usually had only a company of light AAA. The SS-Wiking had a few 88mm guns, but since the troops also had to have some air defense, it was difficult to concentrate much AAA on the air field. The Flak company of Korps-Gruppe B was sent to protect Korsun airfield, and on 1 February it was able to shoot down a Yak-7.335
Since he had been defending a bridge on the night of 29 January, Anton Meiser had been separated from his artillery battery. He found it again early in the morning of 1 February. The march westward continued, sometimes on roads littered with destroyed vehicles and dead horses. At noon a new threat appeared, one which they had been spared thus far during the arduous retreat. Soviet fighter aircraft began to strafe the German artillery vehicles as the latter approached a small village. Thanks to a brave initiative by Lieutenant Sorajewski, all carriages made it through the village. The small force continued toward Vyasovok and finally reached its parent corps. However, the men had only succeeded in moving from a small pocket into a larger one.336