Aside from Vatutin’s attack on the northern face of the pocket, which was more an attempt to get an accurate picture of the German defenses, Konev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front made the only effort on 1 February to dent the pocket, when the attacks in the Burty sector were repeated. These failed, however, even though the XI Corps was strained. Stemmermann reported that casualties were about 300 men per day, and the supply brought in by air was insufficient to replace them. The losses were concentrated among the combat units, where the manpower situation was strained already before the battle began.337
While Gruppe Stemmermann remained at risk, 8th Army continued to exert pressure on von Vormann. Just before midnight, Speidel and von Vormann spoke on the telephone and von Vormann said that he could not carry out the strike north the following day. The long flank could not be covered and the collapsed bridge at Iskrennoye was a serious obstacle, exacerbated by the delay in getting bridging equipment forward.
Speidel insisted however: “The army is well aware of the situation, but the attack must under all circumstances continue, to establish connection with Gruppe Stemmermann. The 3rd Panzer Division is moving forward. There is no alternative.”
“I could certainly thrust forward to XI Corps with my tanks, but then I would have to call them back, since I don’t have the infantry to cover the long corridor that would be the result, and the tanks can not be left without infantry in the terrain.”
“We know that, but it would be an important accomplishment if connection could be established, and a supply convoy could be sent into the pocket. Also it would mean that the enemy rear would be interrupted. Furthermore, it would have positive effects on the morale of the encircled soldiers.”338
Speidel continued to emphasize that the mission assigned by the 8th Army remained, and that he regarded this as the last opportunity to assist the XI Corps. Von Vormann required the 3rd Panzer Division to cover his east flank, and Speidel said that the deployment of 3rd Panzer Division was von Vormann’s decision. Von Vormann replied that he would make the final decision early in the morning.339
Time was pressing for von Vormann, but he could do little more than stand by as a spectator on 2 February, while the engineers worked hard to rebuild the destroyed bridge at Iskrennoye. Not only did the delay mean that Gruppe Stemmermann would be more exposed, but also the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army would have more time in which to attack the German bridgehead, which was still only weakly defended. Before noon his fears were partly realized. Rotmistrov directed an attack towards the 11th Panzer’s east flank, on the southern side of the Shpolka River. Von Wietersheim’s division repelled the threat, but the attack was an ominous sign of what might come.340
If he were to advance north from the Iskrennoye bridgehead at 14.00hrs as planned, von Wietersheim needed reinforcements. These were on their way. The 3rd Panzer Division had been relieved by the 376th Infantry Division and had been marching toward its assembly area since 05.00hrs, but the muddy roads had caused delays.341 Perhaps even more important to von Vormann was the 24th Panzer Division, which had been located near Nikopol, about 300 kilometers from Korsun, when it received orders to reinforce the XXXXVII Panzer Corps. Struggling on bad roads that had been weakened by the thaw, it had not only lost time, but also used up an inordinate amount of fuel and caused many of its vehicles to bog down or break down. Flying in a Fieseler Storch, von Vormann went to see how the division progressed. What he learned was not encouraging. The march had been troublesome from the beginning, but became progressively worse the closer to Korsun the columns came. In the evening the division began to cover the last part of its arduous journey, from Novo Archangelsk to Yampol.
Of the 192 vehicles in one of the Panzer grenadier regiments, 40 become stranded along the road, while the repair services had a very difficult time just reaching the vehicles that needed repair. As the tanks negotiated the mud, the fuel consumption rose alarmingly, forcing them to wait for replenishment.342
At 12.00hrs Wöhler arrived by aircraft at von Vormann’s command post, where he also met Hans Mikosch and Wend von Wietersheim. They discussed the situation and Wöhler learnt that so far only a provisional bridge with a maximum capacity of 10 tons had been constructed. Equipment for a K-Bridge would soon arrive, but such a bridge could only support 24 tons and would not carry a Panther. In fact, within the entire army area there was no J-Bridge equipment available, a type that had a capacity of 60 tons.343
Von Vormann’s complaints about the exposed flanks were also confirmed. On 1 February the Soviet forces had quickly noted that the German attack had begun, and soon countermeasures were initiated. In particular these were directed at the flanks of the German attack force. Nevertheless, Wöhler still insisted that the attack should proceed to the encircled corps.344
Before he left, Wöhler reprimanded von Vormann. Wöhler was very disappointed with the previous day’s discussions and told von Vormann that his reports on the situation must be clear and precise, and that there should be no debate. The army was in no position to give missions covering several days. Von Vormann should not complain about the missions he received, rather he should focus on keeping his divisions together instead of splitting them up. Currently, everything was about breaking through to Stemmermann, thus flank protection should be kept as thin as possible.345
Obviously Wöhler was very disappointed with von Vormann, but in fairness it must be said that the problems the XXXXVII Panzer Corps’ commander saw were very real. At the same time, Wöhler seems to have felt a responsibility to help Gruppe Stemmermann by whatever means possible.
On the following day, Wöhler admitted that an attack to the north from the bridgehead was futile. By that time the K-Bridge had been built, allowing Panzerz IVs and StuG IIIs to cross the river, but since Panthers made up half von Vormann’s tank strength, the bridge was insufficient. The fact that there was no available bridging equipment capable of taking the weight of a Panther was hardly von Vormann’s fault, as no such equipment was available in Wöhler’s entire army.346
Around 12.00hrs, the 3rd Panzer Division began to assemble southeast of Iskrennoye, but it had to fend off counterattacks on its right flank while on the march. In any case, bridge construction at Iskrennoye required more time than expected, partly because of Soviet fire directed at the area where the bridge was to be constructed. Von Vormann would have to wait one more day before advancing from the bridgehead.347
The 376th Infantry Division received two battalions with replacement personnel on 2 February. Often it was the lack of riflemen that set the limit on how wide a frontage the divisions could cover, and by this addition of new soldiers, the 376th Division could widen its front, thereby enabling 320th Division to take over the sector held by the 14th Panzer Division, which in turn became free for von Vormann to use. The 14th Panzer Division was weak, but nevertheless it was an added asset.348