Rotmistrov chose to continue the probing attacks on the east flank of the German salient at Iskrennoye. Using infantry from the 49th Rifle Corps and tanks from 29th Tank Corps, the Soviets harassed the 11th Panzer Division. The action was quite modest and von Vormann realized that it would be better to wait until 4 February for the main event, which would then coincide with the III Panzer Corps opening up its offensive. The 24th Panzer Division was assembling at Yampol, some 30 kilometers south of Zvenigorodka, and would be available to von Vormann on 4 February, giving him a stronger hand to play with. Indeed, without the 24th Panzer Division his task would probably have been impossible.359 Von Vormann’s attacks had been quite weak thus far, but meanwhile a stronger counterattack was being prepared in the sector of 1st Panzer Army, further west.
CHAPTER 11
Hube Assembles a Relief Force
The first major combat unit sent to the staging area for the relief attempt by 1st Panzer Army was the 17th Panzer Division. The decision was taken on 28 January and the division was expected to be ready for action in the VII Corps’ area early on 31 January.360 It was to be followed by the 16th Panzer Division, the SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and the heavy Panzer regiment Bäke.361 These units were to disengage during the night of 30 January and to be ready to attack on 3 February.362
On 29 January, 1st Panzer Army ordered that 16th Panzer Division and the units of Breith’s III Panzer Corps should be the first to disengage, followed by the SS-Leibstandarte.363 In the meantime the weather deteriorated. The thaw caused the ground to become muddy so that it was necessary to improve roads and bridges to cope with the traffic resulting from the movement of several Panzer divisions. Since many 45-ton Panthers and 57-ton Tigers were to participate, bridges had to be constructed or reinforced to carry 60-ton loads.364
Engineers and construction units subordinated to 1st Panzer Army were ordered to end their current work and begin to transfer to the VII Corps’ area. The army engineer commander (Armee-Pioniere-Führer) was sent to VII Corps to coordinate the work. At least two roads were required that could support heavy tanks moving toward the assembly area. Rail transport was to be used for most of the tracked vehicles of the relief force, but since the railroads did not cover the full distance to the staging area, some road travel would still be necessary.365
In addition to its own resources, 1st Panzer Army was to be reinforced by the 1st Panzer Division, commanded by Major-General Richard Koll. The division had been engaged in action with the 4th Panzer Army, but was still a strong unit. It would not be available on 3 February, however, when the relief operation was planned to commence, since the distances involved were considerable. Also, the whole division could not immediately be relieved. Consequently, it created a strong advance detachment to be taken out of the line almost immediately and moved to the VII Corps’ area. Breith must have realized that he could not count on committing the 1st Panzer Division as a complete division. Rather he would have to expect to use Koll’s division in a piecemeal fashion.366
In the meantime, the XXXXVI and III Panzer Corps finished off the Soviet forces encircled in the Balabanovka area. The Germans claimed that Operation Watutin was a considerable success. It was reported that 701 Soviet tanks and assault guns had been destroyed or captured, together with 213 artillery pieces and 468 anti-tank guns.367 While such claims are often exaggerated, it should be noted that German claims were usually relatively close to the mark,368 so it is reasonable to conclude that Soviet equipment losses were indeed considerable.
The planned relief operation was given the code name “Wanda” on 30 January. Formal orders were issued to the III Panzer Corps, in which it was given the mission of attacking in the direction of Medvin–Koshevatoe, with the purpose of establishing contact with the encircled German forces and destroying the Soviet forces in the area between the VII Corps and 8th Army. The corps was to attack at dawn on 3 February, using the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, plus the heavy tank regiment Bäke. The SS-Leibstandarte was expected to be available one day later. The 198th Infantry Division would be temporarily subordinated to Breith’s Corps, as might the 34th Infantry Division.369
In the war diary of 1st Panzer Army for 30 January it was noted that the operations section of the staff assembled in a separate room for a short celebration of the 12th anniversary of Hitler’s assumption of power in Germany, through which “the Reich regained its freedom. The highest mission for every soldier was to defend this freedom with all his powers in the proud feeling of connection with the struggling German nation.”370 It should be noted that this passage in the war diary is a very rare example of anything with political connotations in the documents.
While the planning and preparations proceeded, the front was relatively serene on the VII Corps’ sector after 28 January. The Red Army conducted nothing greater than local battalion-sized attacks, and the Germans were content with holding their positions.371 At this time the front line ran along the Pobodna–Shubennyi Stav axis.
The condition of the roads had deteriorated considerably due to the warm weather, making it difficult for the III Panzer Corps to complete its assembly in the prescribed time. Early on 2 February, 1st Panzer Army suggested that the attack be postponed one day, a proposition that III Panzer Corps found very welcome. After lunch, Field Marshal von Manstein arrived at the 1st Panzer Army staff and he concurred with the proposal. The III Panzer Corps suggested that it should employ its forces not mainly according to tactical and operational factors, but rather in response to the prevailing conditions of the muddy terrain. It was necessary to select attack directions where it was possible to advance without getting completely stuck in mud. The corps was given full freedom to choose attack routes.372
On 3 February the thaw continued. No combat actions took place across the 1st Panzer Army front, except for sporadic exchanges of artillery fire and some patrol activity. While the III Panzer Corps struggled to get its units in position for the attacks that were to be launched within less than 24 hours, the weather and Soviet pressure on the two encircled corps caused a change to the plan. Originally it was intended that the III Panzer Corps should attack northward, cross the Gniloi Tikich River, proceed to Medvin and then turn east, toward the surrounded corps. Due to the muddy ground, which would make the attack proceed more slowly than originally anticipated, and the fact that the pocket had been compressed, it was decided that the III Panzer Corps should turn right almost immediately after crossing the Gniloi Tikich River.373
In mud and slush, the soldiers of the III Panzer Corps struggled to get their equipment in position. The force that managed to assemble for the attack was fairly strong. Although the 17th Panzer Division had only 15 Panzer IVs operational, these were complemented by eight Panthers and eight Tigers from the heavy Panzer regiment Bäke. All of these were available on the morning of 4 February in time for the attack. The 16th Panzer Division had 40 Panthers, 26 Panzer IVs, and 18 StuG IIIs operational. Also the s.Pz.Abt. 506 with eight combat-ready Tigers was attached to the 16th Panzer Division and the StuG.Abt. 249 was attached to the 17th Panzer Division. The assault gun battalion was quite weak, though, as on 1 February it only had three StuG IIIs operational. Thus the corps had 126 tanks and assault guns available at the beginning of Operation Wanda.374