For the Germans in 1944 this was a pretty impressive attack force, especially considering that more than half the tanks were Panthers and Tigers. Furthermore, the corps knew that the 1st SS-Panzer Division and the 1st Panzer Division would soon arrive and be able to provide flank cover. Thus the initial attack force could concentrate on pushing forward.
As we have seen, the second prong of the German relief attack, the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, had not been in a position to assemble such a strong force. In fact, von Vormann made little specific preparations, but instead he was forced to try to create an attack force from the midst of a defensive battle. This attack force had already been committed on 1 February and had largely got stuck. Von Vormann’s hopes rested with the 24th Panzer Division, since it was the only new force he could commit. However, the 24th Panzer could not be regarded as a fresh division up to strength. It was short of 4,168 officers and men and had only 17 Panzer IVs and 14 StuG IIIs operational, plus a few command tanks.375
As a result, the German rescue attempt depended on Breith’s corps, which not only possessed a much stronger armored punch, but had recently concluded a successful encirclement, which may well have boosted morale. In addition, the formations had been given a few days free from combat. Admittedly the soldiers had had to struggle in the mud to reach the assembly areas, but most likely that was preferable to the horrors of combat. In comparison, von Vormann had only one advantage—a shorter distance to the pocket. This mattered little if his forces proved insufficient to break through the Soviet defenses.
CHAPTER 12
Breith’s III Panzer Corps Attacks
Hermann Breith was a very experienced Panzer commander. In October 1941 he had taken command of the 3rd Panzer Division and led it during the battles outside Moscow in the harsh winter of 1941–42. He continued to command the division during the Kharkov battle in May 1942, where a quarter of a million Soviet soldiers were captured. In the summer offensive that followed, Breith led the 3rd Panzer Division when it advanced into the Caucasus until he left the division on 1 October 1942. Three months later, he was given command of the III Panzer Corps, a position he held, with the exception of a few short periods, until the end of the war. During his combat career he had seen many difficult actions, especially the retreat from the Caucasus and the extrication through the Rostov bottleneck in January–February 1943. All these actions had been very important, but the task given him in February 1944 was the most important and difficult thus far, as was signified by the forces given to him. At the beginning of the offensive, his units had 105 tanks and 21 assault guns.376 Sixty-four of the tanks were Tigers or Panthers.
The number of tanks available at the outset of the offensive was impressive for the German army at this stage of the war. Breith also knew that both the 1st and 1st SS-Panzer Divisions were on the way to reinforce his corps. He could count on them adding more than 150 operational tanks and assault guns to his initial force, of which more than half were Tigers or Panthers.377 In fact, more than half of all Tigers and Panthers on the Eastern Front were either with Breith’s corps, or on the way to it. These figures compared very favorably to the forces available to von Vormann, whose XXXXVII Panzer Corps only had 58 tanks and assault guns in running order on 4 February, with little prospect of being reinforced.378 If Breith could not fight his way to the surrounded Germans, nobody would succeed.
According to the plan, the 16th Panzer Division, commanded by Major-General Hans-Ulrich Back, would attack from the line at Chervona Sirka–Poboika, via Tinovka, and establish a bridgehead across the Gniloi Tikich River in the Kosyakovka–Veselyy Kut region. From there it was to advance south of Medvin toward Morentsy. The 17th Panzer Division, commanded by Major-General Karl-Friedrich von der Meden, would jump off from the area north of Roskoshevka over Pavlovka and Votylevka, and take a bridgehead over the Gniloi Tikich River between Semenovka and Boyarka. From there it would proceed to Morentsy via the Lisyanka area.379
The main Soviet formation blocking the projected German attack was the 104 Rifle Corps, with the 58th and 133rd Rifle Divisions. However, there were reserves available. The 6th Tank Army was deployed between Vinograd and Zvenigorodka, with many of its combat units behind the line. This meant that the army was deployed east of the direction along which the Germans were going to attack.380
We have seen that the 5th Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from 6th Tank Army after Zvenigorodka had been liberated. On the evening of 3 February it returned and took up positions between Zhabinka and Yablonovka. The 5th Mechanized Corps was not only a valuable asset that could prove useful if the Germans struck, it was also a boost to the morale of the men in 6th Tank Army to get back the unit that had been absent for almost a week.381
It is unclear why the Soviet 6th Tank Army was deployed east of the German attack axis. Possibly it just remained there as a result of its advance towards Zvenigorodka. Whether Soviet intelligence identified the German attack direction or not is unclear. The deployment of 6th Tank Army could be interpreted either way. It may have been placed along the Vinograd–Zvenigorodka axis to block a German advance along the most direct route to the two encircled corps. But it may also have been placed there to be in position to launch a flanking attack against a German attack along the Roskoshevka–Boyarka axis. The latter interpretation has its problems though; in particular the fact that the muddy roads would make it time consuming to move the 6th Tank Army west if it were to strike the Germans in the flank.
To the Germans, it appeared that the attack on 4 February had come as a surprise to the Red Army.382 This fact suggested that at least the direction of the attack was not the one anticipated by the 1st Ukrainian Front. Another possibility is that the Soviet commanders hoped that their holding attacks would prevent the Germans from forming an attack force, but such hopes were not fulfilled. The Soviet General Staff Study claims that already on 31 January the 1st Ukrainian Front had reached the conclusion that the Germans intended to attack in a northeasterly direction from the Russalovka–Rubannyi Most–Pavlovka sector.383 Such statements should be taken with a grain of salt, but if true, it is not surprising that the 6th Tank Army was in fact deployed east of the German attack axis.
The morning of 4 February was sunny, except for a few clouds. The temperature was well above freezing and the thaw continued. The thaw did not augur well for the Germans, but the attack could no longer be postponed, especially as nothing suggested that colder weather could be expected within a day or two. The only alternative was to launch the attack according to the plans already made.
At 6.00hrs the 17th Panzer Division, including the heavy Panther and Tiger tanks of Panzer Regiment Bäke, jumped off. The Soviet defense consisted mainly of infantry and antitank guns protected by minefields. Despite Soviet flanking fire, the Germans broke through the first and second Soviet defense lines. Panzer Regiment Bäke was concentrated on the left. It managed to cross the railroad and by 10.00hrs it had penetrated into Pavlovka. Progress was slower on the right wing, where infantry attacked through a partly forested area and fighting continued there well into the afternoon. After taking Pavlovka, Bäke continued the advance in a north-northeast direction and joined forces with Pz.Rgt. 39, which had advanced west of Vinograd. Together the two tank formations broke into Votylevka at 12.45hrs.384