Half an hour later than 17th Panzer Division, at 06.30hrs, the 16th Panzer Division began its attack. Strong Soviet resistance was initially encountered, especially when the division crossed the railroad embankment a few kilometers south of Tinovka. Despite enemy opposition and ground softened by thaw, the tanks battled on, captured Tinovka and reached hill 229.8 (two kilometers east-southeast of Stanislavchik) by 13.00hrs.385
The two Panzer divisions had made good progress so far, but the 198th Infantry Division had less success with its flanking attack. It did not manage to take advantage of the breakthrough made by 17th Panzer Division. Strong Soviet frontal opposition was supported by flanking fire from Shubenyy Stav and hill 243.4. The fighting raged for hours until noon, when the Soviet defenders began to evacuate their positions. They retreated to the Vinograd–Bosovka–Yablonovka area and the Germans took the low hills between Vinograd and Shubenyy Stav (240.6 and 236.9). The 198th Division prepared to attack the new Soviet positions, but this could not be done before the artillery had replenished its ammunition.386
While the 17th Panzer Division had been very successful before noon, it made far less progress in the afternoon. The infantry found it difficult to follow the tanks and the latter had to halt at Votylevka. Not until 15.00hrs could the infantry begin to clear Pavlovka, and allow Reconnaissance Battalion 17 to begin to open the road to the tanks in Votylevka. The 107th Infantry Regiment, subordinated from 34th Infantry Division, approached the southern outskirts of Vinograd, with the mission of covering the right flank of 17th Panzer Division.387
The 16th Panzer Division made better progress during the afternoon. After a short break, the tanks that had reached hill 229.8 turned towards Fedyukovka, which was soon taken. This opened the way to Kosyakovka on the Gniloi Tikich River, and at dusk the tanks broke into the southern parts of Kosyakovka. Unlike the 17th Panzer Division, Back’s division had managed to push its infantry forward much faster. At the end of the day, it had reached almost as far as the tanks. Possibly this was due to the fact that the 16th Panzer Division was much better supplied with armored half-tracks for the grenadiers.388
Vatutin reacted to the German attack by moving elements from the 6th Tank Army west. They were unsuccessfully employed in the defense of Pavlovka but also, and with greater success, against the German 198th Infantry Division. In addition, the 2nd Tank Army, which had been in the 1st Ukrainian Front reserve, was moving to counterattack the III Panzer Corps. The 2nd Tank Army did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting on 4 February, but it assembled in the Goisika–Razumnitsa area during the night of 4 February.389
The Germans also had reinforcements moving up. Kampfgruppe Huppert was the first element of 1st Panzer Division expected to arrive, and it was decided that this formation would join 198th Infantry Division and try to take the high ground between Shubenyy Stav and Bosovka. The intent was to open a supply route over Frankovka/Bushanka to use for the later stages of Operation Wanda. Further to the west, the lead elements of the 1st SS-Panzer Division had reached the Novaya Greblya–Krasny area early in the afternoon, but it could not be assumed that they would be ready for action before 10.00hrs on 5 February.390
The 1st Panzer Army was disappointed that the 17th Panzer Division had not reached the Gniloi Tikich River, and requested that a night attack be made by the division. It was also proposed that the division could be supplied by air. Orders were issued to 17th Panzer Division at 22.00hrs. However, General von der Meden, 17th Panzer’s commander, disagreed, since the area in front of the division was covered by mine fields and an attack through those during darkness would lead to heavy casualties. Furthermore, due to the catastrophic condition of the roads, the division was already low on supplies. Von der Meden recommended that the division move out at first light and try to reach a bridgehead over the Gniloi Tikich River at noon on 5 February. The III Panzer Corps concurred.391
While these discussions took place, the 16th Panzer Division cleared Kosyakovka, but found that the bridges over the Gniloi Tikich River had been blown up. The bridge column was stuck in mud south of Tinovka and could not be expected to arrive in Kosyakovka before dawn. The 16th Panzer Division was ordered to retain its hold on Kosyakovka but attack to the east with most of its strength. It was hoped that it could find a river crossing at Boyarka. Still, the efforts to create a crossing at Kosyakovka continued.392
The condition of the roads became a matter of paramount importance. During the night of 4 February, only incomplete replenishment of ammunition and fuel could be made for Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke.393 Any major effort by the regiment was inconceivable. Also, the regiment had to pull back its elements in Votylevka during the night, since they were running out of supplies, allowing Soviet forces to reoccupy parts of Votylevka. Reconnaissance Battalion 17 counterattacked from the west and managed to limit the Soviet gains.394
The partial loss of Votylevka upset Breith, and he ordered the commander of 17th Panzer Division to explain why Bäke had pulled out of Votylevka without orders to do so. Von der Meden replied that the muddy roads had made the supply of the advanced elements impossible and that there was no alternative. Ernst Merck, chief of staff of the III Panzer Corps, told von der Meden to make every use of the local population, carts, and animals to haul supplies forward. The 1st SS-Panzer Division was also told to make “ruthless” use of civilians to improve the roads.395
How difficult the mud was to deal with can best be illustrated by the fact that even the lead elements of 1st SS-Panzer Division, still not in contact with the enemy, could not be resupplied. Only the tracked vehicles had made any reasonable progress, but most of the division was stuck with its wheeled vehicles in the deep mud. Similarly, the 17th Panzer Division reported that only tracked vehicles could negotiate the roads. There was not much Hube could do for the moment, but at least the 1st Panzer Army offered a construction battalion to improve the roads in the III Panzer Corps’ sector. Had not fog made air supply impossible the Luftwaffe might have furnished Breith’s troops with fuel and ammunition, but for the moment that solution had to be disregarded. Hube could do little more than exhort the III Panzer Corps to do its utmost to get the attack rolling again.396
The Panthers, with their wide tracks, had quite low ground pressure, despite their weight. Of all German vehicles they were among the best suited to negotiate the mud. Still, on the road just west of Krivets, where most of the Leibstandarte tried to move forward, the mud was so deep that even Panthers got stuck. When its 700hp engine could not move the 45-ton tank forward, the men had to work extremely hard. The 1st SS-Panzer Division seems only to have been able to send one battle group, Kampfgruppe Heimann, into action on 5 February. This consisted of 12 assault guns with infantry from SS-Panzer Grenadier Regiment 1 riding on them. At noon it moved out from Novaya Greblya to the Tinovka area, where hard fighting was raging.397