Vatutin intended to add to the German difficulties. During the night 40th Army, 6th Tank Army, and the recently arrived 2nd Tank Army had assembled to counterattack. The 40th Army attacked in a southeasterly direction from the line Goisika–Olshanka–Konela, with the aim of taking Kuty, Antonovka, and Krachkovka. Kravchenko’s 6th Tank Army had the mission of attacking from the Ryzhanovka–Popovka area, to reach Krachkovka, Popuzhintsy, Pashchevoe, and Sokolocha. The plan was far too ambitious and the attack failed to make substantial progress.398
Since supplies could not be brought forward to the spearheads of 16th Panzer Division, the projected advance toward Boyarka had to be postponed and the positions held on 5 February. Instead the Red Army initiated counterattacks. Units from 6th Tank Army in the east and 40th Army in the west attacked the flanks of the 16th Panzer Division, whose positions protruded far into the Soviet lines. The Soviet attacks met with some success and the German spearhead in the Kosyakovka region was cut off. Further strong Soviet attacks were directed against Tinovka.399
Supply difficulties also beset Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke and the 17th Panzer Division. The division already had its reconnaissance and antitank battalions fighting in the outskirts of Votylevka. When the engineer bat talion arrived in Pavlovka, the division sent Kampfgruppe Fink (I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 40 and II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 63), supported by a few of Bäke’s Tigers, to Votylevka. After hard fighting most of Votylevka was recaptured by the Germans, but Soviet forces still held the eastern parts.400
Before noon the 198th Infantry Division sent one battalion, strongly supported by artillery and rocket artillery, to attack toward Vinograd. It managed to penetrate the town and clear the southern parts. The rest of the division faced strong Soviet resistance and made little progress.401
At about 16.00hrs Panzer Regiment Bäke had been sufficiently replenished with fuel and ammunition to send elements to reestablish connection with the 16th Panzer Division’s spearhead. A major tank battle ensued. According to German estimates, about 40 Soviet tanks participated, of which 31 were claimed to have been knocked out. Such claims should not be taken at face value, but the figures do suggest that hard fighting took place. Just after midnight Bäke’s tanks accomplished the link up, but the road conditions remained as difficult as ever.402
It was clear to the Germans that, while the opening of the offensive had been a success, by the second day the attack was bogging down. At about 18.00hrs on 5 February, Colonel Ernst Merck, Chief of Staff of the III Panzer Corps, discussed the matter with Major-General Walther Wenck, Chief of Staff of 1st Panzer Army. Merck argued that the corps could count on succeeding in attacking toward Bushanka; that is, in an eastern direction rather than the more northerly direction pursued thus far. The disadvantage with this solution was that it would cause the formation of yet another narrow protruding section of the front, which would require more precious troops to cover it. Nevertheless, Merck favored this option and wanted to use the Kampfgruppe Huppert and 17th Panzer Division to attack Repki. This would enable the corps to get a wider and more secure basis from which to continue its attacks, whether it continued according to the original plan or shifted its attack direction almost 90 degrees. Wenck said he would take up the matter as soon as possible with Hube, and within less than an hour Wenck reported that Hube had agreed.403
Hube was also in contact with von Manstein. When the original plan was conceived, the ground conditions were much better, and this kind of thaw in early February was not something the German forces had experienced during their previous winters in the Soviet Union. Hube was quite confident that his Panzers could roll over any Soviet defense consisting of infantry and antitank guns.404 Given the battles his forces had fought during the second half of January and the first day of Operation Wanda, this confidence was possibly justified.
However, the immense supply difficulties and the fact that the roads were almost impassable to wheeled vehicles (which made up the majority of the armored units on both the German and Soviet side), meant that the punch of the Panzers was to little avail. Von Manstein considered that it might be worthwhile to try to attack in another direction, since the slow progress on 5 February had made it possible for the Red Army to shift its tank and mechanized corps to block the III Panzer Corps in its present direction. Hube replied that 1st Panzer Army had already considered this, but the loss of time that would be associated with a regrouping would be unacceptable. With the present condition of the roads, a regrouping that would normally take a few hours required days.405
Von Manstein’s assumption that Soviet reinforcements were moving up was correct. As we have seen, Vatutin had already sent Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army to attack the western side of the wedge that the III Panzer Corps had driven into the 1st Ukrainian Front. Further units arrived on 6 February. The 202nd and 340th Rifle Divisions moved up on the western side of the protruding spearheads of the III Panzer Corps, while the 32nd Antitank Brigade occupied defensive positions north of the Gniloi Tikich River. Vatutin led the reinforcement race, even though the two rifle divisions were not immediately ready to go into action. The 2nd Tank Army was ready for combat, however, and had been tasked with counterattacking in the Tinovka area on the morning of 6 February, but the attack failed to make any progress.406
Another aspect to consider for Hube and von Manstein was the meager progress the XXXXVII Panzer Corps had made. Its low strength meant that there was little prospect of improving von Vormann’s chances for success. Consequently the original idea, to encircle the Soviet 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies in the vicinity of Zvenigorodka at the same time as the two encircled German corps were rescued, had little prospect of succeeding. Accordingly, it might be better to use the III Panzer Corps to attack along the shortest path to make contact with Gruppe Stemmermann. Given the difficulties of supplying the spearheads of the III and XXXXVII Panzer Corps, it might have been better to use an attack route that was as short as possible.
While the debate raged in the higher echelons of German command, the struggle continued at the front. For most of 6 February, heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke was engaged with covering the tenuous link to the 16th Panzer Division’s spearhead at Kosyakovka. It did what it could to bring supplies forward to Kosyakovka, where the Germans had been very low on supplies for a while. The mud was very deep. 17th Panzer Division reported that the roads were barely passable even for tracked vehicles. Even halftracks got stuck.407
The mud not only hampered progress toward the battlefield, it also made evacuation of the wounded difficult. Near the front neither side had the capacity to take good care of the seriously wounded, who were supposed to be evacuated to the rear where they could receive better care. The field ambulances fought an unequal battle with the mud to reach the medical facilities. The wounded endured long and agonizing journeys, and the duration of each journey meant that fewer wounded men could be evacuated per day. Some of the wounded waiting to be evacuated died before they could be moved to the ambulances.408