On 6 February Kampfgruppe Huppert, the first elements of the 1st Panzer Division, joined the German attack. Reinforced with some engineers and assault guns, plus a battalion of infantry from 198th Infantry Division, the Kampfgruppe attacked from Pavlovka at 09.45hrs and broke through the Soviet positions west of Vinograd. Soon the church in Vinograd was reached and during the afternoon the town was cleared. A Soviet counterattack followed, but it was repelled.409
The 34th Infantry Division and elements from the Leibstandarte assumed responsibility for the defense around Tinovka, which was hotly contested. A Soviet attack forced its way into the northeastern parts of Tinovka, but units from the 16th Panzer Division restored the situation. The latter division was also able to send one of its Panzer grenadier regiments toward Tatianovka and the northern half of the village was taken, despite determined Soviet resistance.410
Further elements of the 1st Panzer Division were arriving. Initially these were used to secure the southeastern part of the flank of 1st Panzer Army. The sub-units had been unable to maintain an even advance rate in the mud and so arrived piecemeal. For example, many of the tanks of the Panther battalion had arrived, but not much else. Thus the battalion as a whole was not combat ready, although its 51 Panthers were technically fit for action.411
The chiefs of staff of German formations and higher command echelons took a very active part in the decision-making, both during prior planning and the conduct of operations. On 6 February, Lieutenant General Hans Speidel, Chief of Staff of 8th Army, visited the staff of 1st Panzer Army to discuss the ongoing battle. Both Wenck and Speidel agreed that the two armies should make their main efforts near the junction between the two armies, in the general direction of Morentsy. Also it was agreed that the two surrounded corps would break out toward Morentsy. Time was pressing, as it was estimated that from 9 February supplies would almost be depleted within the pocket.412
The conclusions from the discussion were immediately sent to Army Group South, and very soon a new order was received at 1st Panzer Army and 8th Army. Essentially, it contained what Wenck and Speidel had suggested. The III Panzer Corps was to destroy the Soviet armored formations in front of the Gniloi Tikich River and then proceed northwards along the Bushanka–Lisyanka–Morentsy road to link up with Gruppe Stemmermann. The 8th Army should attack with at least two Panzer divisions over the Iskrenoe–Yerki–Olshana line to prevent enemy forces in the Zvenigorodka–Kasazkoe area from interfering with the III Panzer Corps’ operations. Gruppe Stemmermann should be made ready to break out toward the west and southwest.413
These orders showed that the original grand design had been reassessed. The more limited, but still vital, task of rescuing Gruppe Stemmermann remained. Given the quagmire on the ground, the poor flying weather, and the low strength of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, there was probably no alternative.
For much of 7 February, Soviet attacks forced the III Panzer Corps to assume a defensive position. The 34th Infantry Division managed to hold on to its positions from Tinovka southward. Soviet pressure on the 16th Panzer Division spearhead at Kosyakovka was very strong and forced the Germans back. On the other hand, the 16th Panzer Division captured all of Tatianovka, which had been partly taken the previous day. The Leibstandarte managed to move elements forward, to create a screening line between Tinovka and Kosyakovka, which ensured that the 16th Panzer Division would be supplied for the following day.414
On the night of 6 February, Soviet forces penetrated into Votylevka, forcing the 17th Panzer Division, together with heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, to spend the morning of 7 February clearing the village. At the beginning of the afternoon, Bäke attacked toward Repki but his Panzers soon collided with a Soviet tank unit and neither side made any progress.415
On the eastern flank of the salient, the III Panzer Corps had driven into the Soviet lines. 198th Infantry Division and Kampfgruppe Huppert tried to clear Vinograd and capture the high ground east of the village. There was some disagreement between the 198th Infantry Division and the III Panzer Corps on how to use the Kampfgruppe Huppert. The corps wanted Huppert to bypass Vinograd from the south and continue toward the high ground east of the village. However, at 09.20hrs the 198th Infantry Division suggested that the Kampfgruppe should attack through Vinograd and from there proceed east. Too much time would be lost by regrouping Huppert’s forces. Wenck reluctantly assented, but clearly pointed out that this was not a proper way to use mechanized units. However, due to Soviet pressure, neither the 198th Division, nor Kampfgruppe Huppert began any attack before noon. At 13.55hrs the III Panzer Corps again ordered that the attack to the east had to be made. The attack finally got rolling at 16.45hrs, with two infantry battalions, one infantry company, and a tank company, but an hour later the 198th Division reported that the tanks were stuck only 500 meters east of Vinograd, and the infantry was engaged by stubbornly defending Soviet forces. German progress on this sector remained unimpressive.416
During 7 February the mud continued to be the dominant factor in the battles. On the German side, the roads were so bad that in many places only tracked vehicles could negotiate them. The countryside was a morass. The tanks of the 1st Panzer Division’s Panther battalion remained in the Tshernaia Kamenka–Ivanki area, since no supplies could be brought to them. Soldiers sometimes had to throw off their boots and continue barefoot. However, in the evening temperatures fell slightly and during the night there was a light frost. If this continued, the ground would improve.417
The Red Army also experienced considerable problems due to the mud. Second Lieutenant Murashkin was a veteran from 1941, but late in 1942 he had been sent to an armor school at Rybinsk, where he stayed for more than a year. In December 1943 he was sent to Chelyabinsk, which was a center for tank production. Murashkin was not allowed to see anything of the tank production factories. The reason he had been sent to Chelyabinsk was to follow a replacement unit to the front. On 25 January, together with green tank crews and 32 T-34s, he entrained for a journey toward Kiev. Eventually, the trains unloaded at Belaya Tserkov on 4 February, where an officer from 21st Guards Tank Brigade waited and informed the men that the tanks and their crews, including Murashkin, constituted the 2nd Battalion in the 21st Guards Tank Brigade. The unit was ordered to proceed by road to Tolstoye Rogi, a journey of approximately 80 kilometers.
The T-34 had a good reputation for its ability to negotiate difficult ground conditions, but the relatively short journey was a real challenge. Of the 32 tanks, no less than 19 got stuck in the mud or suffered mechanical breakdowns. Early on 8 February, 13 T-34s arrived at the front and were immediately sent into battle. Murashkin and the other tankers received virtually no information on the situation, the enemy, or neighboring units. The only advice they received was that American tanks were used in some of the Soviet units, hence it would be better to be cautious when firing. With such poor guidance it is perhaps no surprise that Murashkin was taken prisoner on the same day as he arrived at the front.418
Kampfgruppe Huppert was more successful during the morning of 9 February than the previous day. By 08.45hrs it had taken Tolstoye Rogi, which also enabled the 308th Infantry Regiment of 198th Division to take the ground between Vinograd and Shubenyy Stav. This was as far as they got, however, as Soviet counterattacks forced them on the defensive.419