For the 17th Panzer Division and heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, the day began with a Soviet attack toward Votylevka, just before 07.00hrs. It was repelled, and three hours later the Germans attacked. At 11.30hrs, the Germans entered Repki, but it took more than two hours to secure the village. The attack was intended to advance toward Kharchenkov, on the Gniloi Tikich River, but this had to be cancelled due to lack of fuel.420
Similarly, the 16th Panzer Division had to call off its attack on Petrovskaya due to lack of fuel. Fuel shortages were common for the Germans on this day, almost entirely due to the impassable roads. In the evening, Wenck asked both the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions if the lack of notable results during the day was due to enemy resistance or insufficient supplies. He also wanted the divisions to consider whether the slow progress had given the Red Army time to reinforce to such an extent that there was no purpose in continuing the current attacks. Finally Wenck asked the two divisions to consider whether it would be better to regroup and attack from the Rizino area toward Lisyanka, even though he estimated that such a regrouping would require two days given the poor condition of the roads.421
Both 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions were of the opinion that the lack of progress during the last days was caused by the supply problems and the catastrophic condition of the roads. They considered that the new proposal from the corps was the most suitable solution.422
The main forces to be committed in the new direction were the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions plus the heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, which had also been the main attack force on 4 February. In addition, the main body of the 1st Panzer Division would be in position for the new attack, while the Leibstandarte would cover the northern flank.423
As the German commanders saw it, there were four advantages with the new direction of attack. First, the northern flank would be shorter and could partly be based on rivers and streams and would thus require fewer forces. Second, the supply routes would be shorter. Third, the three attack divisions would converge on the Gniloi Tikich River, where Soviet resistance was expected to be strong. Fourth, the protection of the south flank would be simplified, since the three Panzer divisions would attack through the 198th Infantry Division, which would thus be freed for flank protection.424
Still, the main problem remained. The divisions and the corps’ staff unanimously regarded the difficult road conditions, and the resulting supply problems, as the main bottleneck thus far and not the strength of the opposition. However, the decision was made to see what results were achieved on 9 February before fully committing to the new proposal.425
The hopes for any significant progress on 9 February were soon dashed. During the night of 8 February, the Red Army launched several attacks against Kampfgruppe 79 (formed around Pz.Gren.Rgt. 79 of 16. Pz.Div.) in Tatianovka. The Germans managed to hold the village, despite running low on ammunition and being rendered immobile due to lack of fuel. Just after 08.00hrs the 17th Panzer Division reported that it could not attack before noon due to supply difficulties, and soon the 16th Panzer Division reported that it also had to postpone its attack. Effectively, this decided the issue, and at 12.35hrs both divisions were ordered to reassemble in the Rubannyi Most area as soon as possible.426
The final phase of the relief operation was about to begin. However, while Breith had endeavored to cross the Gniloi Tikich River, dramatic events had taken place within the pocket and on the sector held by von Vormann’s corps.
CHAPTER 13
8th Army, 4–10 February
At 20.00hrs on 3 February, Nikolaus von Vormann received orders to shift 11th Panzer Division further west, to make it possible to combine 11th and 24th Panzer Divisions for a concerted attack on 5 February. Thus its two strongest divisions would be combined, which probably was the best solution for XXXXVII Panzer Corps, given the intention to push forward to the pocket.427
However, far away decisions were made that ruined the idea of combining 11th and 24th Panzer Divisions. Hitler had suddenly decided to send the 24th Panzer Division south, to Army Group A. After its long and difficult struggle along the muddy roads, it had reached its assembly area 30 kilometers south of Zvenigorodka, only to turn around 180 degrees and move to southern Ukraine. The news reached 8th Army at 02.50hrs on 4 February, when an order from Army Group South arrived. Aside from the decision by Hitler, the new order contained instructions that von Vormann’s corps should be used to tie up Soviet armor, to prevent it from being shifted to block Breith’s attack.428
At least there was some logic in the new order from Army Group South. With the loss of a major component for the planned attack, it was quite reasonable to reduce the level of ambition. Wöhler and Speidel, however, did not want to accept the situation. At 09.00hrs Speidel spoke with Busse and declared that neither he nor Wöhler could understand the decision to send 24th Panzer Division back south, considering the combat situation as well as the weather and the condition of the roads. Busse did not need any persuasion since he was of the same opinion. In fact, Army Group South had already objected to the order, but to no avail. Minutes later, Wöhler had to inform von Vormann about Hitler’s decision.429
Von Manstein and Busse still worked to change the decision. The 6th Army was to receive 24th Panzer Division, according to Hitler’s order, but after a brief discussion the army declared that it did not need the Panzer division, what it needed was more infantry. Von Manstein and Busse conceived the idea that the 2nd Parachute Division, currently employed by the 8th Army near Kirovograd, should be sent to 6th Army. At 10.50hrs Busse called Speidel to ask how 8th Army regarded the proposal. Speidel almost immediately spoke with Wöhler, who needed very little time to make up his mind. Within minutes Speidel could again speak with Busse and say that 8th Army had no objections. The risks involved in pulling out 2nd Parachute Division had to be accepted in order to keep 24th Panzer Division in von Vormann’s corps.430
Von Manstein and Busse immediately sent the proposal to OKH and nervously waited for a reply. The proposal seemed quite reasonable, especially as 6th Army had declared that it did not need the 24th Panzer Division. However, at about 13.00hrs they were informed that the proposal had been declined. The 24th Panzer Division should be sent to 6th Army. Obviously von Manstein and Busse were very disappointed, but there was little they could do, except convey the bad news to 8th Army.431
Hitler’s role in German military operations has been a subject of intense discussion since the end of World War II. It has been argued that his influence, directly as well as indirectly, was a serious disadvantage, leading to many unnecessary disasters for the German forces. Unsurprisingly the German field commanders, in their postwar writings, have been proponents of this idea. On the other hand there have been those who have argued that the German generals exaggerated the role of Hitler, in order to avoid taking responsibility for their own military disasters in the field. In the case of the Korsun battle, the records clearly support the view that the field commanders were hampered by disadvantageous decisions made by Hitler. The back and forth movement of the 24th Panzer Division is a good example. After having reached its assembly area on 4 February, it needed almost a week to travel back to Nikopol, where the battle was almost over when it arrived. It spent most of its time moving back and forth on muddy roads, between two battles, without making any particularly useful effort in either. The records clearly show that the field commanders realized that too much valuable time would be lost by shifting 24th Panzer Division back and forth, but they were overruled.