Whatever von Manstein, Wöhler, von Vormann, and the other officers may have thought about it, they had to adjust to the new situation created by the diversion of 24th Panzer Division. For the moment there was probably not much else to do beyond carrying on with the order already given to von Vormann, that XXXXVII Panzer Corps should prevent Soviet tank units, in particular Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army, from shifting west where they could block Breith’s III Panzer Corps.
Wöhler had been trying to do his utmost to assist the two encircled corps, but with the departure of 24th Panzer Division his ability to help them was seriously reduced. Perhaps this contributed to his decision to fly into the pocket, together with Major Bittl who had already made the journey a few times. Wöhler informed the commanders that he would land at Korsun at about 16.30hrs and asked Stemmermann and Lieb to meet him there.432
Inside the pocket, the XXXXII Corps continued attacking toward Kvitki, but progress was slow. One prong reached the southeast part of Kvitki, but most of the fighting occurred inside Kvitki, where fierce house to house fighting took place. Even though this was not the main attack in the effort to reestablish contact, it was yet another indication that each stage of the attack was taking longer than had been anticipated, which of course was very serious in the difficult situation. At 11.20hrs the previous day it had been estimated that XI Corps only had supplies for another two days.
The XXXXII Corps was somewhat better off, with supplies for three or four days. Gruppe Stemmermann was completely dependent on the supplies provided by air, but bad weather could easily render flights impossible. However, the Luftwaffe was able to fly in or drop 160 tons of supplies on 3 February, while 2,800 wounded men had been flown out between 27 January and 3 February. The supply situation nevertheless remained precarious. At 10.50hrs on 4 February, Stemmermann reported that the daily ammunition consumption was 180 tons, despite strict rationing.433
With supplies running lower and lower, time was also running out for the Germans. But it was not only the problem of supplies that prompted the Germans to act as quickly as possible. The Soviet commanders were not sitting idle and waiting for the Germans to act. Reinforcements had been moved to the Korsun area. The Kirovograd battle had been costly for the 2nd Ukrainian Front, but during the two weeks that had passed since, it had been possible to replenish the units. Konev had sent some of these to take part in the Korsun battle. On 4 February, tanks as well as infantry and artillery arrived from 5th and 7th Guards Armies. Tank and antitank assets were particularly important, both for compressing the pocket and for blocking the German relief attempts. Among the units that arrived on 4 February were 27th Tank Brigade from the 7th Guards Army and the 34th Antitank Gun Brigade from 5th Guards Army.434
In the afternoon, Wöhler and Bittl climbed aboard the aircraft that would take them to Korsun. Clouds obscured the sky, but posed no hindrance to take off. The pilot set course toward the Korsun airfield and initially the journey was uneventful. As they approached Korsun, however, the situation changed. The flashes and noise from exploding Soviet antiaircraft shells forced the aircraft to turn back. Wöhler was disappointed, but it was decided that Major Bittl would try again later in the evening.435
With the order to send back 24th Panzer Division, von Vormann had few options left. His tank strength was low. The 11th Panzer Division was strongest with 21 Panthers (including the attached I./26 battalion) and eight assault guns (including attached assault gun units). The 3rd Panzer Division had 12 Panzer IVs, while the 14th Panzer Division had five Panzer IVs and four StuG IIIs. The 13th Panzer Division only had four Panzer IVs and one Panzer III. There were also four command tanks and artillery observation tanks within the units. Thus the entire corps, with its four nominal Panzer divisions, had only 59 tanks and assault guns available, about one third of a single, full strength Panzer division.436
The units possessed many more tanks and assault guns, but they had either bogged down in the mud or were at workshops waiting for repairs, and there was little prospect of quickly raising the number of operational tanks. Indeed, the Germans would probably have to be content with keeping the number of operational tanks at the current level.
The infantry situation was not much better for the Panzer divisions. Even though a division might have fairly high manpower strength, this did not necessarily translate to high infantry strength. The overall manpower ranged from 8,942 men (for the 14th Panzer Division, whose Kampfgruppe von Breese was inside the pocket and unable to report) to 12,464 (for the 11th Panzer Division).437 However, the infantry combat strength was only 724 for the 3rd Panzer Division. The other three Panzer divisions, 11th, 13th, and 14th, had 1,100, 1,420, and 551 infantry respectively.438
With these meager resources von Vormann not only had to cover a sector almost 40 kilometers wide, from Listopadov, north of Novomirgorod, to the Iskrennoye bridgehead, but also to attack toward the pocket. Even though the original scope of the attack had been reduced, it was still not an easy task. Probably Wöhler thought along similar lines, because the reprimands he had subjected von Vormann to during the preceding days seem to have ceased, at least for a while.
The weather remained troublesome. Olaf Ehlers noted in his diary on 4 February: “After the rain yesterday, it is sunny and so warm today that we can lay down on the rapidly drying straw and sleep in the open. In the night it was a bit cold. The snow has become thin and in many places naked ground was exposed. In the field works we have found cockchafers and we have also seen the first violets blossom.”439 The first signs of spring were joyful to behold, but they were definitely a hindrance to operations, and were indeed likely to prove transitory.
Despite the weakness of his divisions and the filthy weather, von Vormann decided to attack Vodianoe and Lipyanka, using both 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. While von Wietersheim’s Division attacked Vodianoe from the northwest, Lang sent part of his division toward Vodianoe from the southwest. By surprising the enemy, the spearheads of the 11th Panzer Division captured Vodianoe. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 3rd Panzer Division approached Lipyanka. However, assisted by minefields, the defending Soviet forces were able to hold their positions along the stream flowing through Lipyanka.440
The 13th Panzer Division retained the bridgehead at Iskrennoye, but in the afternoon Soviet concentrations were observed to the east and northwest of Iskrennoye, and they seemed to be preparing for an attack on the bridgehead. The Germans called for Stukas to attack the concentrations. According to German estimates the air attacks were quite effective, but it must, as always, be remembered that such estimates are difficult to make. In any case it was important for the XXXXVII Panzer Corps to hang on to the bridgehead. The advance to the north was still planned to go ahead, according to an order from 8th Army at 17.45hrs, and the bridge over the river was to be reinforced to carry 60 tons as soon as possible.441