The German attack on 11 February, which continued overnight, must have come as a shock. Soviet sources maintain that the attack was expected, but that statement seems hard to reconcile with the very rapid advance made by the German Panzers. Within five hours, Breith’s tanks had covered approximately one third of the distance to the pocket, and secured a crossing over the most significant obstacle. Such a development could hardly have been expected. Perhaps the attack itself was no surprise but at the very least the intensity and speed of the attack seem not to have been anticipated in time to complete countermeasures.527
During the day, Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army was relieved by rifle units and transferred to the Chesnovka–Pisarevka area. Vatutin also sent the 206th Rifle Division, which was part of the 27th Army, to the Pisarevka area. He also ordered attacks on the positions held by the 34th and 1st SS-Panzer divisions, but neither was strong enough to cause more than local difficulties for the Germans. The 1st Ukrainian Front did not manage to offer a serious threat to the rear of the attack force that Breith had sent to the Gniloi Tikich River.528
Konev, too, had some forces to spare. He sent the 5th Guards Airborne Division and 62nd Rifle Division to the Morentsy–Maydanovka area, which was about 10 kilometers east of Lisyanka. Previously he had ordered Selivanov to prepare his cavalry corps to move west. Selivanov’s troops had already spent most of the night moving over muddy roads, and the soldiers and horses were exhausted. Selivanov sent reconnaissance troops to the Selishche–Shenderovka–Novo Buda area, while the remainder of his corps got some rest around Kvitki–Valiava area, before setting out toward Novo Buda in the evening.529
There was every reason for Konev to be concerned about the situation in the Novo Buda sector. By shortening the frontline of the pocket, Stemmermann and Lieb had strived to assemble an attack force that could attack from the area south of Steblev toward Shenderovka and Novo Buda. This consisted of units from different divisions. The Germania regiment from SS-Wiking seems to have been the first to arrive, and was quickly sent to attack Shenderovka, which was captured during the day. Otherwise the main attack force was mainly formed of elements from the 72nd Division, which had disengaged from the eastern part of the pocket on 10 February. Major Kaestner, who commanded the 105th Infantry Regiment in 72nd Division, reconnoitered the area between Tarashcha and Shenderovka, and found that his regiment would have to attack down a slope which was very exposed to enemy observers and fire. Except for a few small depressions there was no cover to be found. Furthermore, despite recent deliveries from the Luftwaffe, artillery ammunition remained scarce. The attacking forces could not count on continuous artillery support; the most they could expect was a short barrage just before the attack was about to begin.
Kaestner concluded that there was little prospect of success if the regiment attacked in daylight. Instead he suggested that a surprise night attack should be staged, and his proposal was approved. Major Siegel, who commanded the neighboring 266th Infantry Regiment, would also attack with his regiment in darkness and to that end he assembled his troops during the day. To his surprise, Siegel found a paved road, which made advancing considerably easier, but his delight did not last long, as the good road was soon followed by the ordinary dirt roads that had been turned into channels of mud by the weather. Nevertheless, Siegel’s regiment was ready to attack when the sun set.530
As we have seen, during the preceding days, von Vormann had been shifting forces toward the area south of Zvenigorodka. The most important role was given to 11th Panzer Division, and at 20.00hrs on 10 February, von Wietersheim issued orders for the attack on 11 February. He was particularly concerned at the lack of bridges that could carry Panthers, so he separated the Panthers from the other tanks and assault guns that could cross rivers on less sturdy bridges. Accordingly, several Kampfgruppen were formed. The most powerful was Kampfgruppe von Sievers, led by Major von Sievers, who was commander of the Panzer regiment of the division. The Kampfgruppe consisted of the Panthers from 11th Panzer Division and the I./Pz.Rgt. 26, one or two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and some engineers. Some elements of the 11th Panzer Division were still in the Iskrennoye area, as they had not been relieved in time, but Kampfgruppe Haack and elements of the 13th Panzer Division were to join the attack.531
Von Wietersheim assembled his Kampfgruppe commanders at midnight and issued the final orders. Kampfgruppe von Sievers would attack from the Viknino area toward Yerki, where a bridgehead was to be secured. The 110th and 111th Infantry Regiments would follow Kampfgruppe von Sievers and secure the flanks and captured areas, allowing von Sievers to continue forward. Kampfgruppe Gehrig from the 13th Panzer Division, reinforced with the few operational PzKw IV tanks possessed by 11th Panzer Division, as well as the assault guns from Pz.Abt. 8, was to attack from the area around the state farms at Rushkovka, and follow on the right wing of Kampfgruppe von Sievers. The divisional engineer battalion would follow behind Kampfgruppe von Sievers and ensure that bridges with a capacity of at least 60 tons were created or maintained. The various units would jump off between 04.30hrs and 05.30hrs.532
Kampfgruppe Haack, which had assembled near Brodetskoye, was not as mobile as von Wietersheim’s units. Accordingly, it had to begin its attack at midnight, when von Wietersheim issued orders to his Kampfgruppe commanders. At first it was an uneventful march in darkness and mud. Without meeting much resistance, Romanovka was occupied just before 07.00hrs. By then, von Wietersheim had already launched his units.533
Most of the punch von Sievers possessed came from the 18 operational Panthers of I./Pz.Rgt. 26, which, with grenadiers riding them, passed through Vilknino at 06.30hrs and continued toward Yerki. The roads were, as usual, very soft and wet, and the tanks mostly moved off the roads. However, in the boggy ground the tanks ploughed forward in second or third gear (the Panthers had seven forward gears). Hardly any resistance was met until they approached a crossroads two to three kilometers southeast of Yerki. Soviet infantry opposed the German tanks, but as the defenders only had antitank rifles, the Panthers brushed aside the opposition and continued toward Yerki. At this moment the lead elements of Kampfgruppe Haack appeared to the left.534
There was no time to lose, and under low-hanging clouds that precluded air support, the attack immediately continued toward Yerki. When the outskirts of the town were reached, the Panzer grenadiers jumped off the tanks and escorted the tanks on foot as they entered the settlement. Von Sievers directed his troops toward the northeastern part of Yerki, where there was a bridge over the Shpolka River. With the tanks advancing as quickly as they dared, the southern end of the bridge was approached, only for the German forces to see it destroyed by an explosion. The Germans turned left and followed the Shpolka River downstream. They soon found another bridge that had already been destroyed, but the tankers had more luck further south, where an intact bridge was discovered. It was not strong enough to take Panthers, but it might prove possible to ford the Shpolka River close to the bridge. Lieutenant Wartmann inspected the river and its banks, and decided it was worth trying. Luck accompanied the Germans, and all the Panthers were able to cross at the ford. The first step of XXXXVII Panzer Corps’ mission had been accomplished—to create a bridgehead over the Shpolka River.535