Farther east, Kampfgruppe Gehrig set out from its staging area at the Rushovka farms. Without drama it reached the high ground about three kilometers southeast of Yurkovka at noon. Its purpose was twofold. The maneuver served both to protect the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division and also to capture a staging area for further attacks to the north. More forces were expected to become available on 12 February, when the relief of 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions had been completed.536
After securing Yerki, Kampfgruppe von Sievers and Kampfgruppe Haack continued. The I./Pz.Rgt. 26 had 15 Panthers operational (three had suffered mechanical breakdowns), on which infantry from Kampfgruppe Haack climbed. The tanks were divided into two groups, one commanded by Lieutenant Weidinger, which advanced along the road to Zvenigorodka, and one commanded by Lieutenant Muth, which advanced further east, toward Skalevatka. Soon Soviet mortar shells exploded around the Panthers, forcing the infantry to jump off the tanks and take cover. Almost immediately Soviet antitank guns joined the action. The Panthers fired back and defeated the guns, without a tank being knocked out. Weidinger’s group pushed further north and captured hill 161.2, just east of Stebnoye. In the meantime Muth was approaching his objective, the road and railroad crossing north of Skalevatka. A concealed antitank gun suddenly opened fire on Muth’s tanks after they had passed, but it was silenced by fire from Weidinger’s group before it could knock out any tanks, which were then able to reach their objective. Together with infantry from Kampfgruppe Haack, the crossroads was secured.537
Low clouds had blocked air support, but when Muth’s tanks had reached Skalevatka, a low flying Soviet reconnaissance aircraft appeared. Muth ordered his gunner to fire on the small aircraft. Using machine guns and firing high explosive shells, the aircraft was shot down. Otherwise, antitank guns were the main opponent for the Panthers on 11 February. Soviet tanks had not appeared, despite the fact that the area was defended by 20th and 29th Tank Corps. Rotmistrov’s engineers had been more active during the day, placing over 5,000 mines in the area north of Yerki.538
The effects of the mines had thus far been negligible, but that might change during the following day. Even though the German forces had been able to advance despite the poor ground condition, von Vormann and his staff was concerned about the fuel supply, as it had become apparent that consumption was about five times higher than normal. The ground was also one of the most important factors behind von Vormann’s proposal that the main direction of the attack should be west, rather than east of Tarasovka. It was imperative to avoid low lying river crossings as much as possible, something which spoke in favor of the area west of Tarasovka. Von Vormann’s suggestion was approved, but before Tarasovka could be approached it would be necessary to see what results were achieved on 12 February.539
As usual, fuel was a prerequisite for success and von Vormann wanted the Luftwaffe to fly fuel to his spearheads. Wöhler, of course, agreed, and later in the evening it was confirmed that the Luftwaffe had prepared to fly 35 cubic meters of fuel to von Vormann. Reinforcements were also required, but the only major unit that could be counted on was the 2nd Parachute Division, which would require days before it could be inserted into the front line.540
As we have seen, Gruppe Stemmermann had been preparing to attack in a south-westerly direction. The 105th Infantry Regiment would lead 72nd Division’s attack on Novo Buda. Major Kaestner chose to place the submachine-gunners and machine-gunners in the lead, to generate as much firepower as possible at the front of his attacking regiment. As the attack first and foremost relied on surprise, there would be no artillery preparation, which perhaps was one of the factors that led Kaestner to place the automatic weapons in the lead.541
During the day, Kaestner’s troops had been hiding further back, but after sunset they moved forward to the positions from where the attack would be launched. Including the attached elements, Kaestner’s force numbered 689 officers and men. There was no moonlight, but with the snow on the ground it was not completely dark; it was light enough for the soldiers to find their positions without allowing the Soviet defenders to discover what was going on. Silently the Germans crouched while they waited, until at 20.30hrs the attack began. In snow smocks they stealthily stalked forward, toward the Soviet defenses that had been revealed by previous observations. The Germans held their fire as long as possible. No signs of discovery were observed until they got very close to the Soviet positions, but then the Soviet troops seem to have noticed that something was going on. Immediately the Germans opened fire and assaulted the Soviet defenses, which were captured after a brief close-quarters combat action.542
There was no time to spare if the initial success was to be exploited. The lead elements continued forward while other troops protected the flanks. By midnight the northeastern outskirts of Novo Buda had been reached, when noise from moving vehicles was heard from the area around Sukhiny. The German spearhead halted and discovered a column of about 30 vehicles, plus a rocket launcher. Kaestner had ordered that 20mm antiaircraft guns should be brought along right behind the lead infantry. It had been arduous to move them through the snowdrifts, but at this moment they proved useful. When the guns opened fire at about 200 meters, the trucks were soon riddled with shells from the rapid-firing 20mms. Some of the trucks were evidently loaded with fuel, as they burned violently, illuminating the remainder of the column. The rocket launcher opened fire on the Germans, but as the Soviet troops were firing into the dark, they could not aim accurately, and after firing a few rounds the rocket launcher was silenced. After destroying the column, Kaestner’s troops quickly reorganized and continued toward Novo Buda, which was taken without fighting at about 02.30hrs.543
Kaestner’s regiment had been the spearhead, but was not alone in the attack. The other two regiments of 72nd Division, plus elements of SS-Wiking and SS-Wallonien had also taken part, and at dawn the Germans held Nova Buda, Komarovka, and the northern part of Khilki. Less than 20 kilometers now separated Gruppe Stemmermann from the spearheads of III Panzer Corps.544
CHAPTER 15
Stalin Intervenes
The Germans’ successes on 11 February and the following night seem to have caused consternation among the top Soviet leadership. Zhukov had been coordinating the two Soviet fronts, but on the morning of 12 February he suffered from fever and fell asleep. He could not recall how long he had slept when his adjutant, Leonid Fedorovich Minyuk, woke him and said that Josef Stalin was on the telephone. The Soviet supreme commander had learned about Breith’s breakthrough, and also the recent attack by Gruppe Stemmermann, which had swept through Khilki and Novo Buda. When Zhukov was asked if he knew anything about it, he had to admit that he was uninformed. Stalin told him to check it and report later.545
Zhukov immediately called Vatutin, who told him how the situation had developed during the night. After a brief discussion, Zhukov called Stalin and told him everything he knew. According to Zhukov, Konev had just talked with Stalin and proposed that his 2nd Ukrainian Front take command of all Soviet forces around the pocket, thus including Trofimenko’s 27th Army, which had hitherto been part of Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front. According to Konev’s proposal, Vatutin would control the forces constituting the outer ring, defending against Breith’s and von Vormann’s latest attacks. Zhukov replied that the defeat of the surrounded German forces was only a matter of three or four days, and that a change of command structure would only cause delay.546