It was not only Bäke’s and Frank’s battle groups that were depleted; the strength of the entire III Panzer Corps was exhausted. More troops were needed in the Lisyanka area, and the only possible source seemed to be the 1st SS-Panzer Division. However, as we have seen, although the first elements of this division had begun the arduous journey early on 15 February, they did not arrive until late in the afternoon on the 16th. Although further small forces from 1st SS-Panzer Division were on the way, they could not be expected to arrive soon, given the poor condition of the roads.666
Not only were the German forces around Lisyanka weak in numbers. The soldiers were exhausted from the strain of combat, lack of sleep, and shortage of food. Hot meals had not been served to the spearheads for half a week, but on this day Walther Sherf received a surprise. Bäke asked Scherf to come to the regimental command post to report about the recent action. Scherf’s Tiger was located only about 400–500 meters from Bäke’s command post, and Scherf’s driver took it to a point about 80 meters away, whereupon Scherf walked the remaining distance. Once he had arrived at the command post only a few minutes were spent discussing military matters. Suddenly a plate with fried potatoes was placed in front of Scherf and Bäke said, “Enjoy your meal.” The potatoes and the lard they were fried in had been found in an earth cellar.667
CHAPTER 18
Breakout from the Korsun Pocket
By dusk on 16 February, the III Panzer Corps had fought its way slightly closer to the pocket, but still about seven kilometers separated its spearhead, heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, from the surrounded Gruppe Stemmermann. Part of the reason for the remaining distance was the Soviet attack on Komarovka, which had succeeded in capturing the western half of the village. The part of Komarovka held by the 2nd Ukrainian Front was the only significant built-up area on the shortest route between Gruppe Stemmermann and the leading elements of the III Panzer Corps.
After the dash forward by the III Panzer Corps on 13 February, German hopes for a rescue had been high, but optimism faded as it became clear that fatigue, casualties, mechanical breakdowns, supply difficulties, and longer front lines had gradually sapped the corps’ attack strength. On the morning of 16 February it was clear that the chances for a breakthrough to Gruppe Stemmermann were slim indeed. At Shenderovka, Stemmermann discussed the situation with his fellow corps commander Lieb and the division commanders.668
“Gentlemen, you all know our situation,” Stemmermann said before giving a brief description of the situation, after which he continued: “We have no other chance; it is now or never. We will have to proceed as follows: The entire cauldron will move toward Lisyanka. General Lieb will be responsible for the breakthrough. We will employ three columns, with army units to the right, Waffen-SS to the left and the 72nd Division in the center. The 57th and 88th Divisions will make up the rear guard. I will stay with those who leave the cauldron last. X-hour for the operation will be 23.00, today February 16. Any questions?”
“What shall we do with the vehicles?” asked General Lieb.
“We can’t take them along. All vehicles will have to be destroyed. Only tanks and other tracked vehicles can accompany the operation,” replied Stemmermann.
“And the wounded?”
“All the wounded that can be transported will be loaded on carts and sledges, the others will have to remain at Shenderovka with voluntary medical staff.”
At this moment the commander of the SS-Wiking Division, Lieutenant-General Gille, broke into the discussion and asked: “Who will provide the main force that will break through the Soviet defense perimeter?”
“That is a task for you, Gille,” Stemmermann replied.
“I would have suggested it, Herr General,” was Gille’s immediate response, which also marked the end of the discussion.
Finally the die had been cast. The commanders went to their units, passing through Shenderovka where signs of German military units could be seen everywhere. Small buildings with their straw roofs were chock-full of wounded. In between, various staffs and signals units competed for space. Soldiers who enjoyed a short rest tried to find some warmth and shelter in the buildings, at least to get a chance to dry their wet clothes. However, during the last days their clothes rarely, if ever, got really dry.669
Frantic activity took place in Shenderovka. Staff members were burning various papers which could not be taken along, nor allowed to fall into enemy hands. Still, some papers did survive, such as the order for the breakout issued by Divisions-Gruppe 112, one of the component parts of Korps-Abteilung B. The order reflected the precarious situation. As it was part of the first echelon, the Divisions-Gruppe 112 was to attack at 23.00hrs on 16 February. It would have to be in position at least an hour earlier, partly because other elements of Gruppe Stemmermann would also have to move forward.670
Surprise was of paramount importance to the breakout attempt. Remarkably, the soldiers of Divisions-Gruppe 112 were to attack with rifles unloaded. The order for the attack continued: “Any unnecessary shooting is a crime and jeopardizes the entire breakthrough. Each soldier who sees an enemy in front of him and does not immediately attack and kill him, is himself to be killed silently. This has to be made clear to everyone. More serious matters are at stake than the life of a single person.”671
Undoubtedly this was a rather severe order, but it has to be remembered that the situation was very grave. A large force was surrounded, and after three weeks consisted largely of exhausted men, who tended to be either desperate or apathetic. Exactly how many men still remained with Gruppe Stemmermann is unclear. The staff of XI Corps estimated that about 45,000 men were inside the pocket and still in condition to fight. Also it was estimated that there were about 2,100 wounded inside the cauldron. However, by this time accurate monitoring of manpower strength was not possible, and it is likely that the strength of Gruppe Stemmermann was slightly greater. Whatever the true number, the final chance for all of them rested on surprise, and in addition to the instructions mentioned above, other measures were taken to keep the Soviets unawares. For example, it was forbidden to set fires, smoke, speak, or cause any unnecessary noise near the frontline. Vehicles had to be destroyed using means other than explosives or fire. Radio traffic was kept normal until the very last moment.672
Doing their best to observe these precautions, the Germans made themselves ready for the breakout. Nevertheless some firing was heard by Anton Meiser as he waited for the order to begin the breakout, but perhaps total silence in a combat area might have appeared even more suspicious to the Soviet forces nearby. Meiser was not with the foremost units who were to conduct the initial breakthrough of the Soviet defense perimeter. The units that had received this task probably had greater reason to observe silence.673
One of the units in the first echelon was Major Kaestner’s 105th Infantry Regiment. For the breakout his regiment had been reinforced by men from various dissolved or broken up units. However, he regarded these elements as having little combat value, and he relied on his own troops to provide the assault power. As his regiment had conducted several successful night attacks during the preceding week, Kaestner relied on the experiences gained and intended to use similar methods during the breakout.674
The 105th Infantry Regiment, as part of 72nd Division, was placed in the center of the first echelon, with Korps-Abteilung B to the north and SS-Wiking to the south. The central position of 72nd Division would hopefully ensure that its flanks would be protected. However, in the darkness, orientation could easily be lost. The aim was Lisyanka, but the small town was no shining beacon. Rather, the troops would have to find their way over ground covered by snow. Maps were scarce; Kaestner was fortunate to have a map in the scale 1:10000, which had been taken from a captured Soviet officer, but with all the difficulties inherent in a night operation there was always the possibility of confusion and units becoming mixed. Furthermore, if hard fighting began, it would be very difficult for the officers to lead their men except those who were nearby.675