264
For example, The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation maintains that the German force consisted of 75,000 soldiers and officers, 1,700 machine guns, 1,100 guns (including 108 self-propelled), 540 mortars, and 270 tanks and assault guns(p. 41). However, the German documents show that the pocket consisted of around 55,000 men, 313 guns (including 23 self-propelled) and less than 70 tanks and assault guns. Such exaggerations are common in Soviet sources. Whether they reflect inaccurate wartime estimates or conscious post-battle distortions is unclear. However, these two possibilities do not exclude each other. It is worth recalling that the Soviet sources invariably inflate German strength, they do not underestimate it.
265
Gruppe Mattenklott 18 Februar 1944, Nicht im Kampfraum XI. und XXXXII. A.K. befindlichen Teile, T313, R72, F7310468-70.
266
Jahnke & Lerch, Der Kessel von Tscherkassy, pp. 28–9.
267
Gruppe Mattenklott 18 February 1944, Nicht im Kampfraum XI. und XXXXII. A.K. befindlichen Teile, T313, R72, F7310468-70.
268
The documents are not entirely in agreement. An entry in the 8th Army war diary on 11 February states that Gruppe Stemmermann consisted of 56,00 men of all ranks. However, another entry, on 14 February, gives the figure as 54,000 men. At first glance it could be assumed that the difference is caused by wounded soldiers flown out of the pocket. This is however unlikely, as the air evacuation had ceased during the period 11–14 February. It seems also quite unlikely that losses in killed and missing would be more than a few hundred men. Either the figure 56,000 refers to a date much earlier than 11 February, or else the figure 54,000 is the result of a more careful investigation. Another report (AOK 8/O.Qu Nr. 277/44 geh. 11.2.44, T312, R63, F7581371) confirms the latter figure and also shows that 3,904 wounded and sick had been evacuated by air since 29 January. Thus the total would have been 58,000 when the pincers closed. However to this must be added soldiers killed or taken prisoner since the pocket was formed. We estimate that number to approximately 1,000. Hence we arrive at the figure 59,000.
269
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 30 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305845-8. See also Edgar Röhricht, Probleme der Kesselschlacht (Condor Verlag, Karlsruhe 1958), pp. 147–9.
270
The following Panzer divisions were with Army Group South: 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, Grossdeutschland, Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Wiking. The 4th, 5th, 12th, and 20th were with Army Group Center and the 26th Panzer Division was in Italy, as was the Hermann Göring Division. The rest of the German Panzer divisions were forming or refitting.
271
A good example is the Soviet victory in the Winter War 1939–40. It seems perfectly clear that the Red Army prevailed only thanks to overwhelming military resources, but the use of these resources was far from efficient.
272
For more on advance rates, see N. Zetterling & A. Frankson, “Analyzing World War II Eastern Front Battles,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol 11, No 1 (March 1998), pp. 192–8.
273
KTB PzAOK 1 Qu, 27 Jan 1944, T313, R74, F7312709.
274
Gruppe Mattenklott 18. February 1944, “Nicht im Kampfraum XI. und XXXXII. A.K. befindlichen Teile,” T313, R72, F7310468-70.
275
KTB PzAOK 1 Qu, 28-29 Jan 1944, T313, R74, F7312710.
276
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 21.
277
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 21 & 133. The three divisions were the 84th Rifle Division, 94th Guards Rifle Division, and 6th Guards Airborne Division.
278
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 112f,
279
G. T. Zavizion & P. A. Kornjusjin, I na Tichom okean. (Voenizdat, Moscow), p. 22.
280
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 116 & 189.
281
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 116.
282
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 189.
283
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation claims that the Germans transferred large tank forces to the Kapitanovka area on 29 January, units that included a considerable number of Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands, and that the correlation of forces turned out to be in favor of the Germans (p. 132). This is hard to accept. First, the German 8th Army did not send any Ferdinands or Tigers into the Korsun battle. Second, it seems unlikely that the Germans had an advantage in numbers. On 27 January the 14th and 11th Panzer Divisions reported five and 30 tanks and assault guns respectively. These figures include the non-divisional assault gun units attached to the divisions, but not the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther Battalion, which had 17 operational Panthers on 29 January. The available reports for 1 February and 4 February suggest that if anything the number of tanks in the German units decreased after 27 January. In the absense of accurate Soviet strength figures it is difficult to settle the issue conclusively, but it seems unlikely that the Red Army, with the comittment of the relatively fresh 18th Tank Corps, would have had less than around 50 tanks and assault guns. (See Fernschreiben 14. Pz.Div. 27.1.44, 23.40 Uhr, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584304; Fernschreiben 11. Pz.Div. 27.1.44, 16.25 Uhr, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584303; KTB AOK 8 Ia, 29 Jan, 11.00, T312, R64, F7581770; XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia Tagesmeldung 1.2.44, T314, R1132, F000594; AOK 8 Ia Nr. 845/44, geh., 4.2.44, T312, R64, F7582968).
284
KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, 29 Jan, T314, R1132, F000432ff; Anlage 7 zum KTB I./Pz.Rgt. 26, BA-MA RH 39/599.
285
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 56–62 & 131–133.
286
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 21–22.
287
KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, 29 Jan 1944, T314, R1132, F000432-4; AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 27 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581767-75.
288
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 27 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581767-75; AOK 8 Ia Nr. 712/44, Tagesmeldung 29.1.44, T312, R66, F7584252ff.
289
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 27 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581767-75; AOK 8 Ia Nr. 712/44, Tagesmeldung 29.1.44, T312, R66, F7584252ff; XXXXII. A.K. Funkspruch an AOK 8, 29.1.44, 18.05.Uhr, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584240.
290
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 27 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581767-75; AOK 8 Ia Nr. 712/44, Tagesmeldung 29.1.44, T312, R66, F7584252ff.
291
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 27 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581767-75; AOK 8 Ia Nr. 712/44, Tagesmeldung 29.1.44, T312, R66, F7584252ff.
292
XXXXII. A.K. Funkspruch an AOK 8, 29.1.44, 18.05 Uhr, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8, T312, R66, F7584240.
293
These were the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther battalion, the Pz.Abt. 8 (with StuG III assault guns), the StuG.Abt. 905 and the StuG.Abt. 911.
294
AOK 8 Ia Nr. 712/44, Tagesmeldung 29.1.44, T312, R66, F7584252ff; KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, 28.1.44, T314, R1132, F000432.