FRANK (thoroughly subdued): Goodness gracious, I really could have sworn that the book seemed red to me; it sure seems that it seems red to me!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I’m sorry, but you are wrong again.
FRANK: Really? It doesn’t even seem that it seems red to me? It sure seems like it seems like it seems red to me!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Wrong again! And no matter how many times you reiterate the phrase “it seems like” and follow it by “the book is red” you will be wrong.
FRANK: This is fantastic! Suppose instead of the phrase “it seems like” I would say “I believe that.” So let us start again at ground level. I retract the statement “It seems red to me” and instead I assert “I believe that this book is red.” Is this statement true or false?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Just a moment while I scan the dials of the brainreading machine—no, the statement is false.
FRANK: And what about “I believe that I believe that the book is red”?
EPISTEMOLOGIST (consulting his dials): Also false. And again, no matter how many times you iterate “I believe,” all these belief sentences are false.
FRANK: Well, this has been a most enlightening experience. However, you must admit that it is a little hard on me to realize that I am entertaining infinitely many erroneous beliefs!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Why do you say that your beliefs are erroneous?
FRANK: But you have been telling me this all the while!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I most certainly have not!
FRANK: Good God, I was prepared to admit all my errors, and now you tell me that my beliefs are not errors; what are you trying to do, drive me crazy?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Hey, take it easy! Please try to recalclass="underline" When did I say or imply that any of your beliefs are erroneous?
FRANK: Just simply recall the infinite sequence of sentences: (1) I believe this book is red; (2) I believe that I believe this book is red; and so forth. You told me that every one of those statements is false.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: True.
FRANK: Then how can you consistently maintain that my beliefs in all these false statements are not erroneous?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Because, as I told you, you don’t believe any of them.
FRANK: I think I see, yet I am not absolutely sure.
EPISTEMOIOGIST: Look, let me put it another way. Don’t you see that the very falsity of each of the statements that you assert saves you from an erroneous belief in the preceding one? The first statement is, as I told you, false. Very well! Now the second statement is simply to the effect that you believe the first statement. If the second statement were true, then you would believe the first statement, and hence your belief about the first statement would indeed be in error. But fortunately the second statement is false, hence you don’t really believe the first statement, so your belief in the first statement is not in error. Thus the falsity of the second statement implies you do not have an erroneous belief about the first; the falsity of the third likewise saves you from an erroneous belief about the second, etc.
FRANK: Now I see perfectly! So none of my beliefs were erroneous, only the statements were erroneous.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Exactly.
FRANK: Most remarkable! Incidentally, what color is the book really?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: It is red.
FRANK: What!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Exactly! Of course the book is red. What’s the matter with you, don’t you have eyes?
FRANK: But didn’t I in effect keep saying that the book is red all along?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Of course not! You kept saying it seems red to you, it seems like it seems red to you, you believe it is red, you believe that you believe it is red, and so forth. Not once did you say that it is red. When I originally asked you “What color is the book?” if you had simply answered “red,” this whole painful discussion would have been avoided.
Scene 3. Frank comes back several months later to the home of the epistemologist.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: How delightful to see you! Please sit down.
FRANK (seated): I have been thinking of our last discussion, and there is much I wish to clear up. To begin with, I discovered an inconsistency in some of the things you said.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Delightful! I love inconsistencies. Pray tell!
FRANK: Well, you claimed that although my belief sentences were false, I did not have any actual beliefs that are false. If you had not admitted that the book actually is red, you would have been consistent. But your very admission that the book is red, leads to an inconsistency.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: How so?
FRANK: Look, as you correctly pointed out, in each of my belief sentences “I believe it is red,” “I believe that I believe it is red,” the falsity of each one other than the first saves me from an erroneous belief in the preceeding one. However, you neglected to take into consideration the first sentence itself. The falsity of the first sentence “I believe it is red,” in conjunction with the fact that it is red, does imply that I do have a false belief.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I don’t see why.
FRANK: It is obvious! Since the sentence “I believe it is red” is false, then I in fact believe it is not red, and since it really is red, then I do have a false belief. So there!
EPISTEMOLOGIST (disappointed): I am sorry, but your proof obviously fails. Of course the falsity of the fact that you believe it is red implies that you don’t believe it is red. But this does not mean that you believe it is not red!!
FRANK: But obviously I know that it either is red or it isn’t, so if I don’t believe it is, then I must believe that it isn’t.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Not at all. I believe that either Jupiter has life or it doesn’t. But I neither believe that it does, nor do I believe that it doesn’t. I have no evidence one way or the other.
FRANK: Oh well, I guess you are right. But let us come to more important matters. I honestly find it impossible that I can be in error concerning my own beliefs.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Must we go through this again? I have already patiently explained to you that you (in the sense of your beliefs, not your statements) are not in error.
FRANK: Oh, all right then, I simply do not believe that even the statements are in error. Yes, according to the machine they are in error, but why should I trust the machine?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Whoever said you should trust the machine?
FRANK: Well, should I trust the machine?