The hearing had a sideshow as well, a press conference by Philadelphia trial lawyer Arthur Wolk. A news release said that Wolk would “unveil the real causes of the Boeing 737 crashes that continue to baffle the NTSB.” The investigators regarded Wolk as a lawyer eager for a headline. Most of the press corps skipped his news conference and went to dinner. A few reporters showed up, along with Vikki Anderson, the FAA investigator. She sat in the back row, dutifully taking notes. (After the news conference, she said the head of the FAA had asked her to attend and write down Wolk’s theories. The FAA was open to suggestions from anyone, she said.)
Wolk lashed out at the party system, saying, “Boeing has been involved in every single aspect of this. It makes no sense to have the company that has the most to lose involved in the investigation.” Using a model of a USAir plane, Wolk showed how the plane had rolled out of the sky. He said the PCU was faulty because the valve could reverse, but he could offer only the same theories the safety board had been chasing for months. The reporters asked a few questions, munched on free potato chips, and left.
At the hearing the next day, as Cox walked up to testify, USAir lawyer Mark Dombroff whispered to a company official, “Cox is about to dump on Boeing.” But Cox was cautious. He explained his concerns about the crossover point and his surprise that it occurred at 190 knots/flaps 1, a routine speed and setting for an approach to an airport. “I would have expected more padding underneath,” he said. He delicately questioned the accuracy of Boeing’s simulator but said he was pleased that the company was going to correct it. He said he would not be disoriented by wake turbulence if he encountered it during a flight.
The Boeing witnesses had a different spin. Carriker, the test pilot, stuck to the company line that the soda can valve should prevent rudder hardovers. Boeing did not require any pilot training for a hardover, he said. “We don’t train for events that don’t occur.”
When the parties got their turn, ALPA leader Herb LeGrow asked a pointed question to remind everyone that Carriker had never flown for an airline. That tactic was used by both parties at the hearings. Boeing and ALPA tried to land punches on each other and toss softballs to their own people. Carriker struck a nerve with ALPA when he referred to “average” pilots. That brought laughter from the room because everyone realized that in the union’s view there was no such thing as an average pilot. They were like children from Lake Wobegon. They were all exceptional.
LeGrow also sparred with McGrew, the Boeing engineer, about the crossover point and the company’s willingness to include ALPA members on a new Roll Team that was investigating reports of sudden rolls by 737s. McGrew said, “We at Boeing have offered to the parties and to the NTSB in the past to please send representatives at any time to come and sit with us as we go through this investigation. We would be happy to accommodate you.”
The union official shot back, “Mr. McGrew, I’ve been the coordinator of this accident since September 8th of last year and I have received no such communication from the Boeing Airplane Company.”
“Excuse me, Mr. LeGrow, but I made that same statement sitting at the stand back in January.” Later, McGrew scoffed at the importance of the crossover point. “Our basic position today is that the airplane has proved its airworthiness over the years and that this is probably not a significant item,” he said. Boeing was planning improvements to two rudder system components, but neither one appeared to have played a role in the Hopewell crash. “There were no faults found in the mechanical systems of the airplane,” he said.
Once again, McGrew’s self-confident manner came on strong. He got snippy when anyone suggested that anything was wrong with the airplane. Haueter questioned whether older 737s should be required to meet current safety standards, but McGrew said it wasn’t necessary. “If you buy a toy wagon for your child, and it wears well and is still usable when he’s your age and has [his own] child, should you go out and re-fit it again? It’s perfectly functional and works, nothing wrong with it.”
Haueter grinned and said, “I guess using your analogy, we wouldn’t put airbags in cars nowadays.”
McGrew retorted, “I think now we’re getting into arguing the relative safety statistics of the automobile versus the airplane. And I think you’ll lose.”
Relations between Boeing and the safety board were getting rocky. NTSB officials said Boeing had not told them about the Roll Team until two days earlier—even though the team had been investigating the incidents for more than a month. Boeing had distributed a packet of lists and charts showing that many “suspicious” rolls reported by 737 pilots were actually encounters with wake turbulence. Boeing’s point was that there was no gremlin in the plane and that pilots just overreact when they hit a wake.
Included in the Boeing packet was the Roll Team’s list of 737 incidents and the company’s conclusion on each one. The first twelve were attributed to wake turbulence, five were blamed on minor airplane malfunctions, and three on pilots. If Boeing had left Flight 427 off the list, the NTSB would not have made such a fuss. But there it was, listed as “Roll Event No. 2.” The “Boeing conclusion” for the crash was listed as “wake turbulence.”
That was heresy. Only the NTSB was supposed to determine a probable cause. It looked as if Boeing was saying it had solved the case while the safety board was still stumped. Yes, the wakes might be a factor, but they were not the primary cause. McGrew and other Boeing officials apologized when they testified, saying that the Roll Team was a sincere attempt to help the airlines. They said it never crossed their minds that it might be related to the investigation. McGrew likened it to other minor changes that Boeing had made to the 737 without any need to notify the safety board. “I must tell you that we probably won’t tell you when we change the brand of tires that we start putting on airplanes, either.”
Hall was miffed. He told McGrew that the Roll Team looked like a parallel investigation without the NTSB, That could damage the integrity of the safety board’s effort, Hall said. The board should be notified of any work that might be related. “It’s like the Holiday Inn. The best surprise is no surprise.” McGrew took his licking on the stand without complaining further, but again he felt he was a victim of Hall’s grandstanding. The NTSB staff not only knew about the Roll Team, McGrew said later, but there was an NTSB person on the team.
Still, McGrew faulted himself for not doing a better job of communicating with the NTSB, informing the top officials ahead of time. He was a great engineer, but he realized he still had a lot to learn about politics.
In an interview a month later, Hall was still complaining about Boeing’s behavior. “I think somebody [at Boeing] went brain-dead, to think they’ll put together a team to look at rolls, but it had nothing to do with this investigation.”
Hall had promised Haueter and Phillips that he would let them keep the investigation going as long as they needed, until they had exhausted everything. But he was growing pessimistic. “It looks like it will be very difficult” to solve the mystery, he said. “I’ve always said that good luck comes only after hard work. We’ve certainly worked hard enough. Maybe that will help us.”
When the rickety 737 landed at Boeing Field, the pilots were relieved. They said it had been a white-knuckle flight. The old bird just didn’t have much life left in her.
The plane, Ship 213, was what USAir called a “runout.” It had flown for twenty-seven years, but the airline found it was no longer economical to keep it. In contrast to the newer plane used in the Atlantic City flight tests, USAir squeezed every last mile out of Ship 213 and then donated it to the Museum of Flight in Seattle. The wings and tail were going to get chopped off so the fuselage could be used as a theater. John Little, the museum’s assistant security manager, greeted the pilots as they got off the plane and peeked inside the cockpit. It must have been a scary flight, he decided. There was a Bible on top of the instrument panel.