Or the trial might give him a lot more.
Time was of the essence. Joan’s father had died recently, and her mother was getting older. Brett wanted Joan’s mother to know that the scholarship foundation was going to be a reality. So he called her at home in Melrose, Iowa, and asked her opinion. She said she was comfortable with Brett making the decision.
After he hung up, Brett came up with a novel way to decide.
Fate had put Joan on Flight 427, so it might as well be fate that decided whether he should settle. He would flip a coin. Maybe God or Joan’s hand would decide which way it landed.
He reached into a drawer where he kept his spare change and grabbed a quarter. It was from 1987, which seemed appropriate because that was the year he and Joan had started dating. Heads he would go to trial. Tails he would settle.
He flipped the coin and was sure it would come up heads. As it tumbled through the air, he thought about the trial and what it would be like. The quarter landed on the carpet.
Tails.
It was time to settle.
He took a long walk and then called Demetrio from his cell phone. He wanted to be sure a settlement wouldn’t prevent him from writing a book about his experiences. Would there be a gag order?
No, Demetrio assured him. Brett was free to talk.
“Let’s end it,” Brett said.
USAir Flight 427 changed aviation forever.
At the NTSB’s urging, the FAA conducted an unprecedented study of the 737 rudder system. An independent panel of hydraulic engineers and flight control experts spent a year studying the valve, flying 737 simulators and analyzing extreme failures that were not fully explored in the Flight 427 investigation.
In its final report, the panel agreed with the NTSB and warned that the 737 rudder system was susceptible to many failures and jams that could be catastrophic. The group recommended better training for 737 pilots and, in the long term, a complete redesign of the plane’s rudder system.
As a result of the report, the FAA and Boeing announced in September 2000 that the unique valve-within-a-valve rudder system on all 737s would be replaced by a two-valve system, similar to the one used on other planes. The announcement marked a surprising and dramatic change for Boeing and the FAA. Both had insisted for years that the redesign was unnecessary.
Boeing said it would pay the entire cost of the new rudder system, estimated to be more than $240 million. The company said the new system should be installed in all 737s by 2007.
In the meantime, all 737s have been equipped with improved valves that cannot reverse. The planes also have better yaw damper couplers (the computers that command small adjustments to the rudder) and pressure limiters (devices that limit how far a rudder will move). Pilots have been alerted to the crossover point and have been trained to identify and recover from rudder problems.
After years of complaints from the NTSB, the FAA mandated that airlines upgrade flight data recorders to take additional measurements such as rudder pedal position, a change that should make it easier for investigators to determine the cause of future crashes. Instead of the thirteen parameters recorded on the USAir plane, they now must have at least seventeen.
Tom McSweeny, the FAA official who was criticized for being soft on Boeing, left the FAA in the fall of 2001. He is now director of international safety and regulatory affairs for Boeing.
USAir changed its name to USAirways in early 1997 after former United Airlines head Stephen Wolf became chairman. One of Wolf’s first priorities was a new image that has helped erase the memories of the airline’s five crashes. USAirways repainted its fleet, announced plans to buy new Airbus planes (the airline said the 737 problems were not a factor in the decision), and improved amenities for frequent travelers. A plan to merge with United Airlines fizzled in 2001, so USAir once again talked about consolidating and cutting costs. Its future was unclear as this book went to press.
Boeing merged with its rival McDonnell Douglas in 1997. One of the biggest challenges for the gargantuan company has been keeping up with demand. Sales of 737s remained strong and were unaffected by the controversy over the rudder. In 2000 Boeing produced more than twice as many 737s as in 1994, the year of the crash.
The painful experiences of the families of Flight 427 and other crashes prompted Congress to pass the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act, which requires airlines to have detailed plans for responding to a crash and notifying family members. An airline must notify the next of kin as soon as it verifies that the passenger was aboard the plane—regardless of whether other names have been confirmed, and the airline must consult with families about plans for human remains and personal effects. Also, the law says attorneys cannot make unsolicited contact with families until at least thirty days after an accident.
Under the new law, the NTSB is designated as the main federal agency to help families after an aviation disaster. Many safety board investigators, including Haueter, did not want their agency to take on that responsibility because they believed it conflicted with the safety board’s investigative mission. But Chairman Jim Hall said it was consistent with the government’s role to help people in need. Since the passage of the act, airlines and the NTSB have been praised for their treatment of families.
In late 2000, Tom Haueter was promoted to deputy director of aviation safety, the second-highest aviation job in the NTSB. He says he is confident that his team solved the mystery of Flight 427, although it’s possible that the 737 rudder system may have other failure modes that haven’t been found. “The big lesson is to keep pushing,” he says. “In 585 [the Colorado Springs case], we ran out of data and quit. In 427, we didn’t quit.”
In the summer of 2001 the NTSB released a revised report on United Airlines Flight 585, the Colorado Springs crash. It incorporated the findings of the Flight 427 investigation and the new conclusion that the United plane most likely had a rudder reversal. The words “FOR UNDETERMINED REASONS” no longer appear on the cover.
Haueter still flies in 737s on business trips, but his constant talk of rudder problems has frightened his wife, Trisha, to the point that when they go on vacation, she insists on flying in a different type of plane.
Jean McGrew retired from Boeing in 2000. He says the crash investigation took a heavy toll on him and was a big factor in his decision to retire. Always blunt about his feelings, he says he is still convinced the pilots caused the crash.
However, McGrew says he is glad the 737’s unique rudder valve is being replaced. “It was not as good as it should have been,” he says. “It could have been more fail-safe than it was.”
He has strong feelings about the NTSB and how it was run by politicians: “I think they ought to take the politicians and get rid of them.”
John Cox was promoted to fly the Airbus A320 for USAirways and in 2001 was named chairman of ALPA’s Executive Air Safety Committee, the union’s top safety job. During the USAir investigation, a fellow pilot sent him a book with this inscription: “John, there are people alive today that otherwise would not be except for your work in safety, and I thank you for that.”
On September 9, 2000, the day after the sixth anniversary of the crash, Brett Van Bortel got engaged to Victoria Hartz, a woman he had been dating for several years. They were married in July 2001.
His lawyers received $1.5 million, which was 25 percent of his settlement. After other expenses were deducted, Brett ended up with $4.18 million. He is using $1 million for the Joan Lahart-Van Bortel Memorial Scholarship Fund. Each year, it provides a four-year scholarship for a young woman from Joan’s home county in Iowa to attend college. Brett also used some of his settlement to take Joan’s mother and brother to Ireland.