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“There can be no question of the sincere friendliness of the American people toward the Russian people.”—Charles Evan Hughes

For sixteen years the United States had refused to recognize Russia, and the U.S. Secretaries of State during that period were very precise in explaining why. For example, in 1923 Secretary Charles E. Hughes declared: “There can be no question of the sincere friendliness of the people toward the Russian people. And there is for this very reason a strong desire that nothing should be done (such as granting recognition) to place the seal of approval on the tyrannical measures that have been adopted in Russia, or to take any action which might retard the gradual reassertion of the Russian people of their right to live in freedom.”

A common sight in New York during the 1930s when American Communists paraded through the streets with their familiar slogan: “Defend the Soviet Union.”

Many such statements over a period of years placed Stalin on notice that if the United States were to recognize Russia, it would require many changes in Communist policies and Communist tactics. Therefore, early in 1933, when Stalin sent his old comrade in arms, Maxim Litvinov, to Washington to negotiate for U.S. recognition, he knew what the terms would have to be. In written statements, Litvinov promised that henceforth the USSR would not attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States; he said the USSR would not allow its officials to use propaganda or agitate for the overthrow of the United States Government, and furthermore, he promised that the USSR would not permit any group to organize in Russia for the purpose of agitating for the overthrow of the United States Government.

At the moment it looked as though the Communists were going to repudiate the Communist International and world revolution. On the basis of these solemn promises by an official of the Russian government, recognition was extended by the United States to the USSR late in 1933. Such were the circumstances which led the U.S. to change its policy toward Communist Russia from one of co-resistance to co-existence.

But within ten months, officials of the United States knew this nation had been defrauded. William C. Bullitt, the first U.S. ambassador, reported from Moscow that world revolution was on the tongue of every Soviet official. Plans were already under way for the Communist International (an organization to promote world revolution) to hold its seventh conference in Russia, even though this violated both the letter and the spirit of the promises made by Litvinov.

The U.S. vigorously protested to Litvinov, but he merely shrugged his shoulders and said the USSR had absolutely no “obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International.” It was obvious that conditions in Russia had changed. Stalin once more felt secure in his dictatorship. The prestige of U.S. recogniton had served its purpose, and the promises of the USSR were now scraps of paper.

When the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International convened, the United States was denounced along with all other capitalistic countries, and plans were openly advocated for the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, at the very time Litvinov was promising not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States, Soviet intelligence officers were busy in Washington setting up elaborate spy rings in various agencies of the government.

There were political authorities who believe the United States should have broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviets the very moment it was discovered that the Communist leaders were brazenly violating their promises. But this did not happen. Diplomatic strategists at the time advocated that we treat the Bolsheviks like big blustering boys and overlook their delinquencies. They further rationalized that at least we would have a listening post in Russia by maintaining an ambassador there. It was on the basis of this recommendation that the U.S. policy of coexistence fell another notch. Our diplomats decided to eat humble pie made out of apathetic tolerance for broken promises and abject submissiveness to Communist abuse. This boosted Stalin’s political stock in Russia tremendously.

Joseph Stalin’s Return to Power

When Stalin saw the outward signs of public resentment in Russia disappearing, he felt he could once more assume a bolder front. But a deep-seated hatred continued to fester in the minds of the Communist Party leaders. They secretly admitted among themselves that Stalin must be removed “for the good of the Party.” Therefore, the top revolutionaries of Russia surreptitiously combined their ideas on how best to do away with Stalin. Finally, they decided the best plan was to first destroy those immediately around him and then effect a coup. The initial attempt was against Sergei Kirov—a favorite of the Man of Steel who had been officially designated by the Politburo as Stalin’s successor.

Kirov was shot and killed gangster style December 1, 1934. It is said that nothing had ever so deeply affected Stalin as this murder. It was perfectly clear to him what his enemies were up to and he therefore struck back with a viciously effective blow. Lists were published of more than one thousand persons selected from every district in Russia and all these were summarily shot.

Stalin then directed the secret police to plunge into every devious crevice of the party and dig and prod until they had found out who was behind the murder of Kirov. This was not difficult. Even many of the most insignificant members of the Party were aware that some of the biggest names in Russia were involved in the conspiracy. To save their own skins they quickly confessed. Stalin ordered the arrest of every suspect together with their families, associates, friends and even their correspondents.

Tens of thousands went down before firing squads in secret executions while the more prominent officials were exhibited before the world at Stalin’s famous purge trials. In these trials Stalin’s former comrades of the revolution sought to win mercy for their families by confessing in the most self-degrading language to all the crimes of which they were accused, But it gained them nothing.

The list of those publicly condemned with their families and friends is described by Nikolaus Basseches as involving “not only ex-leaders of the party… but also fully a dozen members of the Government who were still in office, and the supreme commander of the army, the Chief of Staff, almost all the army commanders, and in addition a considerable number of senior officers; the Minister of Police and the highest police officials; the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, almost all the ambassadors ministers representing the Soviet Union abroad, almost the whole of the diplomatic staff at the Ministry in Moscow; and also highly placed judges and members of the governments of the federal republics.”

Even Whittaker Chambers who was an American Communist spy at the time suspected that a horrible crime against humanity was being enacted in Russia. He later wrote: “The great purge was in the most literal sense a massacre…. This great massacre, probably the greatest in history was deliberately planned and executed…. Those killed have been estimated from several hundred thousand to several million men and women. The process took about three years, 1935–1938.”

Stalin Creates a New Class

At the very end of the process came the execution of the executioners. Since time immemorial it has been a favorite trick of political pirates and brigands to use a hand-picked band of followers to commit murder and then murder the murderers to cover up the original crime. Stalin followed the same procedure. He selected a pathological personality named Yeshov to set up the secret police machinery for the purge and then drew certain judges into the conspiracy. Both police and judges faithfully performed their miserable missions on the assumption that they were basking in the radiant light of Stalin’s affection and trust.