If this plan had worked, it would have been truly a master stroke of diplomatic genius. Unfortunately, however, it turned out to be just what many military officials and heads of intelligence agencies predicted it would be—the means by which Russia would catapult herself into a world power by capitalizing on the treasure and prestige of the very nation she most desired to destroy.
Nevertheless, the program was inaugurated and America’s attitude toward Russia both during and after World War II can only be understood in terms of this policy.
In early June, 1942, Molotov came secretly to Washington and stayed at the White House. After his departure preparations were made to break the new U.S. policy to the American people. On June 22, 1942, (the anniversary of Hitler’s attack on the USSR) a Russian Aid Rally was held in New York’s Madison Square Garden. There a top government official announced: “A second front? Yes, and if necessary, a third and a fourth front…. We are determined that nothing shall stop us from sharing with you all that we have and are in this conflict, and we look forward to sharing with you the fruits of victory and peace.” Then there followed the pathetic, but blindly hopeful statement: “Generations unborn will owe a great measure of their freedom to the unconquerable power the Soviet people.”{76}
The Story of American Lend-Lease to Russia
This American policy of generosity immediately began to manifest itself. Billions of dollars of Russian Lend-Lease Were authorized. Even the deliberate sacrifice of American self-interest was evident in some of the orders received by U.S. military services. An order to the Air Service Command dated January 1, 1943, carried this astounding mandate: “The modification, equipment, and movement of Russian planes have given first priority, even over planes for the U.S. Army Forces.”
The U.S. Congress was not quite as enthusiastic toward Russia as the diplomatic strategists. Congress specifically restricted Russian Lend-Lease to materials to be used for military action against the Axis enemy. It forbade the shipment of materials which would be used for civilian personnel or the rehabilitation of Russia after the war. This was in no way designed to show unfriendliness toward the Russian people. It was simply an expression of belief that U.S. resources should not be used to promote Communist Russia into a world power. Some day the Russian people would perhaps regain their freedom, and that would be the time to share resources. Meanwhile, non-military generosity would only strengthen the post-war position of the Communist dictatorship.
In spite of these legal restrictions, however, the uninhibited generosity of the diplomats dominated Lend-Lease rather than Congress or the leaders of the Military.
General John R. Deane, for example, who was in Moscow as Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, turned down a Russian request for 25 large 200-horsepower Diesel marine engines because the engines already sent to Russia were rusting in open storage and from all appearances were simply being stockpiled for post-war use. Furthermore, the engines were badly needed by General MacArthur in the South Pacific. After hearing General Deane’s decision, the Russians appealed to Harry Hopkins (head of the Lend-Lease program) who over-ruled General Deane. During the following two years a total of 1,305 of these engines were sent to Russia at a cost to the American people of $30,745,947.
After Pearl Harbor, when Navy officials were given the highest possible priority for copper wire to be used in the repair of U.S. battleships, they found the Russians had an even higher priority for an order of copper wire which was apparently to be used for post-war rehabilitation of Russian cities. The wire was turned over to the Russians in such quantities that it had to be stored on a 20-acre lot in Westchester County, New York, where it remained until the war was nearly over. A few months before the Armistice, it was shipped to Russia for the rehabilitation of their communications systems.
Since the close of World War II, the American people have gradually learned the details concerning the flood of goods and treasure which went to Russia under Lend-Lease. The lists which have been published are from Russian records. They were secured by an American officer, Major George Racey Jordan, who was the official U.S. expediter for Russian Lend-Lease at the Great Falls Air Base in Montana. An analysis of these lists showed that according to Russian records, the Communists received over eleven billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease and that in spite of the legal restrictions against it, the diplomatic strategists included $3,040,423,000 worth of American goods, paid for by American taxpayers, which definitely does not appear to be authorized by the Lend-Lease act. These lists show shipments of vast stockpiles of “non-munition” chemicals together with voluminous shipments of cigarette cases, phonograph records, ladies’ compacts, sheet music, pianos, antique furniture, $388,844 worth of “notions and cheap novelties,” women’s jewelry, household furnishings, fishing tackle, lipstick, perfumes, dolls, bank vaults, playground equipment, and quantities of many other types of illegal, non-military merchandise.
Students of Russian wartime history point out that American Lend-Lease began feeding into Russia at a time when she was almost prostrate. She had lost most of her crops as a result of the scorched earth campaign designed to slow Nazi advances. Even with Lend-Lease food the troops had to be rationed at a bare subsistence level so it is likely that without
Lend-Lease the Russian resistance might well have collapsed. Furthermore, the Germany occupation cut the Russians off from many of their major industrial centers. In addition to U.S. planes, munitions, chemicals, tools, heavy machinery, and so forth, the amazing American “Arsenal of Democracy” provided Russia with 478,899 motor vehicles. This was nearly half of all the motor vehicles used on the Soviet front.
It is an interesting commentary on the Communist psychology to note that the United States never received an official “thank you” from Russia for the eleven billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease goods which were paid for and literally “donated” to the Communist Motherland by the American people. Stalin’s excuse was that his government felt the United States made an error when it stopped Lend-Lease at the close of the war. He made it icy clear that under the circumstances his people did not feel an expression of gratitude would be either appropriate or justifiable.
Russian Attempts to Secure the Secrets of the Atomic Bomb
Throughout World War II Russian espionage vigorously concentrated on the most important thing to come out of the War—the harnessing of atomic energy. A two-pronged thrust was employed to get the information as it was developed: one by espionage and the other by diplomatic channels. For a time the diplomatic channels were particularly productive, not only for atomic energy secrets, but for all military and industrial information.
Major Jordan first became aware of this at the Great Falls Lend-Lease Air Base when the Russians began bringing large quantities of cheap, black suitcases along with them whenever they left the United States. They refused to let Jordan see the contents on the grounds that the suitcases were pieces of “diplomatic luggage” and therefore immune to inspection.