However, when Malenkov and Beria took over as heirs of Stalin they immediately found themselves confronted by an explosive economic crisis. Pressure was building up inside Russia (and her satellites) just as it did in 1922 and again in 1932. Malenkov therefore offered respite to his people: “Let us now lay heavy industry aside for awhile. The people cannot eat heavy industry…. We should care for the needs of our people.” This was the beginning of a radical new policy for the USSR. At home the slogan was “More Food”; abroad Malenkov’s slogan was a campaign for “Peaceful Coexistence” with all the democracies.
It was just twenty-three days after Stalin died that the Communist Chinese acted on their new signals and opened negotiations with the U.N. commanders for an armistice. This finally led to the signing of a truce on July 27, 1953. It became effective twelve days later.
Thus ended the Korean War. It had cost the United States 20 billion dollars and more than 135,000 casualties. It had cost South Korea 1 million dead; another million maimed and wounded 9 million left homeless and saddled South Korea with 4 million refugees from North Korea.
The U.S. Summarily Abandons Its Twenty-Year Policy of Appeasement
The people of the United States came out of the Korean War sadder and wiser than when they went in. Authorities have stated that two things happened in the Korean War which may yet brand it as the greatest blunder the Communist strategists ever made. First, it awakened the United States to the necessity of vigorously rearming and staying armed so long as the Communist threat exists. Second, it demonstrated to the people of the United States the inherent weaknesses of the United Nations. As Senator Robert A. Taft summed it up: “The United Nations serves a very useful purpose as a town meeting of the world… but it is an impossible weapon against forcible aggression.”
Back in 1950 when the U.N. called upon all its members to furnish the means to resist the Communists, only 16 countries responded with the highly essential ingredient of armed troops. Altogether, these 16 nations furnished an army of 35,000 fighting men. Little South Korea maintained a fighting force of 400,000 men while the United States made up the difference by furnishing a force of 350,000. More than one million American GI’s had to be rotated through Korea to maintain the U.S. quota of military strength. In the mind of the average American the U.N. had therefore ceased to represent “collective security.”
It was difficult to forget that while Americans and South Koreans were taking the brunt of the war, Russia and Britain had both violated the U.N. embargo by shipping strategic materials to Red China. On the floor of the U.N., Andrei Vishinsky had thrown down the Russian challenge: “The Soviet Union has never concealed the fact that it sold and continues to sell armaments to its ally, China!”
The end of the Korean War marked the end of an era. During the summer of 1953 the United States served notice on Britain and France that if the Communists broke the cease-fire agreement in Korea we would immediately launch a major war against China. Both Britain and France agreed to support this stand. Many did not realize it at the time, but by this action the United States was passing the death sentence a twenty-year-old policy of Communist appeasement.
The Role of the FBI in the Battle of the Underground
No one could have welcomed the end of appeasement with greater relief than John Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI and the number-one law enforcement personality in the United States. Since 1919 he had struggled to illuminate the minds of government leaders as well as the public generally concerning the conspiratorial nature of Communism. As an assistant to the Attorney General in 1919 he had prepared one of the first legal briefs reflecting the subversive aspects of the worldwide Communist movement.
During the twenty years of appeasement, when many Americans had been lulled into a sense of security by the “sweet talk of Communist United Front propaganda,” John Edgar Hoover had struck out with two-listed blows at the Red menace which was gnawing at the vitals of American life:
“The American Communist… must be placed in the same category as the Ku Klux Klan, the now defunct German-American Bund, and other totalitarian groups…. As common criminals seek the cover of darkness, Communists, behind the protection of false fronts, carry on their sinister and vicious program, intent on swindling and robbing Americans of their heritage of freedom.”
John Edgar Hoover was a great disappointment to the Communists. In most countries the Red leaders had been able to completely discredit the agencies handling the police powers of government by blasting them with charges of corruption and violation of civil liberties. However, the Director of the FBI had spent his adult lifetime building the FBI so that the public would know that any such charges would be false and fraudulent.
Over the years the public had learned that FBI agents spent as much time checking out innocent suspects as they spent in ferreting out the guilty. In fact, by careful investigation and humane treatment of the guilty, the FBI had secured confessions in 85 percent of its cases.{91}
Therefore, the Communists were deeply disappointed with the results of their campaign to portray the FBI as an American Gestapo. The Communists leaders were further embittered by the knowledge that the FBI had trained its personnel to be just what governmental officers in a free nation should be—alert, intelligent, scientific and hard working. And what particularly frightened the Reds was the quiet methodical way in which Bureau agents went after subversives—all of which foreshadowed a day of reckoning for Communist strategists.
It came July 20, 1948, when all the top leaders the Communist Party of America were indicted. The “Big Eleven” who stood trial were all convicted. Six of their attorneys were also fined or imprisoned for contemptuous conduct during the trial. Four of the eleven Communists jumped their $20,000 bail bond and the FBI had to launch an international investigation to have them returned.
Shortly afterwards the Government became convinced that Soviet espionage agents had been stealing atomic information and the FBI was given jurisdiction. Within weeks the FBI had gristed through tons of records, interviewed hundreds of “restricted” employees at various atomic energy plants and emerged from the slow elimination process to point the finger of justice at a physicist, Klaus Fuchs, who had spent considerable time at Los Alamos. However, at that moment the German-born, naturalized Britisher was the dignified director of England’s atomic energy establishment at Harwell.
Acting on the FBI tip that Klaus Fuchs was the principal suspect in the subversion of the free world’s monopoly of the atomic bomb, British Intelligence went to work. Within one month they saw some evidence that the FBI might be right. After another month they had no doubt about it. On February 3, 1949, the British announced that Fuchs had been arrested and had made a full confession.
Fuch’s confession sent the FBI on another hunt. Fuchs said he gave packets of information dealing with the atomic bomb to a person known to him only as “Raymond.” This person had to be identified and located since he was apparently the courier who delivered the bomb secrets to the Soviet Consulate in New York. Although the FBI had nothing to start with but a physical description, a phony name and the possibility that the courier might be a chemist, agents finally came the right man. It was Harry Gold.