Of course, as time marched on toward Cuba’s inexorable doom, the course of history embarrassed the Congressman and also the State Department. In the closing months of the conflict American policies followed blind alleys which authorities have since attributed to either “stupidity, incompetence, or worse.”
The Communist Take-Over
It was January 1, 1959, that Fidel Castro became the political steward of a dazed, war-weary Cuba. Batista had fled. All opposition was crushed. In many circles of American liberals and confused newspaper readers there was a great huzza as though liberty and constitutional government had come to Cuba at last.
But many students of international problems saw ominous signs that the suffering and blood-letting for Cuba had barely begun. The first warnings were exultant boasts from the Communist press that “they” had won. In Moscow, Pravda pointed out that from the very beginning of the Castro movement “our party considered it its first duty to aid the rebels, giving them the correct orientation and the support the popular masses. The party headed the battles for land and thereby increased its authority among peasantry. Our party… appealed to the popular masses Fidel Castro in every way….”{117}
The Communist Party of Cuba also came out in the open to boast that they had provided an important part of the revolutionary action “to overthrow the bloody tyranny of Batista which served as the instrument of imperialistic interests and was supported by imperialism.”{118}
If General Batista read this statement he may have wondered where this “imperialistic” support was supposed to have come from. He knew that if the Communists were accusing him of enjoying U.S. support they were really confused.
As soon as Castro took over he used his revolutionary courts of mob justice to send over 600 persons to the firing squads. American liberals described the punishment as “harsh, but deserved.” Then he reached out and began a “reform” movement of typical Communist dimensions:
• Confiscation of land and settling Cuban workers on what turned out to be large, Soviet-type collectivized farms.
• Confiscation of more than a billion dollars worth of American industry which Castro had neither the technicians nor finances to operate.
• Breaking up of Cuban family life and placing medium-aged children in special farm communes so “the children will be under the influence of teachers and not their families.”
• Reorganization of the schools to serve as propaganda transmission belts to dispense Communist doctrine and the “Hate Yankee” line.
• Suspension of civil liberties and other constitutional guarantees.
• Elimination of free elections.
• Capture of all press, TV and radio for government propaganda purposes.
• Termination of all cultural, political and economic ties with the United States.
• Alliances with Russia.
• Recognition of Red China.
• Trade with the Communist bloc.
While all of this Communist machinery was being put into operation during 1959 and early 1960, many American apologists for Castro continued to insist that he was neither Communist nor dictatorial, just “misunderstood.” They snatched at every hopeful atom of news from Cuba indicating that Castro might be “getting more reasonable now,” or “Castro is changing.”
But all of these dreams of hopeful illusion were smashed by Castro himself when he dutifully answered the call of Nikita Khrushchev in the summer of 1960 and went to the United Nations as part of the Red Bloc “show of strength.” At Castro’s Harlem headquarters the two dictators warmly embraced each other. They were brothers and comrades.
Now that the Iron Curtain has come rumbling down on little Cuba perhaps some Americans occasionally reflect on the glowing description of Castro which Herbert Matthews wrote for the New York Times in 1957: “Castro,” he said, “has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections.”
Other Americans who chose the wrong side have since said, “It is all so unfortunate. Perhaps it was inevitable.”
This last statement has a familiar ring. This is precisely the theme which Dean Acheson put in his White Paper when he tried to explain why we lost China. He excused it as “inevitable.” But the Wedemeyer Report revealed that China was also lost because of stupidity, incompetence or worse. China was lost when the State Department promoted an arms embargo against this long-standing U.S. ally at a time when she was fighting for her very existence. The same kind of thinking put the arms embargo on Batista. Both were lost. Both were casualties of Communism.
All of this led former Ambassador Gardner to remark sadly:
“We could have prevented it all and we didn’t. If we’d carried out normal relations with Batista, just carried out our contracts, he (Batista) would have got out as scheduled, come to live in Florida, and been replaced by an ideal candidate.”
“A pro-Batista man?” Gardner was asked.
“No, Marquez Sterling, a doctor, whom everybody loved, was Batista’s opponent. Ironically, although against Batista, he had to flee Cuba because of Castro.”{119}
Events during 1961 demonstrated that the United States was still not giving the Cuban situation sufficient attention. None of the tragic errors of the past were any worse than the fatal blunder which occurred on April 17, 1961, when an abortive invasion of Cuba was attempted at the Bay of Pigs under circumstances which doomed it to failure before the attack was even launched.
Badly organized, poorly equipped, and carrying the sagging prestige of the United States with it, a little band of less than 1400 Cubans landed from antiquated ships to spark an “uprising against Castro.” Castro was waiting for them with Soviet tanks, jet planes and Soviet guns. When the shooting was over the “invaders” were captured in a body. Communist propaganda machinery all over the world went into hysteria of screaming headlines against American imperialism. “A first-class disaster for U.S. prestige” wailed the free world press.
In the panic atmosphere which followed, Castro facetiously said he might trade tractors for the prisoners. Immediately misguided U.S. liberals began collecting money for tractors to pay off Castro’s blackmail demand. Castro was so pleased to see citizens from the most powerful nation in the world cowering at his feet that he gleefully tantalized the negotiators by boosting his demands. As should have been expected, the negotiations came to nothing.
Responsible Americans began to demand a halt to all this ridiculous pampering of a Soviet puppet. Serious political leaders began to set down the plans for a long-range strategy which would eventually liberate the beleaguered people of Cuba.
CHAPTER TWELVE
The Future Task
In this study we have made no attempt to cover up the blunders of the past which free men have made in dealing with Communism. In fact, all of these mistakes may be counted a benefit if we have learned a lesson from each of them. Nevertheless, we certainly would be guilty of the “decadent stupidity” which the Communists attribute to us if we allowed ourselves to repeat these mistakes in the future.
In this chapter we shall deal with the task at hand. To appreciate the problem we shall first discuss the progress which the Communists have made under their Timetable of Conquest. Then we shall deal with the current line of Communist strategy. Finally we shall describe some of the most important things which must be done to win.