The new administration should reexamine existing institutions in Europe to determine what institutional framework would best serve this purpose. CSCE has failed, and NATO is not relevant because the problems in Europe are no longer primarily military in nature.
The most persuasive argument for a new institution is that Russia should be surrounded by viable states. Russia is a powerful nation state, possessing nuclear weapons. The United States will have to deal with it, and should anticipate a resurgence of a strong Russia. When Russia does revive, it may well pose a real threat to its neighbors. The 25 million Russians living outside Russia are a time bomb and will be the source of a great disaster if there is a nationalist revival in Russia. The territorial status quo can not be ensured without some guarantees for protection of minority rights.
It is probably naive to expect that what will emerge on the Eurasian land mass will be a collection of democratic, market oriented and benign states, or that out of chaos and crisis will come a well-ordered market. One can hope that Russia will break with over 1,000 years of its history, but more likely is the eventual revival of an autocratic state, probably well-armed and potentially hostile toward its neighbors.
European security has hitherto been a question of cushioning the East-West confrontation. Now it will have to be redefined to cushion the inevitable conflicts within Europe itself.
Asia. The revolutionary changes in Europe are, on the whole, positive. The changes that will take place in Asia are more worrisome. America’s proper role is still elusive. The problems are the same—our uneasy relations with Japan and China. Usually, we have managed to have good relations with one or the other, and recently with both. Now the opposite seems more likely: that our relations with both Japan and China will deteriorate.
Japan has achieved its World War II aims of preeminence in Asia, except for a free hand in China. But the price has been to antagonize its principal protector, the United States. What role will Japan now play, when there is no common threat? What is the nature of our relationship if and when Japan becomes more active in Asia and internationally?
Many advocate a more equal partnership. The idea is based on a probably erroneous estimate of Japan. Despite its economic gains, Japan is a weaker country than it appears. Moreover, there is an underlying racism in Japan that will be a formidable barrier to a deeper relationship with the United States. While a more mature partnership is a desirable goal, its attainment may be impossible. It seems likely that American and Japanese interests will become more and more antagonistic.
The United States, therefore, should not press Japan to take on a larger global role. On the other hand, Washington should stop supporting Japan’s insistence that its aid to Russia be conditioned on return of the Northern Territories. This is an irresponsible position given the dangers in the region. The United States should be more supportive of the Russian position, since it was the United States that gave the islands to Russia at Yalta.
There are more variables in relations with China. It is now far less valuable as an ally against Russia. In an era of democratization China remains an anomaly, and it is also the country where a change in top leadership is likely to have a profound impact over time.
What is American policy, and how are our interests defined? It is high time to put aside the obsession with Tiananmen. We should not isolate China. If one American purpose is to revive its own economy, why jeopardize trade over an incident 5 years ago? More relevant, perhaps, is that China will continue to play a role in Cambodia, in North Korea, and in the U.N. Security Council. Our interests in the manner in which that role is executed will have to outweigh our revulsion over Tiananmen.
The American interest is not to permit either Japan or China to dominate our Asian policy. We need a balance between China and Japan, and a balance among China, Japan, and the United States. One way to achieve this is to support Russia in the Far East.
The Middle East. The United States has now become the only outside power of any consequence in this area. In the wake of the Gulf War, President Bush and Secretary Baker saw a great strategic opening. The radicals had been defeated. The United States had demonstrated its willingness to intervene, and Israel was more willing to heed American advice during the Gulf War, and especially since the elections in Israel.
With elections in Israel and America now completed, a strategic dialogue with Israel is needed, a dialogue that should finally confront the basic issues of a settlement. Sooner or later the United States must develop its own plan, and then insist on it. Unlike in Europe and Asia, in the Middle East some aggressive American diplomacy will be needed as well. There is no other way, except a war sometime in the future.
It is surprising how little attention has been paid to military security in the wake of the cold war. The conventional wisdom is that the military establishment ought to be reduced, and substantially so. This reduction has begun. The debate, however, has degenerated into quarrels about “redundancy” themes that were echoed in the election campaign. To make “redundancy” (roles and missions) the major issue is not worthy of a superpower. The real issues are difficult enough without becoming bogged down in interservice quarrels, or conflicts between the armchair strategists in the Congress and the Service Chiefs.
What threats are likely in the near term, and over the longer term? There is a tendency to answer this question in terms of the past. Thus, DESERT STORM is widely cited as an example of the kind of operation that the United States should be ready to execute in the future. The new Secretary of Defense, when he was still in the Congress, advocated adding to the DESERT STORM model an air and naval combat force capable of supporting the defense of Korea, new lift capabilities, a capability for humanitarian aid, and the capability to execute a Panama-sized operation. (Statement of Les Aspin, August 3, 1992). This seems very close to the forces in the current structure. But even this thinner program is questionable in light of Bosnia. Intervention there would be close to the kind of wars that were planned for central Europe against the Russians; a subsequent occupation phase in Yugoslavia might be like Vietnam. It is clear that the strategic analysis required for this debate is still in its infancy.
The Gulf War was nonnuclear. If it is a model for future conflicts, what is the role for nuclear forces? Pure deterrence? Of whom? In the event both START agreements are realized, the United States will find itself heavily dependent on sea-based strategic forces, with all of the complications of command and control and antisubmarine warfare that entails.
Finally, there is the question of strategic defense. With the threat of new nuclear powers growing, and the probable proliferation of long range delivery systems, how long should America tolerate a strategic vulnerability with no defense whatsoever? The entire complex of issues surrounding SDI ought to be reexamined. Many of the objections related to deterrence equations against a Russian threat that is disappearing; most of the argument are now obsolete or no longer applicable. The concept of cooperation on a worldwide warning system is highly attractive. The SCUD attacks against Israel by Saddam ought to be a lesson.