Yeltsin was, of course, well aware that the deputies’ furious criticism was aimed less at Gaidar than at himself. His reaction was fully in character: he sulked and, from the podium, appealed over the heads of those assembled to the citizens of the country, declaring that the congress had turned into ‘a mass of total reactionariness’. The president refused to cooperate with the parliament, called for a national referendum of confidence and ostentatiously walked out.
In response, the congress refused by an overwhelming majority to extend the president’s emergency powers, but did, ultimately, accept his proposal to elect Viktor Chernomyrdin chairman of the government. Chernomyrdin had served as minister of the gas industry of the USSR and had subsequently headed Gazprom. It was also agreed to hold a referendum in April 1993 on the main provisions of a new constitution, including reallocation of powers between the legislative and executive bodies. Very soon, however, it became clear that this was only a temporary truce in a conflict between two parties, neither of which was inclined to collaborate with the other, to compromise, or to settle for anything less than unconditional victory at any price.
Unlike many, I did not consider the idea of a national referendum constructive or as contributing to stabilizing the situation and consolidating society. In fact, it struck me as positively counterproductive and dangerous. The purpose of the noisy referendum campaign was to divert society’s attention from the big question of why the course adopted in January 1992 had brought society to the verge of ruin. I made my opinion clear in an article in the weekly, Moskovskiye Novosti [Moscow News]. ‘Rather than bringing the supporters of reform closer together and extending democracy, the referendum will only deepen divisions and reinforce Russia’s centrifugal tendencies.’
The situation was now so acute that I felt compelled to express myself very directly. I described the government’s policy towards the people as blatantly cynical. ‘The inefficiency of the state bureaucracy and corruption have reached levels unprecedented in Russian history, and indeed in the modern world.’
In the same article, I expressed the opinion that ‘further expansion of the Russian president’s powers is fraught with the danger of fomenting an openly authoritarian regime’. I drew attention to ‘rumours that the president’s circle are thinking of declaring a “transitional period”, with emergency powers’. A situation might be created, I warned, which ‘could be used to justify a “temporary” reduction of free speech and other civil liberties, and suspension of representative bodies while a new constitution was developed and introduced’.
What needed to be done? In order to preserve civil peace, I advised the Congress of People’s Deputies to examine the work of the Supreme Soviet and executive arm and seek ways of restoring social harmony. ‘If that proves impossible, the only way to resolve the crisis constitutionally is to hold early elections of both branches of government, rather than waiting for a whole year.’
I also felt new elections were needed because the Russian institutions of government had been formed in the days of the USSR, when there was still a centre to the Soviet Union. ‘Many active and experienced Russian politicians were not eligible to participate in those elections because they were working in Union, rather than specifically Russian, institutions. Moreover, during the past two years new, fresh forces have come on the political scene in Russia that are capable of assuming responsibility for developing every sphere of life.’
The way events developed showed only too clearly how real these threats were. They were compounded by a continuing deterioration of the situation and increasing hardship in people’s lives. This made the conflict between the president and parliament all the more acute and irreconcilable. Serious accusations were hurled by both sides at the other. Yeltsin’s kitchen cabinet hinted he was on the verge of dissolving parliament. In response, the deputies denounced the ‘Kremlin’s court favourites’, and called for a campaign of civil disobedience and the establishment of a government of ‘national salvation’ to ‘restore order’. I followed what was happening with growing concern.
On the brink of crisis
Meanwhile, tensions in the country continued to increase. Rumours that the president was planning to declare a state of emergency and strip parliament of its functions proved only too correct. On 20 March, Yeltsin announced in a televised appeal to the citizens that he had signed a decree for an emergency system of government in the Russian Federation until the power struggle was resolved: ‘We cannot govern the country and manage its economy, particularly in a time of crisis, by votes, ripostes blurted into microphones, a parliamentary talking shop and endless meetings.’ The chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and the opposition saw the actions of President Boris Yeltsin as an attempted coup d’état. On behalf of the Constitutional Court, Chairman, Valeriy Zorkin declared the president’s statement and decree unconstitutional. Outside the Supreme Soviet’s headquarters, the ‘White House’, rallies of those supporting or opposed to the president alternated in the square. Society was split and there was a whiff of burning in the air.
At the request of Interfax, I expressed my opinion of Boris Yeltsin’s announcement, describing his decree on introducing presidential rule as a ‘serious political miscalculation’ that testified to the narrowness of his political power base and the extent of his suggestibility and reliance on the views of people who, as the saying goes, are ready to burn the house down in order to fry themselves an egg. The unconstitutional course of action chosen by the president, despite his promises to eschew force as a political resource, was, I said, ‘driving society towards confrontation and could upset the fragile state of peace in society and the state’.
I called on the executive and legislative branches of government to behave responsibly during this critical period of the country’s development:
It is important to allow people to decide for themselves in this situation, and the only way to do that is by holding early elections. No other way will extract the branches of government from their current confrontation, and the crisis will only be prolonged, placing all the democratic gains of recent years at risk.…
It is time for the Congress to speak. It has one last chance to disprove the popular opinion that the deputies are motivated only by an instinct to hold on to power rather than by concern for the fate of Russia. In the present inflamed situation it is vital that the government, and especially the law-enforcement agencies and regions, should not allow themselves to be drawn into a political confrontation between the institutions of government, and should preserve the country from collapse and society from conflict and confrontation.
In what happened subsequently, it seems to me today, what was crucial was less the details of the conflict or even the results of the referendum than the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Did they have the political courage to turn away from a senseless fight and settle down to building the essential institutions of democracy: a strong, responsible presidency; a parliament with extensive powers; an independent judiciary; political parties and the organizations that constitute civil society? Would they jointly find ways to implement difficult but essential economic reforms, while shielding people from their most painful consequences? That was the question.