That same day, the Constitutional Court ruled that the actions and decisions of the president relating to his decree of 21 September were not in accordance with the constitution of the Russian Federation. They were grounds for removing President B. N. Yeltsin from office or inaugurating special procedures to hold him to account in accordance with the constitution of the Russian Federation.
On 22 September, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution stating that ‘the president of the Russian Federation has instigated a coup d’état’. The same day it resolved to amend the Criminal Code with an article making actions against the constitution punishable by penalties up to and including death with confiscation of property. Yeltsin saw this as a threat aimed at him personally.
The two sides truly deserved each other! I have no doubt that, right up to the last minute before the bloody showdown on 3–4 October, there was some possibility the crisis could have been peacefully resolved. I had no leverage with the parties directly, but tried to moderate their behaviour by speaking out publicly and calling for common sense.
At a press conference in Moscow on 25 September, I stated: ‘The best way out of the situation that has developed in Russia is simultaneous early elections for the presidency and parliament, and the sooner the better.’ It was essential to return to constitutional politics, since otherwise a very dangerous precedent would be set. ‘This kind of treatment of the constitution, wiping your feet on it, is Bolshevism.’ Another important point I stressed at the press conference was that, if only one source of government power were to be left and have total control of the media, there would be no possibility of conducting free elections to the parliament.
The root of all this evil was the failure of the policy pursued by the Russian government, both the president and the parliament, since the end of 1991. ‘They are each as bad as the other, and are mired in this situation. They must go,’ I said. I advised Yeltsin to immediately return the situation to where it was before 21 September. Needless to say, all the latest resolutions of the Supreme Soviet also needed to be revoked.
I thought the stance of the leaders of the West, with their unconditional support for Yeltsin, was dangerous, and supposed they did not understand the situation. The most important thing Boris Yeltsin could do, I said, was ‘behave not like the protagonist of a particular political faction but as a national leader’. I believe that was his last chance. He did not take it.
On 29 September, Alexiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, appealed to the parties to the conflict not to resort to bloodshed. The church joined the search for a compromise solution. A majority of the members of the Supreme Soviet, meeting in a building surrounded, on the president’s orders, by a cordon of troops, were prepared to compromise. Several regional leaders and presidents of republics within the Russian Federation tried to mediate between the Supreme Soviet, the Presidential Administration and the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin. Even those in favour of the presidential decree of 21 September inclined to a compromise solution close to what I had proposed.
On the afternoon of 3 October, however, the situation in Moscow deteriorated. Groups of demonstrators, gunmen and manifest agents provocateurs, led by General Albert Makashov and Viktor Anpilov, broke through the cordon surrounding the White House, seized the Mayor’s Office on Novy Arbat and headed for the Ostankino Television Centre.
That evening, Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Moscow. Shooting broke out at the Television Centre and resulted in deaths and injuries. Dozens of people were killed, including several journalists. Unquestionably, the situation had to be brought under control, and by the morning of 4 October that had been done. I have no doubt that at that point too the crisis could have been ended without further bloodshed, but just then, at 10:00 am, tanks were brought up to the bridge in front of the White House and opened fire on the building! In effect, a brief civil war had been unleashed in the centre of Moscow, which resulted in the death, according to official statistics, of 160 people.
There were about 1,000 people in the parliament building at this time: deputies, members of staff, service personnel, journalists, women and children. The building caught fire. Tongues of flame and black smoke engulfed it window by window and storey by storey. This appalling picture was being shown live on the screens of millions of television sets in Russia and around world. CNN cameras were broadcasting live from several points in blocks adjacent to the Supreme Soviet building.
‘What infamy!’ I thought, as I watched it on television. At 14:30 people began emerging from the parliament with a white flag. Rutskoy, Khasbulatov and Makashov were arrested. Yeltsin, in a televised address, announced the suppression in Moscow of an ‘armed fascistcommunist rebellion’.
My reaction to those events, my initial assessment and conclusions are most fully set out in an interview I gave two or three days after the event to Komsomolskaya Pravda’s correspondent, Alexander Gamov:
Q: During the assault on the White House, some of our compatriots were on one side of the barricades, some on the other, and the rest were watching what was going on with curiosity and alarm. Where was Gorbachev?
A: Sitting in front of the television, but not in aloof contemplation of the unfolding tragedy. From 21 September I was closely monitoring how the situation was developing and, to the extent that my current position allows, doing my best to react to it. I presented my initial view at a press conference on 25 September, advising President Yeltsin to think things through, return to the situation as it was before 21 September and propose simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. I was told by Oleg Rumyantsev, secretary of the Congress’s Constitutional Commission, when we met later that the ‘besieged Congress’ had been prepared to rescind all its recent resolutions and reach a compromise. That was the preferred option of the Constitutional Court, of most of the regions and of several public bodies. Even people who supported the president’s actions on 21 September inclined to the same approach. The Orthodox Church also joined the negotiation process, so there was real hope that bloodshed could be avoided.
What happened on the Sunday was, I think, unexpected for many people. Before I knew what was going on at the Television Centre and the Mayor’s Office, I sent an appeal to Interfax and ITAR-TASS urging strongly that the army should not become involved. I said that, if troops were deployed in Moscow, there would be bloodshed, a war. I did not know at that moment that a state of emergency had already been declared and troops brought in. Who did? Television and radio were not functioning and nobody had any information. Afterwards, I was accused of supposedly being against measures to halt violent rioting.
Q: Mikhail Sergeyevich, on that murderous Sunday evening your reaction really did seem very peculiar.
A: Not so fast! The way it was presented made it seem that Gorbachev was practically condoning the rioters. My appeal was made during the day but only broadcast late that evening. That is the first point. And then what happened? By the following morning the situation, thank God, was back under control. The White House was sealed off by troops and armoured vehicles, people were going to work and, suddenly, in full view of the whole country, the whole world, they started shelling the parliament! I couldn’t believe it!