From the outset I saw great danger in the course the president had adopted, but nevertheless offered to act as a mediator if either of the parties to the conflict so wished. At a press conference in the Foundation on 29 November, I said:
We could land ourselves with a second Caucasian War. This is the wrong path. Political action and political contact is essential, and we need to meet with Dudaev and initiate dialogue. What we do not need is an attempt to resolve this problem by force of arms. It is a delusion to imagine that will work. Under no circumstances can we permit further casualties on both sides. That is why I am willing to act as an intermediary.
Dudaev phoned me and said he agreed that I should mediate. I have no wish to idealize Dudaev, but he said at that time: ‘We do not envisage our future without Russia. We must live together with Russia.’ He did not say exactly how, but that would have been the subject of negotiation. Here was the key to conducting a dialogue and seeking ways for us to coexist. That approach, however, proved unacceptable to Yeltsin.
On 30 November, the president signed Decree No. 2137c, ‘Disarmament of armed gangs in the Chechen Republic’, which initiated large-scale military operations by Russian federal forces. On 11 December a decree was signed on ‘restoration of constitutional legality’ in the country. Troops of the Ministry of Defence and the Interior Ministry were sent into Chechnya, and the subsequent course of events is well known.
On New Year’s Eve 1994, dozens of Russian soldiers died in the course of a failed assault on Grozny. Their bodies lay unburied in the city’s streets. On 4 January I called for the convening of an extraordinary joint session of both houses of the Federal Assembly, mandating the appearance of the president. I stated that the war in Chechnya had assumed the status of a national crisis. I called for an end to the bloodshed and the conducting of genuine negotiations, with the real players rather than inventing a puppet government in Moscow and trying to export it there, which I warned would not work. The juggernaut of war was on the move, however, and war has a logic of its own.
For what took place in Chechnya the guilt lies not with the army, the soldiers and military staff, but with the politicians and military strategists. The conduct of our soldiers began, however, to be motivated by revenge. That is understandable: when they saw their comrades being killed, when they themselves had been abandoned, when unburied corpses littered the streets, the motive of revenge developed and grew.
Exactly the same was true on the Chechen side. What are people supposed to feel who have lost their family, their father, mother, children, their home? When everything has been destroyed that had been built up over so many years? It was understandable that they too would take revenge. The longer all this continued, the harder it was to find a way out of the crisis.
The war dragged on, and in February 1996 I made a public statement proposing a plan of action for a political settlement of the conflict.
Ending the war in Chechnya is now the first priority for all Russians. The solution must be found today, or literally tomorrow. Every day of delay brings new deaths and destruction that threaten to destabilize the whole of Russia.
Anyone who says there are seven ways to solve the problem does not truthfully have a single one. Endless commissions and hair-splitting discussions are no substitute for political will on the part of Russia’s top leadership.
In order to resolve the problem, it is essential to recognize realities and face the facts. These are as follows:
• the Russian leaders’ attempt to resolve the issue by force has not succeeded;
• Dudaev’s intention of unleashing ‘jihad’ and separating Chechnya from Russia has not succeeded;
• the gamble on settling the conflict by electing new leaders of the republic headed by Doku Zavgaev has not succeeded.
The demand for unconditional withdrawal of troops from Chechnya does not promise an outcome acceptable to all. In the absence of a political settlement, this would almost inevitably result in civil war in Chechnya, with the danger that it would spill over into other regions of Russia.
The way to resolve the problem is direct dialogue between those responsible for the conflict and on whom the possibility of terminating it depends. President Yeltsin, Djohar Dudaev, Doku Zavgaev and, possibly, other Chechen leaders must meet without delay and work out the terms for a political settlement.
In my view this should include an agreement to cease hostilities immediately, a condemnation of terrorism and any forms of the use of force; also detailing of the approaches to the whole range of issues needing to be resolved, and first and foremost the status of Chechnya, taking into account both the interests of the people of the republic and the interests of Russia. Ways must be found of settling other problems, including withdrawal of troops, the holding of free elections throughout Chechnya, formulation of a programme of national restitution, and the resolution of humanitarian issues.
It is essential and possible to stop the war in Chechnya. This requires political wisdom and will on the part of the president of Russia and the leaders of Chechnya.
Only after one and a half years of futile attempts to resolve the problem by force did the Russian government announce some supposed ‘peace plan’, promising to ‘conclude peacefully in Chechnya’. The presidential election was approaching and the government finally decided to negotiate with the Chechen side. A ceasefire agreement was signed.
Military operations continued, however, only in a different form. After the presidential election, the situation of the federal forces in Chechnya continued to worsen. General Alexander Lebed, appointed secretary of the Russian Security Council by Yeltsin, was delegated to conduct new negotiations. Lebed managed to reach agreement, but at the price of effectively conceding the federal government’s defeat.
This was a defeat not for Russia, but for the Yeltsin regime. Its earlier call to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can eat’, the destruction of the Soviet Union and the shelling of parliament were all steps along a road leading to the war in Chechnya. Everything that followed was a consequence of ill-conceived, reckless policies, resorting to force, and a reluctance to recognize new realities and seek a political solution when it was possible.
In an interview, I told Moskovskiye Novosti that the events around Chechnya demonstrated the kind of regime we were dealing with in Russia: ‘I cannot call it democratic.’ The government had run out of energy in both its domestic and foreign policy and that is why it turned to authoritarianism. These events once again showed up serious flaws in the current constitution, which effectively placed the presidency beyond the control of the legislative branch and society.
Yeltsin authorized the Khasavyurt agreement, but it did not settle the conflict; rather, it was a truce which would inevitably lead to a new military confrontation.
The year 1994 is remembered in history only for a succession of decisions that pushed Russia further towards impasse and saw the Yeltsin government lose whatever authority it still commanded. Life for ordinary citizens worsened relentlessly. Suffice it to say that this was a record year for Russia in terms of ‘abnormally high mortality’ of men of working age (between sixteen and sixty). In terms of negative demographic indicators, and also in the suicide rate, Russia far surpassed all European countries.