An economy based on speculation, a corrupt government, a rampant crime wave, tens of millions of people deprived of all support: such was the economic legacy of the ‘Yeltsin Era’. On 21 August a majority of deputies in the Duma called on Yeltsin to resign voluntarily (only 32 deputies voted in support of him). Plans were afoot in the Duma to have him impeached.
The Impeachment Commission invited me to speak at its meeting on 24 August. I replied that I did not intend to be present in person, because those actively participating in it, and even some of its members, had been supporters of the State Emergency Committee or involved in disrupting the signing of the Union Treaty. I was, however, prepared to submit testimony in writing. In the meantime the Duma passed a resolution advising Yeltsin to cease exercising his authority before completion of his term. The suggestion was timely, and I concurred with it.
How to come out of the crisis?
What was the president to do? Yeltsin decided to bring back Chernomyrdin and appointed him acting prime minister.
I could not see the appointment contributing to lifting Russia out of the crisis because it did not represent any change of policy. The Duma twice rejected the proposal. Given the situation, Yeltsin was now forced to retreat and, on 10 September at Yavlinsky’s suggestion, he proposed Yevgeny Primakov for the post of prime minister. That gained parliamentary approval the following day. Yury Maslyukov, a former chairman of Gosplan, the USSR’s State Planning Agency, joined the new government along with him. At the same time, Sergey Dubinin was replaced as head of the Central Bank by Viktor Gerashchenko.
I was positively besieged with requests to comment on their appointments. These were people I knew well. ‘Yevgeny Primakov’, I stated immediately after his nomination, ‘is a man well able to form a government enjoying the confidence of the nation, a government expressing the interests of the nation rather than of 10 or 12 or 20 per cent of the population of Russia, or of some group.’ I described him as an independent person with broad horizons, with a good understanding of the situation in Russia and the world, and expressed confidence that his government would ‘go for a policy of avoiding extreme radical liberalism while also avoiding a return to the past’.
I was sure Primakov was tough enough not to succumb to pressure, to stabilize the situation and create the conditions for early elections. I saw that as the way to bring about an overall improvement of the situation.
Primakov’s government introduced fundamental changes in economic policy. It completely abandoned the practice of restricting money supply by failing to pay salaries, pensions and defaults on government contracts. The size of the backlog of debt on public sector wages was significantly reduced over the next few months. The financial situation was brought under control.
Describing the work of Primakov’s government, I stated at a Gorbachev Foundation conference in November 1998: ‘Even before the August events, we said the country was on the threshold of political change. Now we see that Primakov’s government is already something of an antidote to the present system.’ It was clear to everybody, I said, that change in Russia was inevitable. ‘No matter how long Yeltsin remains at the helm, one year or two, or whether they come up with some kind of presidency for life, that era is now over.’
The only person who did not see that was Yeltsin himself. There was suddenly a discussion of whether he had the right to run for president in 2000, when what needed to be considered was not some fantasy option of prolonging Yeltsin’s political career but of planning his departure at an early date and holding parliamentary and presidential elections as soon as possible. Yeltsin was spending a great deal of time in hospital, and if the president is not functioning, I said, the whole system will be limping along. ‘In the current situation’, I said, ‘the right thing is for Boris Yeltsin to resign.’
The growing authority of Primakov and his government gave grounds to speak of the emergence of a strong potential candidate for president. I mentioned this in an interview for Nezavisimaya Gazeta: ‘If we can manage to implement Primakov’s new approach, I think the country will move forward. And if good fortune accompanies him, he will be the best candidate for the presidency. As far as the office of prime minister is concerned, I believe the most suitable figure is Yury Luzhkov.’
Yeltsin and his entourage, however, did not trust Primakov and his cabinet. They had different ideas about continuity of power, the more so because Primakov was openly talking about his intention of taking decisive action against corruption. The Prosecutor General, Yury Skuratov, had announced that criminal proceedings were being initiated in connection with the financial default and transactions in government securities.
The closer the time came for the next elections, the more Yeltsin and his entourage mulled over what kind of government they would find it easiest to live with. Before long, television commentaries were beginning to resemble bulletins from the front: ‘Yeltsin did not shake hands with Primakov’, ‘the president did not even look in Primakov’s direction’.
In May, the question of removing Yeltsin from office was again raised in the Duma. I had ambivalent feelings about the impeachment move, which I explained in an interview for Interfax. Those initiating the procedure would find it difficult to substantiate their allegations, I warned. ‘To take one example: the question of wrecking the Union. This was a huge misfortune, but the Belovezha Accords were ratified by the Russian parliament, which was 85 per cent Communist. They all stood up and cheered as they voted to destroy the Union, so it is six of one and half a dozen of the other. The same is true of all the other charges.’
Before the impeachment vote, Yeltsin undertook a pre-emptive strike by dismissing Primakov’s government. I described the president’s decision as mistaken and said it could lead to the destruction of the new, hard-won stability. The country might be plunged into a serious constitutional crisis. The Duma was evidently reluctant to risk that, although a substantial majority of deputies voted to impeach Yeltsin on account of his actions in Chechnya. The majority was not, however, large enough for the decision to pass. The Duma then approved the president’s proposal to appoint Sergey Stepashin as the new prime minister. He said he would continue Primakov’s policies but was silent on the subject of his predecessor’s achievements. I immediately detected that the Stepashin government was temporary, a mere tactic. Yeltsin was looking for someone more suitable in terms of his own interests. Once again, the interests of Russia took second place.
Letters of support
Mr President,
I have been an active supporter and sincere admirer of yours, it seems like ever since I was born, because I am 22. I live, study and work in Nizhny Novgorod. Unfortunately we get almost no information about what you are presently doing or about your International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, but I would very much like to keep up to date with all this.
I would like to thank you sincerely for the kind of person I have grown up to be. Please do not be surprised, because it is thanks to you and the policy of Perestroika you introduced that it became possible to think freely in our society, and to analyse the past and present objectively. Thanks to you I have had something my parents never had, and I have something that, most regrettably, my current school students do not have.
In my lessons, I urge the children not to act like a bull in a china shop, to think, to deliberate. Unfortunately, today’s history books also impose ready-made judgements for the children to memorize, the only difference from the old Soviet history books being that 10 or 15 years ago they said the exact opposite. Nonetheless, there are still kids in our school who are genuinely interested in our country’s history, especially of the twentieth century. In this, as a teacher, I find your latest book, Razmyshleniia o proshlom i budushchem [Reflections on the Past and Future], extremely helpful.[1]