26. Iu. K. Begunov, '"Slovo inoe'—novonaidennoe proizvedenie russkoi publi- tsistiki XVI v. о bor'be Ivana III s zemlevladeniem tserkvi," p. 351.
30. Cited in ibid., p. 68.
31. Maksim Grek, Sochineniia prepodobnogo Maksima Greka v russkom perevode, p. 72.
36. G. V Plekhanov, Sochineniia, vol. 20, p. 144.
38. This thought first arose among the Non-Acquirers. Even the most peace-loving of them, Maxim the Greek, who was known for the fact that he taught the sovereign: "Honor not him who, contrary to justice, encourages you to quarrels and wars, but him who counsels you to love peace and quiet with neighboring peoples" (Maksim Grek, p. 102), recommended an attack on the Crimea. "It is difficult and ruinous—not to say impossible—to stand against both tormentors [i.e., the Crimea and Lithuania], the more so since there is a third wolf coming against us. This is the serpent whose nest is in Kazan'," he wrote (V. Rzhiga, "Maksim Grek как publitsist," p. 113). Hence his recommendation to attack Kazan' immediately and then to attack Crimea (ibid., p. 114).
41. Daniil (a pupil of Iosif's and his successor as abbot of Volokolamsk), who was made a metropolitan by Vasilii in 1522, proved, aside from everything else, to be the inventor of an effective political tactic, used with great success many generations later by another leader (who had also had theological training). While his opponents wrote books, made inspired speeches, and edited the canonical texts, Daniil methodically and stubbornly placed his own men in the key positions in the hierarchy. The majority in the assembly consisted of men who were personally loyal to him, and when matters came down to a vote, the Non-Acquirer leaders proved to be generals without an army. Only a month after he became a metropolitan, Daniil appointed Iosif's brother Akakii to be bishop of Tver', and then appointed Iosif's nephew Vassian Toporkov as bishop of Kolomna; later, the ordained monk Savva Slepushkin of the Volokolamsk Monastery was appointed bishop of Smolensk, and Makarii (the future metropolitan and comrade- in-arms of Ivan the Terrible) was made archbishop of Novgorod. Thus, exactly as Stalin did later, Daniil smothered the opposition in its cradle, and made it voiceless in the church assemblies.
43. M. Raev, "O knige Allena Bezansona," p. 220.
9. Nosov, Soslovno-predstavitel'nye, p. 344.
10. Ibid., pp. 365-66.
14. According to the prevailing stereotype, the cavalry of the service gentry revealed its technological backwardness only in the seventeenth century. However, this backwardness was obvious even two centuries earlier, in the time of Ivan III. For example, in 1501, when Plettenberg, the master of the Livonian Order, attacked Pskov, a huge army under the best Muscovite voevoda, Daniil Shchenia, was sent against him. Though many times superior in numbers to the small Livonian detachment, this army could not defeat it, indicating that the Muscovite military organization suffered from some organic defect which compelled it to yield before the German infantry. The army of Ivan the Terrible, which knew only how to attack in a mass, and was quite lost when its furious assault did not lead immediately to decisive success, was on the Tatar level of military action, and not only was not capable of waging a European war, but needed European modernization even to win victories over the Tatars. All this was apparent even during the Kazan' War at the beginning of the 1550s. Russian historians, without a single exception, admit the technological, tactical, and organizational backwardness of the Muscovite army during the period of the Livonian War. Thus, in terms of technology and military organization, the modernization of the army became an urgent question as early as the middle of the sixteenth century.
5. Russia Versus Europe
Livonia had regressed so thoroughly since the time of Ivan III that it
must have seemed an overripe fruit which would fall of its own accord
into the hands of the conqueror. In practical terms, it had ceased to be
a unified state, and had been transformed into an amorphous con
glomerate of commercial cities and the fiefs of bishops and knights.21'
P. Berezhkov, Plan zavoevantia Kryma, p. 68.
Lester Hutchinson, Introduction to Karl Marx's Secret Diplomatic History of the
Eighteenth Century, p. 19.
"The multilayered and divided government was extremely weak: five bishops, a
master of the order, eight commanders, and eight governors owned the land; each had
his cities, districts, staff, and customary laws," writes N. M. Karamzin (Istoriia gosudarstva
Rossiiskogo, vol. 8, p. 261).
37. Edward Keenan, "Vita: Ivan Vasil'evich, Terrible Tsar 1530-1584," p. 49.
39. R. Iu. Vipper, p. 130.
12. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Vipper, p. 31.
15. Veselovskii, pp. 36-37.
16. I. I. Smirnov, Ivan Groznyi, p. 5.
25. Ibid., pp. 167, 169.
26. Ibid., p. 170.
28. Ibid., p. 180.
31. G. N. Moiseeva, Valaamskaia beseda . . .
41. Cited in Zimin, Oprichnina . . . , p. 10.
43. Iu. Krizhanich, pp. 594, 597.
45. V. N. Tatishchev, Istoriia Rossiiskaia s drevneishikh vremen, bk. I, pt. 2, p. 544.
61. Ibid., p. 247. 62. Ibid., p. 256.
1. K. Kavelin, Sochineniia, pt. 2, p. 112.
11. G. V. Plekhanov, Sochineniia, vol. 20, pp. 87-88.
30. Solov'ev, Istoriia otnoshenii. . . , p. 597.
33. S. B. Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . , p. 336. True, in moments of repentance, the tsar ordered that the names of those of his victims who could be remembered be written down. But this was by no means always possible. Hence notations in the Sinodik of the type: "Remember, Lord, 50 [or 40 or 100] souls who perished in such-and-such
ceeded by new attacks of royal fury and, consequently, new hecatombs of nameless
victims.
34. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii. . . , bk. 3, p. 713.
38. Cited in E. V. Tarle, Padenie absoliutizma, p. 99.
45. Iu. Samarin, "O mneniiakh Sovremennika istoricheskikh i literaturnykh," p. 163.
49. Ibid., p. 412; D. S. Likhachev, "Ivan Peresvetov i ego literaturnaia sovremen- nost'," p. 35; I. I. Smirnov, p. 18. Emphasis added.
53. Ibid., p. 71.
68. V. O. Kliuchevskii, Boiarskaia duma . . . , p. 296.
69. V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (1st ed.), vol 2, pp. 192-93. Emphasis added.
71. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (1st ed.), vol. 2, p. 197.
9. Platonov's Argument With Kliuchevskii
In nothing else, perhaps, does the dualism of Russian political life appear so strikingly as in the events of the first Time of Troubles, which followed the death of the tyrant and reached its height in the national crisis of 1605-13. And in nothing else has the transfixing of Russian historiography in the hypnosis of the "myth of the state" manifested itself so vividly as in its inability to explain these events. I cannot discuss the Time of Troubles in detail here. Let us merely consider one example.