[101] Pavlov, p. 46.
[102] Cited in ibid., p. 46.
[103] Cited in Pavlov, p. 71.
[104] Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, Bk. 3, p. 122.
[105] S. M. Kashtanov, "Ogranichenie feodal'nogo immuniteta pravitel'stvom russ- kogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva," pp. 270-71.
[106] Iu. K. Begunov, "Sekuliarizatsiia v Evrope i Sobor 1503 v Rossii," p. 47.
[107] S. M. Kashtanov, Sotsial'no-politicheskaia istoria Rossii kontsa XV—pervoi poloviny XVI v., p. 257.
[108] A. A. Zimin, "O politicheskoi doktrine Iosifa Volotskogo," p. 175.
[109] Malinin, p. 128.
[110] Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, Bk. 3, p. 556.
[111] A. A. Zimin, Reformy Ivana Groznogo, p. 435.
[112] The author of the classical work on the history of Russian law, V. I. Sergeevich, holds precisely this point of view on Article 98. "In order to add new provisions to the law code," he writes, "a verdict by all the boyars is required. This is undoubtedly a limitation of the tsar's power, and a novelty; the tsar is only the chairman of the College of Boyars, and cannot issue new laws without its agreement" (Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti, vol. 2, p. 360).
[113] V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (1st ed.), vol. 3, p. 37. "Kissing the cross" was the customary old Slavic form for taking an oath in any context, whether judicial or political.
[114] Ibid., p. 44.
[115] B. N. Chicherin, О narodnom predstavitel'stve, p. 543.
[116] Until recently, the Muscovite government of the 1550s has been identified with the "Chosen Rada," a term used by Kurbskii in his History of Ivan IV: "And at that time those counselors of his were named the Chosen Rada; in truth according to their deeds they had this name, for by their counsel they produced all that was select and distinguished, that is to say true impartial justice, both for rich and for poor, such as is best in the tsardom" (p. 21). This term has become so firmly established in classical historiography that many historians have even adduced lists of the members of the "Chosen Rada," although Kurbskii mentions no names other than the Archpriest Sil'vestr, Ohol'nichii (the second rank below that of boyar at the Muscovite court) Aleksei Ada- shev, and Metropolitan Makarii. For example, V. I. Sergeevich compiled the following list: Sil'vestr, Adashev, Makarii, Prince Andrei Kurbskii (a boyar since 1556), Prince Dmitrii Kurliat'ev (a boyar since 1549), Prince Semen Rostovskii, and the three Moro- zov brothers—Mikhail (a boyar since 1549), Vladimir (an okol'nichii since 1550), and Lev (an okol'nichii since 1553). M. V Dovnar-Zapol'skii also included in the Chosen Rada Maxim the Greek (who lived out his last years in a monastery), Abbot Artemii, and Bishop Kassian—that is, all the major representatives of the fourth generation of Non- Acquirers, as well as others, to a total of sixteen (Vremia Ivana Groznogo, p. 173). S. V.
[117] By "coalition," I am referring here not so much to actual political alliances as to blocs of interest groups whose goals at the given historical stage were identical. In this sense, it is more a matter of latent, or potential, coalitions. Nevertheless, a cautious hypothesis may be appropriate here as to the correlation between the degree of actualization of the latent coalitions and the intensity of change in the autocratic system.
[118] I understand that some of my readers—particularly those who cherish a weakness for Marxism—may now be asking a puzzled question (if they have not asked it already): is it really possible that in the historical conflict between "money" and ."corvee," the boyars, which is to say the feudal lords, should suddenly turn up on the side of "money"? How can it be that they would struggle against the immunities which make up the essence of the feudal order? I would like to ask these readers in turn: how did it happen that the intellectual and political elite of the Russian serf-holding aristocracy rebelled in the mid-nineteenth century against serfdom, which was the essence of the feudal order? How could it be that this elite not only supported the Great Reform in the struggle against the mass of service landholders who were interested in retaining serfdom, but also became one of the prime political movers in this reform? Standard Marxist criticism is obviously powerless to explain this paradox. But in the case of the Great Reform of the 1860s, it is nevertheless not prepared to deny the facts. On the other hand, what basis do we have for denying the analogous—that is to say, essentially anti-feudal—position of boyardom, or at least of its intellectual and political elite, in the mid-sixteenth century? Why should what was possible in connection with one great reform not be possible in connection with another? Why should the Decembrists and the Slavophiles (most of whom, after all, were serf-owning landholders) turn up on the side of "money" and against "corvee" in the nineteenth century, and the same not be true of the leaders of boyardom in the sixteenth century?
[119] M. N. Pokrovskii, Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, bk. 1, pp. 320-21. Posad: the commercial and artisan district of a Russian town, usually situated outside the city walls.
[120] Here, for example, is how B. D. Grekov explains the enserfment of the peasants in his classical work Peasants in Rus': "As the economic dislocation of the seventies and eighties increased, the number of peasant migrations grew. . . . The mass of service people could not remain calm. The state serving the interests of these landholders also could not be silent. A radical and immediate solution of the peasant question became inevitable. The abolition of St. George's Day was carried out in the interests of this stratum, and for the purpose of strengthening their material position" (Krestiane na Rusi s drexmeishikh vremen do XVII veka, vol. 1, p. 297). True, this murky passage raises more questions than it offers answers. The fact that enserfment was neither in the interests of the peasants nor in those of the boyars to whom the peasants went when they left the service landholders is obvious. But how is it that the "progressive service landholders" suddenly turn out to be the bearers of feudal reaction? The logical implication of what Grekov says is, furthermore, that if there had not been the "economic dislocations," neither would there have been serfdom in Russia. But if the fate of Russia, or at least the fate of the peasantry in Rus', depended on these "dislocations," would it not have been fitting for an expert on the Russian peasantry to give some thought to the question of where these determining "dislocations," which changed the entire character of Russian history, originated? He did not, and neither did the Soviet historiography which he headed during the Stalinist period.