[121] Cited in R. Iu. Vipper, p. 115. 22. Ibid., p. 116.
23. H. Staden, Zapiski . . . , p. 20.
[123] Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, bk. 3, p. 657.
[124] Pokrovskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, bk. I, p. 450.
[125] Vipper, p. 69.
[126] Bakhrushin, Ivan Groznyi, p. 84.
[127] A. M. Kurbskii, History of Ivan IV, p. 126.
[128] Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo, p. 317. Emphasis added.
[129] The main objection usually set forth against the feasibility of such an "open frontier" strategy is that a hundred years after the Livonian war, in the 1670s, Muscovy made an attempt to conquer the Crimea which ended in failure. Was it then possible for the Muscovy of the sixteenth century to have succeeded? My answer is essentially given in the introductory chapter of this book. What was indeed impossible for "weak, poor, almost unknown" pre-Petrine Muscovy, in a "state of nonexistence," was quite possible for pre-Oprichnina Muscovy, then at the height of its power. I am not speaking in terms of a single military operation, as in the 1670s, but of a national, long-range anti-Tatar strategy over a period of decades, which would have required detente with Europe as well as the continuation of the Great Reform, the reformation of the church, and the modernization of the army.
[130] D. P. Makovskii, Razvitie tovarno-denezhnykh. otnoshenii . . . (2nd ed).
[131] M. D'akonov, Vlast' moskavskikh gosudarei, p. 151.
[132] G. Fletcher, Of the Russe Common Wealth, p. 34.
[133] K. D. Ravelin, Sochineniia, pt. 2, p. 112.
N. K. Mikhailovskii, "Ivan Groznyi v russkoi literature," p. 134.
S. B. Veselovskii, Issledovaniia po istorii oprichniny, p. 35.
S. F. Platonov, Ivan Groznyi, p. 5.
[134] Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossiis dreveneishikh vremen, bk. 3, p. 713.
cratic "revolution from above" at the beginning of the eighteenth century). Literally all historians of Russia, native and foreign, proceed from this stereotype. (The reader will find an excellent formulation of it, for example, in Dmitri Obolensky's "Russia's Byzantine Heritage," pp. 93-117.) In the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles turned this stereotype into their ideological banner, calling the Russian elite "home" to pre-Petrine Russia. In the 1880s, their follower Konstantin Leont'ev laid bare the real essence of this appeal—the concept of "Russian Byzantinism," but since that time it has not entered anyone's head to doubt the validity of the stereotype itself. However, the dualism of Russian political culture goes back, as I have tried to show here, to roots in the structure of early medieval Russian society which have nothing to do with either "Western- ism" or "Byzantinism" (which is not to deny important cultural influences from both sides). Two hundred years before Peter, this dichotomy was already an accomplished fact. The first decisive struggle between the two tendencies was the Oprichnina revolution of Ivan the Terrible.
24. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (2nd ed.), vol. 2, pp. 165, 166, 167.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 392.
[138] S. Herberstein, Zapiski . . . , p. 28.
[139] The well-known Soviet historian N. I. Pavlenko admits with a sigh that "about the Boyar Duma of the second half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, we know no more than was known to Kliuchevskii almost ninety years ago. The situation with regard to the study of the Assemblies of the Land is equally unsatisfactory" ("K voprosu о genezise absoliutizma v Rossii," p. 54).
[140] Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 166. Emphasis added.
[141] Ibid., p. 392. Emphasis added.
[142] Cited in Belov, p. 49.
[143] N. M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, vol. 8, p. 308.
[144] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 5.
[145] Kliuchevskii, p. 198.
[146] This word cannot be literally rendered into English. It is derived from liudi (people) and drat' (to tear, to skin), but as the text indicates, it means something more than mere cruelty or atrocities, even of the most extreme kind.
[147] M. V. Lomonosov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, p. 66.
[148] M. M. Shcherbatov, Istoriia Rossiiskaia s drevneishikh vremen, vol. 2, p. 832.
[149] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[150] Karamzin, who had begun his History during the Time of Troubles which occurred after the Oprichnina of Paul, was certainly aware of the need to prevent a new tyranny. As an adherent on principle of autocracy, he saw no better means of doing so than by threatening the potential tyrant with the "eternal curse of history" (vol. 9, p. 439).
[151] Shcherbatov, vol. 5, pt. 3, p. 222.
[152] Karamzin, vol. 9, pp. 438-39. 51. Ibid., p. 440.
Ibid., pp. 440-41,443.
A. S. Pushkin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1, p. 303.
63. Cited in Mikhailovskii, pp. 160-61.
[156] M. P. Pogodin, Sochineniia, vol. 4, p. 7.
[157] Ibid., p. 10.
[158] V G. Belinskii, Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, vol. 3, p. 644.
[159] Kavelin, pt. 1, p. 308.
[160] Ibid., pt. 2, pp. 454-55.
[161] Ibid., pt. 1, p. 333.
[162] Ibid., p. 321.
[163] S. M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, bk. 3, p. 664.
[164] B. N. Chicherin, О narodnom predstavitel'stve, pp. 524-25.
[165] P. N. Miliukov, Ocherki . . . , pp. 113-14.
[166] N. P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, Gosudarevy sluzhitye liudi . . . , p. 223.
[167] Kavelin, pt. 1, pp. 355, 362. Emphasis added.
Terrible, who routed this nobility, and Catherine II who restored it? After all, they were
working in opposite directions—from the point of view of Ravelin's criterion. They were united by another criterion of progress—also one of Ravelin's: the expansion of the might of the Russian state. The problem, however, lies in the fact that these two criteria contradict each other, which Kavelin does not even notice.
15. Kavelin, pt. 1, p. 310. 16. Ibid., p. 357. 17. Ibid., p. 361.
[171] Ibid., p. 362. 19. Ibid., p. 361. 20. Ibid., pp. 361-62.
[172] Ibid., pt. 2, p. 597.
[173] S. M. Solov'ev, Istoriia otnoshenii mezhdu russkimi kniaziami Riurikova doma, p. 597. Emphasis added.