Another aspect of the problem was, however, the need to stabilize the processes leading to the formation of a middle class—in other words, the need to create a political mechanism (which I call the absolutist state) capable, as elsewhere in Europe, of protecting these developments from the destructive influences of the hostile feudal environment. This required: (1) a change in the legislator's perception of the relative value of the soldier and the peasant or merchant—the "middle person"; (2) active legislative protection of private (nonfeu- dal) property; (3) more or less free discussion of the social and economic strategy of the country; and (4), most important of all, minimal interference by the state in the natural socioeconomic process.
This political aspect of the process involved greater difficulties under the conditions of fifteenth-century Muscovy than in most neighboring European states. The positive socioeconomic developments themselves, artificially restrained for so long under the Tatar yoke, were considerably more fragile in Russia than in other countries, and therefore badly needed the political support and nurturing of the state. The Muscovite administration, however, had not exactly had the best possible background for such a delicate job. An ancient autocratic tradition, sharpened and intensified by centuries of colonial corruption, lurked in its depths, ever ready to reassert itself.
But there also existed factors favorable to the re-Europeanization of the country, primarily Russia's geopolitical status in Europe. Parallel to the disintegration of the northern arm of the Asiatic offensive, the Golden Horde, its new southern arm, the Ottoman Empire, was swiftly gathering strength. In the second half of the fourteenth century, the Turks invaded the Balkan peninsula; in the middle of the fifteenth century, they crushed the Eastern Roman Empire; and by the beginning of the sixteenth century, they threatened the most vital centers of Central Europe. Martin Luther, for one, took the Turkish threat so seriously that he even argued the need for the Reformation on grounds that Europe might easily become the prey of the Ottomans if it did not undergo a spiritual rebirth.[10]
Luther's fears were not unjustified. The Turkish sultan was the mightiest sovereign in the contemporary world. In a letter to the king of France, Sultan Suleiman II referred to himself as the king of kings, the prince of princes, the distributor of crowns to the world, the shadow of God in both parts of the world, the ruler of Asia and Europe, the Black and White Seas. The sultan was only partly bragging. Thirty kingdoms then being subject to his rule, he could reasonably call himself "the distributor of crowns."
The rise of Turkey had altered the political geography of Europe, and from this change a new and constructive role for Russia could have evolved. Muscovy was now in the position of a valuable potential ally in any European anti-Turkish coalition. It was not Russia, but Germany, which now had to look to its security. A general rapprochement between Russia and the West might have developed—a cooperation and alliance, perhaps even convergence. In any case, it was clear that unless Muscovy suddenly collapsed or adopted an active anti-Western policy, no serious threat from that direction lay in store for it. This was an unusual relief for a country just emerging from colonial status, preoccupied with internal affairs, and still threatened from the East and South by the heirs of the Golden Horde.
At this fateful crossroads, Muscovy was presented with a truly historic choice. It could return to the family of independent nations as an ally of Europe, and attain its national purpose, the revival of Kievan Rus', in both external (Reconquista) and internal (re-Euro- peanization) dimensions. Or, by contrasting itself to Europe, it could take the place of the vanished Golden Horde.
As we now know, Russia did eventually complete its Reconquista, and ultimately transformed itself into a modern superpower. The question at issue was never whether it would be able to do this, but at what price. By Europeanizing or by de-Europeanizing? Here, at the very source of the Russian historical river, we face a gripping spectacle. For an entire century Muscovy wavered before these fateful alternatives. The choice it made led to national catastrophe—the killing of its Pushkins and Mandel'shams and the exiling of its Kurbskiis and Herzens. In the end, as Herzen put it, "Muscovy saved Russia by suffocating everything that was free in Russian life."2"
3. On the Path to Re-Europeanization
Over the course of the "century of choice" (which in this book, for reasons which will be explained later, I call the absolutist century of Russian history), a great deal was done to achieve both the Reconquista and re-Europeanization:
Reunification of the country was accomplished without civil war, far ahead of Germany and Italy, and with little blood spilt by comparison, for example, with France.
Important administrative, social, and judicial reforms put an end to feudal separatism (these will be discul$ed in chapter five).
A start was made at reforming the church earlier than in other European countries (see chapter six).
The White Sea became an avenue of international trade, and Muscovy acquired a port on the Baltic (Narva), which came to be used by European merchants in preference to Riga and Revel.
Much important western Russian territory in Lithuanian possession was reconquered.
Routing of the Kazan' and Astrakhan' Tatar hordes brought the great path of the Volga under Muscovy's control.
The crucial process of peasant differentiation was in no way impeded. Rather, the Muscovite administration actively supported the judicial defense of private (nonfeudal) property, little by little bringing into being a Russian proto-bourgeoisie in the course of the economic boom of the first half of the sixteenth century. Thus, gradually, economic limitations of power were formed.
The conditions for a broad-based debate over the future of the country were created. This developed over the course of the entire "century of choice," chiefly in connection with the prospective reform of the church. Thus, gradually, the ideological limitations of power were formed.
In creating the bureaucratic apparatus appropriate to a centralized state, and gradually limiting the archaic privileges of the hereditary aristocracy (the boyars), a mortal struggle between these two elites was nevertheless avoided. Both elites learned the art of interacting in the decision-making process. The political functioning of the traditional ("patrimonial") aristocracy, which by reason of its hereditary status was independent of the state, thus represented a strong social limitation of power.
10. Muscovy showed itself capable of instituting local self-government, a system of trial by jury, and even something reminiscent of a national parliament—the Assembly of the Land (Zemskii Sobor).
For all these reasons, it may confidently be asserted that the Kievan, or European, side of the Russian tradition was dominant throughout the "century of choice." At least until 1560 it might have seemed that, by continuing in the direction of re-Europeanization, Muscovy would once again join the European family of nations, as in the days of Kievan Rus'. The sum of gradually accumulating limitations on royal power, although not touching directly on the political sphere, nevertheless deprived this power of its unlimited character.