Of course, as soon as we discuss freedom in terms of rights rather than duties, classical liberalism slips easily into soft socialism with all kinds of ‘rights’ being claimed with little regard for the cost or even the possibility of fulfilling them. These ‘rights’, to the extent that they are even theoretically attainable, can in practice only be fulfilled if the state coerces other individuals by regulations, controls and taxes. By this point one has, in fact, moved the whole distance from liberalism to socialism. Moreover, by granting outside bodies the power to intervene on almost the whole of domestic social and economic policy, the liberal human rights approach does not so much intrude upon national sovereignty as abolish it outright.
If then advancing human rights as traditionally defined is a legitimate aim of foreign policy, what in general is the best way to achieve it? We are fortunate that in the post-Cold War world, new opportunities for freedom have opened up. As the revolution in the technology of communications, the opening of world markets and the opportunities for greater mobility of capital and people all put authoritarian rulers under greater pressure, it will be increasingly hard for them to resist pressures to liberalize their regimes. This, in fact, is why in seeking to advance democracy and human rights, high regard must be paid to the wider impact of economic freedom.
Even countries which maintain a fairly free economy — with a sound currency, limited government intervention, low taxes, private property and mobility of labour — but which for a time experience authoritarian rule, as for example did Chile under General Pinochet, find relatively few difficulties in developing political freedoms later. But, as the experience of Russia shows, without a framework of law, an understanding of the limits of government, private property and a living tradition of enterprise, it is extremely difficult in these conditions to build democratic institutions. Recognizing this, the conservative — as opposed to the liberal-left — enthusiast for human rights will not make the mistake of underrating the progress towards the goal of political freedom which the growth of market capitalism brings with it.
It is this consideration, quite apart from my concerns for the long-term future of Hong Kong, which has led me to oppose linking human rights issues in China with trade issues. We need consistently to press the Chinese to end human rights abuses and to observe civilized standards in their dealings with Tibet, the Christian churches, and dissidents if China is to enjoy the full practical benefits which a relationship of respect brings with it. But it would be counter-productive to slow down the rate of progress towards an open, free economy by seeking to cut China off from trade, investment and outside influence, since these are roads to freedom.
Having said all of which, I would note that policy in regard to human rights is a great deal more complicated in theory than it is in practice. Politicians and diplomats generally know by instinct the cases in which Western influence can be usefully exercised and how best to exercise it. I must add, however, that they sometimes need a kick from public opinion.
STRONG DEFENCE
These four principles have one thing, above all, in common: they can only be given effect by a fifth principle of strong defence. The same arguments which Ronald Reagan and I used during the 1980s still apply. Defence spending is an investment in peace because it is not armaments of themselves which cause wars: wars arise because potential aggressors believe they have sufficient military superiority to succeed in their aggression. Such investment has to go on year after year, even when threats seem vague or remote, because high-technology defence programmes only yield results over a lengthy period. And the only ‘peace dividend’ we have a right to expect from victory in the Cold War is peace itself — rather than the opportunity to spend more on welfare benefits and the dependency culture.
Admittedly, it was right that Western countries should reexamine their defence spending as a result of the dramatic changes which flowed from the fall of communist Eastern Europe, the ending of the Warsaw Pact and finally the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But I now believe that the plans for reduced spending which were announced when I was Prime Minister as Options for Change went too far; subsequent announcements have, of course, gone further still. Personally, I did not share all the optimism which characterized political discussion of defence at that time. But I did overestimate the rate of likely progress in turning the Soviet Union (or Russia) into an ‘ordinary country’, a stable liberal democracy which posed no special threat to the West.
We cannot know whether Russia will ultimately go in the direction of democracy and free enterprise. If Russia were to embark on a course of restoring the old Soviet Union as a new Russian Empire this could not happen peacefully. Nor could it leave Russian relations with the West unchanged. In any event, it would clearly be against our strategic interests if Russian power were once again to move close to the heart of Europe. Similarly, Russia’s commitment of scarce resources to any such imperial strategy would inevitably mean abandonment of the continuing tasks of economic reform and political liberalism. We could thus expect both external and internal policies to revert towards those of the old USSR. And Russia is still a formidable military power.
Already, the various crises and disarray which affected the countries of the former Soviet Union have resulted in a large outflow of advanced weaponry, which was then eagerly acquired by other rogue powers, further increasing the threats we face. Clearly, the West must maintain its defences.
Since 1989/90 it has not been possible to base our defence calculations almost exclusively on assessment of the threat from just one direction — the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. That necessarily makes the task a good deal more complicated. In such circumstances, the temptations are great for politicians to try to balance the different lobbies rather than to take a long-term strategic view of likely threats and the required response. A further difficulty has been that it is not just Britain but also the United States, France, Germany and Italy which have been cutting back. Those in a position to know now claim that even if we had the front-line equipment to intervene where required, there would be big problems in supporting and supplying it. Combined with the unsatisfactory outcomes of UN-authorized interventions, these cutbacks have given the impression of a weakness of resolve and commitment.
Another element of uncertainty has concerned the future role of NATO. As I have suggested, it was right and necessary for this to be re-assessed. In particular, the political impact of NATO as a force for stabilization and strengthening transatlantic links had to be more fully exploited and developed. This has not, however, occurred as I envisaged. In particular, partly as a result of federalist impulses in Europe and partly as a result of different approaches over Bosnia, NATO is no longer satisfactorily fulfilling the crucial task of sustaining American commitment to Europe’s defence. Indeed, NATO itself has been seriously undermined.
NATO should also have welcomed the Central European countries — Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia — into full membership, as they requested. Combined with the European Community’s slow and hesitant approach to bringing those countries in as full EC members, NATO’s decision has come as a blow to the pro-Western democratic forces in the region. Partnership for Peace, which treats a country like Poland as having the same relationship with the West as, say, a member state of the former Soviet Union like Kazakhstan, only serves to confuse the degree of commitment NATO is making. The fact that NATO has allowed Russia — or more precisely the anti-Western influences in Russia — to determine its decisions on this matter is all the more serious. It does Moscow’s democrats no good to bend in this way, because it suggests that those who threaten are more likely to be listened to than those who cooperate.