Ted spent two days talking to the French President. In view of all the past difficulties with the French, the summit was seen as a veritable triumph for him. Negotiations were completed rapidly afterwards — other than for the Common Fisheries Policy, which took years to resolve — and the terms approved by Cabinet the following month. Parliamentary approval could not be assumed, for both parties were deeply split and Labour had reversed its former support for British entry, arguing that the present terms were unacceptable. In the end, the Government decided that there would be a free vote on the Conservative side on the principle of entry. This embarrassed Labour, especially when sixty-nine Labour MPs ignored their own party whip and voted in favour, giving a majority of 112 for entry. But when it came to the terms rather than the principle of entry, the argument was far from won. The Second Reading of the European Communities Bill in February 1972 was only passed by 309 to 301, with the Liberals backing the Government and after much arm-twisting by Conservative Whips. The Bill itself was enacted in October.
The dog that barely barked at the time was the issue of sovereignty — both national and parliamentary — which as the years have gone by has assumed ever greater importance. There was some discussion of the question in Cabinet in July 1971, but only in the context of the general presentation of the case for entry in the White Paper. The resulting passages of the document — paragraphs 29—32 — can now be read in the light of events, and stand out as an extraordinary example of artful confusion to conceal fundamental issues. In particular, two sentences are masterpieces:
There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty; what is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest.
And:
The common law will remain the basis of our legal system, and our Courts will continue to operate as they do at present.
I can claim to have had no special insight into these matters at the time. It then seemed to me, as it did to my colleagues, that the arguments about sovereignty which were advanced by Enoch Powell and others were theoretical points used as rhetorical devices.
In the debate on Clause 2 of the Bill, Geoffrey Howe, as Solicitor-General, gave what appeared to be satisfactory assurances on the matter in answer to criticisms from Derek Walker-Smith, saying that ‘at the end of the day if repeal [of the European Communities Act], lock, stock and barrel, was proposed, the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament must remain intact’. Asking himself the question: ‘What will happen if there is a future Act of Parliament which inadvertently, to a greater or lesser extent, may be in conflict with Community law?’ Geoffrey said: ‘The courts would… try in accordance with the traditional approach to interpret Statute in accordance with our international obligations.’ But what if they could not be reconciled? He went on, elliptically:
One cannot do more than that to reconcile the inescapable and enduring sovereignty of Parliament at the end of the road with the proposition that we should give effect to our treaty obligations to provide for the precedence of Community law… If through inadvertence any such conflict arose, that would be a matter for consideration by the Government and Parliament of the day…[26]
The decision of the European Court that the Merchant Shipping Act, 1988, is in contravention of the Treaty of Rome has made it impossible to put off consideration of these matters any longer.[27]
It was not, however, this question which was to make the Common Market such a difficult issue for the Government. The main political error was to overplay the advantages due to come from membership. As regards the Government itself, this tendency led ministers to adopt and excuse unsound policies. In order to ‘equip’ British industry to meet the challenges of Europe, subsidies and intervention were said to be necessary — reasoning which was endorsed in the 1972 Budget speech. Still worse, loose monetary and fiscal policies were justified on the grounds that high levels of economic growth — of the order of 5 per cent or so — were now sustainable within the new European market of some 300 million people. It was also suggested that competition from Europe would compel the trade unions to act more responsibly. As regards the general public, expectations of the benefits of membership rose — and then were sharply dashed as economic conditions deteriorated and industrial disruption worsened. Yet the White Paper had promised that ‘membership of the enlarged Community will lead to much improved efficiency and productivity in British industry, with a higher rate of investment and a faster growth of real wages’.
The success of the negotiations for British entry and their ratification by Parliament also seemed to have a psychological effect on Ted Heath. His enthusiasm for Europe had already developed into a passion. As the years went by it was to become an obsession — one increasingly shared by the great and the good. The argument became less and less about what was best for Britain and more and more about the importance of being good Europeans.
There was a mood of euphoria in the Establishment. It reached a peak with the ‘Fanfare for Europe’ celebrations of January 1973, held to mark Britain’s accession to the Common Market. After a gala performance by British and international figures at the Royal Opera House, where among many other performances our former next-door neighbour Sybil Thorndike recited Browning, Denis and I were among hundreds invited to a State Banquet at Lancaster House. I could not help but be reminded of two madrigals sung at one of Ted’s Downing Street dinners a couple of years before: ‘All creatures are merry, merry-minded’ and, more particularly, ‘Late is my rash accounting’.
The other issue which alienated many Conservative supporters, particularly in the West Midlands, was immigration. As I have suggested, Ted’s and the Government’s line on this was in fact extremely firm. Our Immigration Bill which received its Second Reading in March 1971 proposed a single system of control for Commonwealth citizens and aliens, while giving free entry to ‘patrials’, that is those with a right of abode.[28] Admittedly, the pledge on grants for voluntary repatriation was effectively shelved. But then it is doubtful whether any such system would have had much impact on net immigration.
The trouble arose when in August 1972 President Idi Amin of Uganda announced the mass expulsion of Asians who had prudently held on to their British passports following independence. In September a full Cabinet was devoted to the Ugandan Asian question. In the back of our minds was the possibility that Asian UK passport holders might also now be expelled from Kenya and Tanzania. My first thoughts when I arrived at Cabinet were that we should hold fast to our manifesto commitment that there should be ‘no further large-scale immigration’. But Ted opened by saying that there was no question of our refusing to admit the expelled British passport holders. The Attorney-General, Peter Rawlinson, explained that we were under an obligation in international law to accept them — regardless of domestic immigration laws. After this there could not be much argument. Later I came to feel that the decision was right on other grounds. There was just no way of evading the humanitarian duty we had — a duty that no one else would accept. I found the Asians who came to my constituency admirable, hard-working people. And this measure really did turn out to be an exception to the rule of strict immigration control, rather than the first step towards its abandonment.
My instincts, however, had accurately reflected Party feeling. There was deep disquiet about the decision. Enoch Powell spoke strongly against it at that year’s Party Conference. In late November the Government was defeated as a result of a large backbench revolt on new immigration rules. Ted himself had been shaken and was convinced that public opinion would not tolerate a repetition. He set up a small group of ministers to consider legislation to prevent another influx, but when it reported back in December — favouring not a Bill but a ‘declaration’ that Britain would not necessarily accept future expellees in large numbers but would consult internationally — Cabinet was divided and the idea fell. It was one of the few occasions on which the Prime Minister did not get his way.
28
Patrials were those citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies whose parents or grandparents were born in the UK; citizens of the UK and Colonies who had been settled here for five years; any Commonwealth citizen who had a father or mother or grandparent born in the UK.