To summarize, one might argue that the parallel coexistence of the informal institutional core and new norms, rules, and mechanisms of governance may be instrumental in policy reforms in certain areas but cannot resolve their fundamental contradictions. The politico-economic order of bad governance imposes high barriers to implementing the agenda of policy reforms. Neither the borrowing nor cultivation of institutions as such can increase the chances of their success. Rather, these plans may be sacrificed for the sake of the regime’s survival, and at a certain point may be launched again, thus contributing to a vicious circle of elusive chances for successful socioeconomic advancements. The experience of the politico-economic order of bad governance in the Third World93 demonstrates that such a circle’s pernicious influence cannot be easily constrained by new norms, rules, and mechanisms of governance; it can reproduce itself under various conditions.
International Influence:
The
Limits
of
Imperialism?
The influence of international factors on domestic changes in post-Soviet Eurasia is often discussed in terms of Western-led democracy promotion, specifically regarding regime cycles and color revolutions (or lack thereof),94 while in Russia this influence after the Soviet collapse has always been modest, to put it mildly. But to what extent does international influence affect the quality of governance rather than regime dynamics in Russia and beyond? The answer to this question is far from obvious, and not only because post-Soviet rulers perceive foreign influence in any domestic arena as a threat to their dominance and tend to resist it in various ways.
Following Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, one can distinguish between international linkages and leverages: the former mechanisms connect a country with an increasingly globalized world in terms of communications, technologies, and knowledge, while the latter mechanisms emerge from attempts by international actors to affect domestic developments.95 As they rightly argue, the combination of relatively high linkages and low leverages (typical for Russia and some countries of post-Soviet Eurasia) provides only weak incentives for democratization. The same is true for governance, especially given the fact that international actors in the region and beyond pursue diverse goals and take different kinds of actions, while their potential for positive influence on the governments of other countries is rather limited.
In the most general sense, international leverages may help overcome bad governance only if and when they work complementarily to domestic efforts on this front rather than being a substitute for them. If ruling groups are unwilling to combat bad governance domestically, then any aid or assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and so forth, will have little impact. Moreover, the governments of the recipient countries often manipulate their donors, thus aggravating principal-agent problems, while the donors have limited opportunities to improve the situation. Without the domestic will to improve the quality of governance, international influence can result in partial changes in certain policy areas at best or even legitimize the preservation of the status quo of bad governance. In this respect, assessments of Russia’s cooperation with the IMF in the 1990s are to be treated rather critically, to say the least.96 The typical practices of postponement of policy decisions, partial and selective implementation of policy recommendations, Potemkin-style showcase advancement of best practices at the expense of donors, and unfulfilled (and often unrealistic) promises result from a lack of genuine interest on the part of the recipient governments in combating bad governance and from a lack of enforcement mechanisms on the donor side. From this perspective, Russia in the 1990s looks no better than its African counterparts.97 Moreover, the efforts of international donors in the region have often been counterproductive,98 and if linkages are curtailed when countries become internationally isolated, or even isolate themselves (like Russia after 2014), the odds of improvements in quality of governance are severely diminished. Conversely, these developments fuel the domestic legitimation of bad governance under the slogan of “protection of national interests,” while international legitimation loses any relevance at all; internationally isolated or self-isolated rulers realize that they have nothing to lose outside their respective countries.
International linkages may be regarded as a double-edged sword in terms of bad governance because of the rise of the offshore economy, the outsourcing of many important functions (such as legal resolution of commercial disputes) to foreign jurisdictions, and plenty of exit options for post-Soviet elites who aim to legalize their status and wealth in the West,99 thus hedging domestic risks. However, one should not underestimate or completely deny the positive effects of international linkages on the quality of governance. Both the practical needs of adjustment to international standards and the international diffusion of policy ideas and best practices may contribute to driving countries toward good governance in certain sectors and policy areas despite the intentions of their rulers. Juliet Johnson argued in her perceptive analysis of the rise of post-Communist central banks that the engagement of the emerging community of top banking officials in international networks played an important role in building the institutional independence of central banks and the prudency of their policies.100 Similar effects of internationally driven steps forward can be found in other areas, ranging from major improvements in national statistics systems101 to tax reforms,102 and attempts to advance Russia’s universities to the top of global rankings (described in chapter 6). These signs of progress are similar to the pockets of efficiency that have been promoted internationally where domestic actors have not prevented their formation (or sometimes have even supported them).
In terms of overcoming bad governance, the only winning combination involves both the domestic political will to implement structural reforms and institutional and policy changes and strong international linkages and leverages. These two conditions are complementary rather than substitutive, as international pressure alone (without domestic drivers) may have only temporary and shallow effects. The EU’s employment of conditionality with respect to East European countries and commitment by East Europeans vis-à-vis their West European partners may serve as the main positive, if short-lived, example of that kind. The large-scale revision of domestic legislation and law enforcement practices in Eastern Europe was important not only from the viewpoint of regulatory quality in certain policy areas and of the effectiveness of governments. In essence, these conditions implied international constraints on domestic sovereignty and a certain (though limited) possibility of enforcement of EU rules and regulations regarding East European governments. Leverages became reasonably effective mechanisms for constraining bad governance: if following the rules of the game imposed by Brussels did not greatly improve the quality of governance in Romania or Bulgaria, these rules at least created barriers to its major deterioration. Without EU accession, these and some other countries would probably be governed no better than their counterparts in post-Soviet Eurasia.103