The administrative reform aimed at the debureaucratization of the Russian economy and the stimulation of business development coincided with a “statist turn” in Russian economic policy. Since 2004, the promotion of private businesses as major drivers of Russian economy has been replaced by building major state conglomerates in key sectors, ranging from Rosneft and Gazprom70 to Russian Railways (briefly described in chapter 2). These changes provide contradictory incentives to administrative reform: although state agencies abandoned some of their redundant functions, they also increased their encroachment into the economy by toughening governmental regulations and increasing the regulatory burden on businesses and the noncommercial sector. Thus, a set of measures—for instance, the division of labor between the ministries responsible for policy development and decision-making, the federal services in charge of implementing these decisions, and the federal agencies that provide public services and manage federal property—would lead to an increase in the number of state officials, but it could not improve the quality of governance, instead leading to a major decline. Figures 1 through 4 clearly illustrate such a tendency: in the second half of the 2000s, World Bank’s indicators for the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality in Russia demonstrated a major deterioration. When the shift to the “predatory state” model of state-business relations occurred in Russia during this period,71 the administrative reform was no longer needed.
One important obstacle to the success of the administrative reform was its long implementation period. Putin had lost interest in this policy area by 2005. Those experts who had initiated the reform were replaced in the Commission for Administrative Reform by the other group of state officials. Finally, the substance of the reform itself was reduced to interminable preparation of new administrative regulations and to making new arrangements for state agencies’ online services. At the same time, transparency and debureaucratization of decision-making itself were no longer considered important features of public administration and civil service.
In conclusion, the failure of the administrative reform resulted from the following factors:
the lack of drivers of reform, that is leaders who would have enough will and power to implement key decisions despite resistance from major interest groups;
dispersed responsibility among state officials and the lack of a politically and administratively strong team who would coordinate the actions of various governmental agencies, which led to inefficiency of reform implementation; and
protracted policy changes and the lack of short-term achievements, which decreased presidential interest in this sphere of reform.
As a result, the administrative reform’s goals were not achieved, and the quality of state governance and public administration went from bad to worse.
Why Are Reforms (Im)possible?: Social Benefits, Police, Military, and Beyond
The logic behind Russian policy reforms analyzed above is summarized in table 4. Although the cases outlined above obviously do not cover the entire scope of policy reforms implemented by the Russian government within the framework of authoritarian modernization, one can trace the influence of the same factors on policy changes in other areas.
The reform of social benefits implemented in 2004–2005 was not a major priority for the government but was considered a by-product of the redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the federal government and the regions. It ultimately failed due to errors in the budgeting process72 and inefficient coordination of government agencies at the federal and regional levels.73 The amount of funds necessary to effectively implement reform proposals was not provided, and the federal authorities put the burden of conducting the reform onto the shoulders of regional governments without designating budgetary transfers that could cover extra costs. This reform contributed to public discontent and to protest rallies in several cities and led to the declining electoral performance of United Russia at the regional elections in spring 2005.74 As a result, the federal government had to cover significant expenditures, which were much higher than was initially planned. It is no wonder that after this failure, the president and the government argued against implementing any new reforms, including policy changes in other areas: further reforms were shelved, and the very term “reforms” became a taboo in the discourse of state officials.75 Political and institutional factors affected the outcome of this reform, alongside technical ones. Although the insulation of the government from interest groups often makes it possible to initiate certain policy changes, it can also aggravate the risk of major policy failures due to inefficient institutional design and/or poor quality of policy implementation.
Table 4. Features and Outcomes of Policy Reforms in Russia in the 2000s
Feature
Tax Reform
Educational Reform
Administrative Reform
strategic priority of reform for the political leadership
high
relatively low
initially high, but later low
key agents of the reform
ministers of finance and economic development and their teams
officials in the Ministry of Education
numerous officials in the government and the presidential administration
concentration of agents of the reform during policy adoption and implementation
high
low
low
resistance from interest groups
strong (in some areas), but not coordinated
strong (in all areas), but not coordinated
strong (in all areas)
insulation of reformers from opponents’ influence
high (due to presidential support)
limited in some areas; self-insulation in the case of the Unified State Exam experiment
none – the reform was implemented by the major interest groups (the officials) themselves
process of adoption and implementation of policy changes
single-stage; major decisions were adopted and implemented quickly
multi-stage; major decisions were adopted quickly but implemented over many years
multi-stage; major decisions were made and implemented over many years
outcomes of the reform
rapid and positive effects that legitimized reforms
non-immediate and ambiguous effects
insignificant effects
impact of the reform
reduction of the tax burden, stimulation of economic growth, increase of fiscal revenues to the state budget
standardizing a system of evaluation of school graduates (despite numerous defects)
increasing number of officials and rise in their salaries
overall assessment of the reform
(incomplete) success
Unified State Exam - success, GIFO - failure
failure
An even more vivid example of unsuccessful policy change was the police reform initiated under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, as convincingly analyzed by Brian Taylor.76 Even though the development of the rule of law and the creation of efficient law enforcement agencies were declared by Medvedev to be his main priorities, the launch of the police reform in 2009 did not bring about any significant effects. This failure was caused, on the one hand, by resistance from influential siloviki in the presidential administration and in the government, and on the other hand by Medvedev’s inability to build a successful pro-reform coalition among non-siloviki officials. The development and implementation of the police reform (including the reduction in the number of law enforcers, personnel changes, and a structural reorganization of agencies) were performed by Ministry of the Interior officials who were the least interested actors when it came to genuine change. Public discussion initiated by the president and his supporters was nominal; alternative proposals were not discussed at all. As a result, the only visible effect of the reform was the change of the title militsiya to politsiya (police). The numerous reshufflings among the midlevel officials were insignificant, and soon after its start, the reform came to a halt.