These flaws and limitations of the technocratic model are universal and not related to particular countries or historical periods. However, under the conditions of the politico-economic order of bad governance they are aggravated over time.21 These factors are inescapable and push political leaders, even if they opt for policy reforms, to concentrate their efforts on a narrow front of top-priority reform projects at best and pay less attention to policy changes in other areas. In the worst cases, they are tempted to revise their priorities and to sacrifice reforms to the benefit of the coalition of bureaucrats and rent-seekers. In addition, the dependence of political leaders in Russia on “regime cycles”22 places priority on those policy changes that may bring relatively quick positive outcomes, while long-term development plans often remain on paper. Due to these factors, even if technocratic reformers enjoy full support from political leaders and overcome resistance from rent-seekers, they are limited in the time and scope of their plans and are often convinced that their cause is hopeless from the very beginning. Policy programs are often subject to self-censorship even at the planning stage, while implementing some reforms becomes filled with bureaucratic tricks, unworkable administrative compromises, and the rejection of key elements.23
How does the technocratic model of policy reform in autocracies really work in general and in Russia in particular? Why does it survive regime changes, only adjusting to changing circumstances, and what is its impact on the quality of governance in Russia and elsewhere? Why do technocratic policy reforms bring success in some cases but result in failure in others? How sustainable is the technocratic model and to what extent do political models present acceptable and realistic alternatives? Some of these issues are explored and highlighted in this chapter.
The Origins and Substance
of
Post-Soviet Technocracy
In May 1992, two major post-Communist policy reformers—Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus and Russian first deputy prime minister Yegor Gaidar—met in a beerhouse in Prague. According to Gaidar, their discussions about economic policy soon evolved into a heated debate on the politics of transition.24 Klaus suggested that Gaidar and his team should not limit themselves to policy recommendations but become independent political actors who had to build their political bases of support, compete for political power, establish political parties, and participate in elections. Otherwise, Klaus warned, policy reforms in Russia could be reversed and lead to undesired outcomes. Gaidar, however, was skeptical of Klaus’s recommendations and followed them only partially and inconsistently. Overall, Gaidar and the other Russian policy reformers of the 1990s served as viziers who acted under Yeltsin’s patronage and (with certain exceptions) did not attempt to play an independent role in politics. Similar tendencies were observed in the 2000s, when technocratic reformers were at the forefront of policy-making in Russia but accepted the Kremlin-imposed formal and informal rules of the game in politics as given facts rather than objecting to these conditions.25 In the 2010s and later on, technocratic reformers in Russia continued to serve as viziers, despite the dramatic shrinking of their room for maneuver in terms of policy-making. Yet many analyses of policy reforms in Russia and beyond disregard the impact of politics as a key factor in the success and failure of policy changes or attribute secondary importance to this factor.26
Of course, it would be unfair to explain the greater success of the economic reforms in the Czech Republic compared to Russia’s policy troubles in the 1990s only through the relationship between policy and politics in both countries: their initial conditions and structural problems were also very different.27 Moreover, Russia in the 1990s was heavily polarized in terms of politics and also experienced numerous intraelite conflicts against the background of a weakening state after the Soviet collapse. These developments left little room for conducting consistent policies, several reforms were compromised, and the decision-making process was chaotic.28 Even if Russian policy reformers in the 1990s had not restricted themselves to the role of viziers but attempted to themselves set the political agenda, their efforts might have been even less successful in terms of policy outcomes. At best, Russia would have followed a path of “polarized democracy” similar to Bulgaria’s where policy was inconsistent and inefficient amid several changes of government.29 At worst, a defeat of the reformers in the political arena could have aggravated the negative consequences of bad policies similar to those conducted by the Soviet leadership before the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus making the situation in Russia even more chaotic. The technocratic reformers’ strategic choice of the role of viziers most probably was the second-best solution. It brought certain short-term benefits for policy changes in the 1990s and 2000s. However, over time, this choice resulted in an increase in social costs for Russia in terms of both politics and policy-making.
What caused the turn of policy-making toward technocracy in post-Soviet Russia instead of choosing a political model? The post-Soviet technocratic reformers in Russia were pragmatic and skeptical of democratic procedures.30 Their skepticism was fueled by the experience of Gorbachev’s perestroika when politics deeply affected policy-making after major liberalization of the Soviet system. Instead of the emergence of a political model of policy-making, these developments greatly contributed to the economic crisis and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet state.31 Among the reformers themselves, democratization was perceived as a source of risks stemming from populist policies and as an obstacle to market reforms, while the insulation of government from public opinion and the patronage of a strong leader were considered preconditions for effective policy changes.32 Due to the major economic crisis and chaotic breakup of the Soviet Union, opportunities to adopt a political model of policy-making were missed. In 1991, the Russian Parliament delegated extraordinary powers to Boris Yeltsin, who established unilateral control over government formation and policy-making, and this decision was enthusiastically approved at that time by Russia’s political elite and by public opinion. This move paved the way for further institutionalization of the technocratic model, and the 1993 conflict between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament, when the latter lost in a zero-sum manner,33 eliminated opportunities for possible revision of this model.
The technocratic model of policy-making in Russia faced numerous problems related to the notorious inefficiency of the state apparatus and the policy influence of interest groups. The technocratic model presupposes that politics, with its formal actors and institutions, which may affect policy-making (namely voters, parties, and legislatures), should be banished from the policy arena. Yet politics also affects policy-making due to the rise of informal actors—oligarchs, cronies, friends, and followers of political leaders whose policy influence is often much greater than that of formal actors. In the 1990s, the influence of interest groups on policy-making was a side effect of the major decline of state capacity in Russia, growing pains so to speak, of the construction of new states and economies. However, in the 2000s and especially in the 2010s, this process became an indispensable part of bad governance and growing pains transformed into a chronic disease. The increasingly rent-seeking way Russia was governed discouraged policy reforms and reduced them to optional items on the policy agenda. Finally, by the 2020s, policy reforms were excluded from the menu of options altogether, although technocrats still play a major role in fool-proofing, preventing Russia’s turn to further decay and degradation in terms of the quality of governance.