9. For an account from the perspective of political theory, see Quentin Skinner, “Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The Artist as Political Philosopher,” Proceedings of the British Academy 72 (1986): 1–56.
10. See The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, https://qog.pol.gu.se/, accessed September 7, 2021.
11. For detailed consideration of the meaning of these frescoes, see Quentin Skinner, “Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s Buon Governo Frescoes: Two Old Questions, Two New Answers,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 62 (1999): 1–28.
12. Among numerous accounts of Russia’s post-Communist transformations, see Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reforms Succeeded and Democracy Failed (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007); Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), especially chapter 3.
13. For analyses of the problems with the rule of law in post-Communist Russia, see, in particular, Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Jordan Gans-Morse, Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia: Violence, Corruption, and the Demand for Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Kathryn Hendley, Everyday Law in Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017); Maria Popova, “Putin-Style ‘Rule of Law’ and the Prospects for Change,” Daedalus 146, no. 2 (2017): 64–75; Taylor, The Code of Putinism, especially chapter 5.
14. Among the voluminous literature on the subject, see, in particular, Bo Rothstein, Jan Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance 21, no. 2 (2008): 165–190; Bert A. Rockman, Sung Deuk Hamn, “The Notion of Good and Bad Governance in Comparative Perspective,” Korean Journal of Policy Studies 26, no. 2 (2011): 1–16; Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science, eds. Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
15. See David Buchan, “Soviet Export of Technologies,” Financial Times, September 14, 1984.
16. For an important and insightful analysis, see Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance, eds. Alexander Cooley, Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), especially chapters 1 and 7.
17. For the classical notion of the use of “deviant case analyses” for theory-building in comparative politics, see Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–693.
18. Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?” Governance 26, no. 3 (2013): 350.
19. See Mark Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science.
20. For a comprehensive overview, see The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. David Levi-Faur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
21. See Worldwide Governance Indicators; Jan Teorell, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli, The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version January 2021 (Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2021), https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/standard-dataset, accessed September 7, 2021.
22. See Bo Rothstein, “Good Governance,” in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. David Levi-Faur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 143–154.
23. For definitions and criteria of measurement, see Worldwide Governance Indicators.
24. See Elites, Institutions, and the Quality of Government, eds. Carl Dahlström, Lena Wängnerud (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente, Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
25. According to Guillermo O’Donnell, these principles are: “1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2. Laws should be relatively stable; 3. The making of particular laws . . . must be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules; 4. The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 5. The principles of natural justice must be observed (i.e., open and fair hearing and absence of bias); 6. The courts should have review powers . . . to ensure conformity to the rule of law; 7. The courts should be easily accessible; 8. The discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.” See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion,” in The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America, eds. Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 317.
26. See Russian Modernization: A New Paradigm, eds. Markku Kivinen, Brendan Humphreys (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), especially chapters 1 and 7.