100. See Yakov Pappe and Yana Galukhina, Rossiiskii krupnyi biznes: pervye 15 let, Ekonomicheskie khroniki 1993–2008 (Moscow: State University—Higher School of Economics, 2009); Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).
101. See Vladimir Gel’man, “Leviathan’s Return? The Policy of Recentralization in Contemporary Russia,” in Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, eds. Cameron Ross, Adrian Campbell (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–24; Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev,” Publius 40, no. 4 (2010): 672–696.
102. See Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurship, chapter 6.
103. See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3–37.
104. On post-revolutionary stabilization, see Arthur Stinchcombe, “Ending Revolutions and Building New Governments,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 49–73.
105. For a detailed account of economic changes in Russia, see The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy, eds. Michael Alexeev, Shlomo Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
106. See Aleksashenko, Putin’s Counterrevolution, chapter 1.
107. See also Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
108. For some descriptions, see Aleksashenko, Putin’s Counterrevolution, especially chapter 6; Åslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism, chapter 2.
109. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 86.
110. For comparative analyses of Russia’s subnational politics, see Ora John Reuter, Graeme B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (2012): 1023–1037; Noah Buckley, Ora John Reuter, “Performance Incentives under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia’s Regions,” Comparative Politics 51, no. 2 (2019): 239–266.
111. For a comprehensive account, see Zastoi-2: Posledstviya, riski i al’ternativy dlya rossiiskoi ekonomiki, ed. Kirill Rogov (Moscow: Liberal’naya missiya, 2021).
112. See Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia, chapter 5.
Chapter 2
1. See Alexei Navalny, “Khroniki genotsida russkikh,” navalny.com, December 24, 2014, https://navalny.com/p/4036/, accessed September 7, 2021.
2. For various accounts of reforms in the railway sector in Russia since the 2000s, see Russell Pittman, “Blame the Switchman? Russian Railways Restructuring after Ten Years,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy, eds. Michael Alexeev, Shlomo Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 490–513; Konstantin Gaaze, “Reformy po krugu: president vernul elektrichki, kotorye sam otmenil,” Forbes.ru, February 5, 2015, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/vertikal/279533-reformy-po-krugu-prezident-vernul-elektrichki-kotorye-sam-otmenil, accessed April, 18, 2020; Farid Khusainov, Zheleznye dorogi i rynok (Moscow, Nauka, 2015), 64–117. For a critical assessment, see Alexei Navalny, “Problema elektrichek, likbez ot FBK,” navalny.com, February 5, 2015, https://navalny.com/p/4107/, accessed September 7, 2021.
3. The regional budgets bear responsibility for implementing Vladimir Putin’s May 2012 decrees that called on regional authorities to achieve a major rise in public sector employees’ salaries without an increase in budgetary revenues, so many other expenditures (including subsidizing commuter trains) were inevitably cut.
4. See Navalny, “Problema elektrichek.”
5. I am indebted to Farid Khusainov for clarifications of these issues.
6. See Pittman, “Blame the Switchman?”
7. See Nikolay Petrov, “Nomenklatura and the Elite,” Russia in 2020: Scenarios for the Future, eds. Maria Lipman, Nikolay Petrov (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 499–530.
8. See Yakunin’s personal web page on the official site of the Faculty of Political Science at the Moscow State University, http://polit.msu.ru/teachers/yakunin/, accessed September 7, 2021. Yakunin’s major 470-page coauthored monograph, which portrayed vicious attacks by the West on the Russian statehood and called for Russian counterattacks, may be regarded as a prime example of a conspiracy theory. See Vladimir Yakunin, Vardan Bagdasaryan, Stepan Sulakshin, Novye tekhnologii bor’by s rossiiskoi gosudarsnennost’yu, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Nauchnyi ekspert, 2013).
9. See 22 Ideas to Fix the World: Conversations with the World’s Foremost Thinkers, eds. Piotr Dutkiewicz, Richard Sakwa (New York: New York University Press, 2013), chapter 9.
10. See Navalny, “Problema elektrichek.”
11. See Brian Taylor, The Code of Putinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chapter 5. For a general account of state-business relations in Russia, see Andrei Yakovlev, “The Evolution of Business-State Interaction in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 7 (2006): 1033–1056; Andrei Yakovlev, “State-Business Relations in Russia after 2011: ‘New Deal’ or Imitation of Changes?” in The Challenge for Russia’s Politicized Economic System, ed. Susanne Oxenstierna (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2015), 59–76.
12. See Mikhail Bushuev, “Zachem byvshii glava RZhD Yakunin poluchil nemetskuyu rabochuyu vizu,” dw.com, August 21, 2018, https://www.dw.com/ru/зачем-бывший-глава-ржд-якунин-получил-немецкую-рабочую-визу/a-45157830, accessed September 7, 2021.
13. See Farid Khusainov, “Negromkii yubilei. Programme strukturnoi reformy na zheleznodorozhnom transporte—20 let,” vgudok.com, May 20, 2021, https://vgudok.com/lenta/negromkiy-yubiley-programme-strukturnoy-reformy-na-zheleznodorozhnom-transporte-20-let, accessed September 7, 2021.